The modern republic of Egypt lives very much in the shadows of its remarkable past. The capital city Cairo spreads westward from the banks of the Nile River to the edge of the Giza Plateau, where stand the three Great Pyramids and the Sphinx. These ancient monuments seem to loom especially large as the sun sets over the western desert, reminders to citizen and visitor alike of Egypt’s ancient glory. Egypt’s grand span of history marched on after the end of the Pharonic dynasties, and Cairo grew to replace the ancient cities of Memphis and Thebes. Cairo’s skyline is studded with minarets of every style, some stretching hundreds of feet into the haze. They represent the great periods of Islamic Cairo: the Abbasid, the Fatimid, the Mamluk, and the Ottoman. The grandeur of al-Azhar University, the Mosque of Kait Bey, the citadel of Muhammad Ali, the Mosque of Ibn Tulun, and the al-Husseini Mosque loom above the buildings around them, their Islamic styles inspiring the gothic architecture of Europe.

Below these spires, Cairo grew and decayed over the centuries. Today its citizens could only remember what it had once been. Nevertheless, everything from the grand mosques to the ornately carved niches in ancient walls serves to remind. While few modern Egyptians expect Cairo to return to the glorious days of the past, they take much pride just in knowing that Cairo was once one of the greatest cities in the world.

Egypt is at once a part of the Middle East, the Islamic World, and North Africa, though in many ways it also stands apart from those around them. Its passion for culture, including its vibrant film industry, its music, its intellectual fervor, and its encouragement of individual achievement have made it home to some of the world’s greatest artists and thinkers. As Edward Said put it, "Most Eastern Arabs, I believe, would concede impressionistically that the dour Syrians and Jordanians, the quick-witted Lebanese, the rough-hewn Gulf Arabs, the ever-so-serious Iraqis never have stood a chance next to the entertainers, clowns, singers and dancers that Egypt and its people have provided on so vast a scale for the past several centuries. Even the most damaging political accusations against Egypt's governments by Palestinians or Iraqis are leveled grudgingly, always with a trace of how likeable and charming Egypt -- specially its clipped, lilting dialect -- as a whole is." There is tremendous pride in some of these artists today; Umm Kulthum, one of the worlds greatest singers, Tahia Cariocha, famous dancer and actress (In whose memorial Edward Said made the comments above about his fellow Arabs), and Hassan Fathy, whose architectural innovations have been copied around the world.

Culture, though, is just one of the things that sets Egypt apart from other Arab countries. Almost all school children know its history, and it draws on that history for a sense of modern identity and influence. Its mythology was the foundation of much for the religious and philosophical thought that follows; and its achievements in science, language, engineering, and agriculture gave it unparalleled status as an ancient culture whose meaning continues on even now. Despite a dearth of natural resources, Egypt is a critical political actor in the Middle East, and Cairo is now a mandatory stop for diplomats, soldiers, and state leaders desiring to impact the Middle East.

Egypt is about the size of New Mexico, a vast rocky and sandy expanse of desert broken only by the green ribbon of life along the Nile River. The Nile is the reason for life in Egypt, and almost 95 percent of its population live on the 5 percent of the land next to that great river. This chapter briefly covers Egyptian history, and then examines the Egyptian political, economic, and foreign policy systems.

The Political Foundations of Egypt. Few countries can boast of as grand a history as Egypt. It is almost impossible to tell when the first humans arrived in what is now Egypt, but they did not have far to travel from what is believed to be the origins of the species in east Africa. They simply had to follow the Nile River north, and many thousands of years ago they migrated up the river until they reached the Mediterranean Sea. As they organized from villages into permanent cities, they formed a ruling structure over both parts of Egypt, Lower Egypt (the northern part) and Upper Egypt (the southern part).

Those unfamiliar with the length of Egypt’s history might associate the Great Pyramids and Rameses II (the Pharaoh who reportedly ruled Egypt at the time of Moses). But visitors to the second pyramid of Kephren may notice on a nearby wall a cartouch dating a visit from Rameses II to the site—over a thousand years after it was built. Yet another thousand years remained between Rameses II and the birth of Christ. During this time, the ancient Egyptians built a civilization along the Nile River and beyond that ranks as one of the greatest in human history. They developed large cities, techniques of precise measurement, astronomy, engineering, seafaring, music, warfare, medicine, theology, and even the culinary arts. The Egyptian Empire at its greatest reach extended south into sub-Saharan Africa, west into modern Libya, and east into the Fertile Crescent.

The British, reacting to widespread anti-British violence in Egypt, ended its Egyptian protectorate in 1922. That did not end British influence in Egypt, though; Britain secured through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1923 the right to maintain British troops in the country to guarantee Egyptian defense, and to police the Suez Canal, which Britain continued to operate.

Egyptian Nationalism and the Road to Independence. The Wafd, Egypt’s first significant nationalist movement, rose when Britain and King Fuad reluctantly allowed for a constitution in 1923 permitting parliamentary elections. The elections occurred in 1924, and in the Wafd won 179 out of 211 seats in the new legislature. But both the Wafd and the legislature were weakened by subsequent events, including the 1930 constitution that strengthened the power of the king, and the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty that failed to give full independence to Egypt. Demonstrations broke out against the Wafd, blamed by demonstrators for not challenging the Treaty, and of failing to address the chronic problems of Egypt’s economy. Many of those who had become disenchanted with the Wafd found the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, more responsive to their own aspirations.

In the 1930s, Egyptian nationalism rose in response to a number of currents. As Egyptians traveled more, they became more anti-Western, and more Islamic in character. These ideas would later form the basis of Egypt’s role in a nationalist pan-Arab movement after World War II.

World War II gave the Wafd a second chance, when the British allowed them to return to power, but the corruption under Prime Minister Mustafa Hahhas led to a governmental collapse in 1944. At the end of the war, the new Prime Minister demanded that the British renegotiate the 1936 Treaty and turn over Sudan to Egypt, fulfilling a longstanding belief by Egyptian nationalists that the Sudan was an integral part of Egypt. Even as the Egyptian government wrestled with the Sudan issue, another event added fuel to Egyptian nationalism—the creation of the state of Israel in May 1948.

The declaration of Israeli independence brought Egyptian and other Arab state troops into Palestine to block the Israeli assumption of the area, but with virtually no coordination between armies, the Arab forces were defeated. This loss galvanized both pro-Arab and anti-Western nationalism in Egypt as well as in the rest of the Arab world. It also brought to prominence a young officer named Gamal Abdul Nasser. A year after the war a group of nationalistic young Army officers founded the Free Officers Movement and Nasser was elected as its leader.

Other groups were mobilized by the defeat of Egyptian forces, including the Muslim Brothers, founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, partly in reaction to a decision by the Islamic leaders of the influential al-Azar Mosque to not oppose British-imposed martial law. The regime curbed Al-Banna’s power after the assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi and unknown assailants murdered him in 1949. The Wafd took power again in January 1950 and Prime Minister Nahhas issued a decree abolishing the 1936 treaty with Britain. British actions in the Suez led to "Black Sunday" on January 26, 1952 when anti-imperialist riots tore through Cairo and other Egyptian cities. The British pressured King Farouk to intervene, but the Free Officers, waiting in the wings, decided to pre-empt the monarch. On July 26, 1952, they launched a coup against him.

As the king sailed out of Alexandria on a yacht for the last time (he would die in exile), the Free Officers formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) They invited former Prime Minister Ali Mahir to head a new government, and elected General Mohammed Naguib as the president. When Ali Mahir resigned as Prime Minister, Naguib took that post as well, and led the RCC into the first of a number of sweeping reforms to oust the old elite. The Agrarian Reform Law limited land ownership in an effort to break the political power of the rural landlords. In January 1953 the ruling RCC banned all political parties, an action designed to weaken the power of both the wealthy and the left. Nasser also abolished the monarchy, ending a period that dated back to Muhammad Ali, and the RCC, renamed the Arab Socialist Union, replaced the king’s bureaucracy with its own.

Egyptian Nationalism Grows. Foreign relations remained a problem for the Free Officers, with the Suez proving to be a particularly difficult problem. Nasser found himself pulled between the British, who at one point offered him membership in the newly-formed Baghdad Pact, and Egyptian nationalists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, who demanded that Nasser nationalize the Suez Canal. Nasser himself began to lean towards the latter position, refusing the British offer, and moving towards the Soviet bloc after a powerful Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955 that left Egypt humiliated. Nasser also found that the initially promising relationship with the United States (which refused to support King Farouk during the coup) began to sour as Egyptian - British tensions grew. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially offered some $20 million in aid for Egypt, including funds to construct a new dam at Aswan. However Egypt was shopping for arms from Soviet bloc countries, and arranged a purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia in September 1955, partly to reflect his anger over western support of regional rival Iraq. This caused the United States to withdraw an offer to fund construction of the Aswan High Dam. The USSR quickly offered its own loan for the project, and, perhaps bolstered by his new patron, Nasser turned his attention to what he regarded as a remnant of foreign influence: the Suez Canal.

Although the British had turned the operation of the Suez Canal over to a private company, British forces protected it. However, Nasser nationalized the holdings of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. Nasser anticipated a negative reaction, but hoped to avoid war over his action. However, Britain and France immediately froze Egyptian assets in their banks and prepared for military action. France, unhappy with Nasser for his support of Algerian revolutionaries, joined in these preparations, as did Israel. The United States, though, uninformed about the pending British - French - Israeli operation, opposed a military response. The military option went forward anyway, though, with Israeli troops striking through the Sinai and French and British paratroopers landing in important Egyptian areas. Soviet Premier Khrushchev threatened to "rain rockets" against the three allies, causing the U.S. to take measures to bring about a peaceful resolution. As the British Pound slipped on world money markets in response to worries about the war, the U.S. failed to support it, finally forcing Britain out of the operation. Without British support, the French and Israelis retired from the war, and Nasser emerged victorious. It was a crowning moment for Arab nationalism, but it was not to last.

The next major event in Arab nationalism was a union between Syria and Egypt, the short-lived "United Arab Republic" (UAR). Syria initiated the proposal, but Syrian leaders grew to resent Egyptian dominance of the UAR and Egyptian interference in Syrian politics. In September 1961, Syrian military officers launched a coup against the Syrian regime, and the United Arab Republic fell apart. A similar effort between Egypt and Yemen, launched in 1962, did not last either, but the enterprise was costly to Egypt, who placed some 75,000 troops in Yemen attempting to defend an anti-royalist revolution. Those troops were absent from the front lines when Egypt and Israel engaged in their third war in 1967, contributing to the outcome of that conflict.

Nasser Shapes Egypt. At the height of his power, Nasser nationalized almost every major industry and carried out drastic land reform in the countryside. Part of the motive for this was import-substituting industrialization, done to reduce Egyptian dependence on imported goods. New public sector industries went up to produce cement, steel, and ships, which quickly began to contribute to Egypt’s heavy public debt. Nasser also imposed a very high tax on persons in upper income ranges (over 90 percent) in the name of leveling wealth. One consequence was that many of Egypt’s wealthy left the country, taking their wealth with them. In addition, given the growing stridency of Nasser’s anti-Israel rhetoric so did most of Egypt’s Jewish families. Before Nasser, Cairo alone had eight synagogues; by the late 1980s only one remained, with only forty or so families still attending.

Nasser also found himself faced with two challenges to his vision of a secular independent Egypt. One came from the Muslim Brotherhood, and its chief spokesperson, Sayyid Qutb, the author of works calling Nasser an "infidel" and demanding that his rule be replaced with an Islamic regime. After efforts to assassinate Nasser attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser arrested Qutb, and had him executed in 1966. Government authorities arrested many other members of the Muslim Brotherhood and kept them in prison for years to come. The other challenge came from the Egyptian Communist Party, which Nasser regarded as agents for the Soviet Union. Moreover, while Nasser ruled over a secular regime, the anti-Islamist nature of the communists was too much to bear for a largely Islamic country. So again Nasser jailed members of the Egyptian Communist Party even while courting the Soviet Union, which chose in turn to turn a blind eye to the imprisonment of their fellow Marxists.

The Arab-Israeli Wars. Tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors dramatically rose in 1966-1967, as Israeli raids into those countries matched Palestinian raids from Egypt and Syria. Air battles began in April 1967, and shortly after, the USSR warned Egypt and Syria that Israeli forces were massing on their borders. Nasser also provoked tensions when he ordered the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran, denying Israel access to its southern port of Aqaba.

For reasons that remain controversial and disputed, Israel decided to strike first, and on June 5, 1967 Israeli aircraft destroyed the bulk of Egyptian aircraft while they were still on the ground, and moments later did the same thing to Syrian and Jordanian aircraft. With Egypt denied most of its air attack capability, Israeli ground units quickly crossed the Sinai Desert to the Suez Canal. Other Israeli combat forces quickly struck into the Golan region of Syria, the old city of Jerusalem (occupied by Jordan since 1947), the Gaza strip between Egypt and Israel, and the West Bank of the Jordan River. The whole operation ended six days later with the defeat of Arab forces on all fronts. Nasser announced his resignation, but mobs of people gathered outside his residence chanting his name, and the National Assembly refused to accept his departure as President.

Despite the emotion of the moment, the 1967 defeat dealt Arab nationalism crucial blow, and Islamist organizations enjoyed a spurt in their membership. Nasser purged several of his top officers, attempted to reform some of the more drastic economic measures, and added a measure of competition to what had been single-party rule. However, many citizens regarded the reforms as largely cosmetic, and discontent against Nasser grew. So did tensions with Israel, as Egyptian artillery and Israeli aircraft traded blows across the Suez Canal. That conflict, which often threatened to explode into another full-scale war, was finally terminated by the so-called "Rogers Plan" originated by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and quietly supported by the USSR. That plan set the stage for the slow return to peace that would follow, but although Nasser set the stage, the peace process got a new leader when Nasser died of a heart attack in September 1970.

Upon Nasser’s death, Vice President Anwar Sadat became acting president. Sadat was widely regarded as a weak political figure (and disparaged behind his back for his mixed parentage—his mother was a Sudanese). Nevertheless, in October 1970, he won over 90 percent of the election to succeed Nasser, and acted quickly to establish a power base of his own. In May 1971, he arrested a number of Arab Socialist Union officials and charged them with plotting a coup against him. That act established Sadat’s move away from Nasser and, by replacing Nasser’s old guard of pro-Soviet loyalists, Sadat was finally able to chart his own political course. He did sign the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, largely because he wanted to speed up deliveries of Soviet military equipment to replace the losses of 1967. He would need that equipment for the task that he hoped would change the course of Arab-Israeli relations, the 1973 attack to gain back territory taken by Israel in the June War. It would not come before Sadat tried a peace initiative in September 1971, offering recognition of Israel for a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Although that effort did not evoke a response in Tel Aviv, Sadat kept trying. He secretly communicated with the United States, and American officials told him that the U.S. might pressure Israel into a peace accord only if Sadat ousted his Soviet military advisors. He did so in July 1972, but the U.S. still remained noncommittal to peace. Sadat felt at that point that he had no choice but to prepare his alternative plan.

On October 6, 1973, Egyptian forces launched an attack across the Suez that surprised the Israelis as much as their own attack had surprised the Egyptians in 1967. Syrian forces also attacked in the Golan, with both Egypt and Syria hoping that their two-pronged attack would divide Israeli forces and lead to their defeat. But the Egyptian forces, after successfully penetrating Israeli defenses along the Suez Canal, bogged down in desert fighting, and the Israelis later managed to cross the Canal themselves south of the Egyptian attack and move forces up towards Cairo. Israeli forces also threatened to surround the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai, and, despite a UN-announced cease-fire, completed the encirclement of Egyptian forces. This development pressed the United States and the Soviet Union close to intervention, and ultimately Washington persuaded Israel to withdraw and let the Egyptian forces leave.

While Israel ultimately gained the advantage after the 1973 war, the Arab forces fought well, and, as Sadat had hoped, redeemed their dismal 1967 performance. The war was also a turning point for both superpower relations and for Middle East politics. The U.S. and USSR initiated a peace process that produced what Egypt had sought in the 1973 war: a graduated Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, as well as the opening of the Suez Canal, blocked by mines and war wreckage. That progress would lead to something more dramatic, however —Sadat’s unexpected trip to Jerusalem.

Sadat introduced a new constitution to begin his separation from the Nasser era in 1971. He also dismissed many of Nasser’s advisors and chose his own loyalists. He allowed a modicum of competition for seats in the National Assembly, though the ASU (now renamed the National Democratic Party) won the vast majority of seats in the October, 1976 election. Sadat also increased participation for the Muslim Brotherhood, who he saw as a check against leftist influence dating back to Nasser. He also tried to free up the state-controlled economy, allowing limited importation of foreign goods and foreign currency. But these measures did not win enough support to stave off violent political demonstrations in January, 1977 when Sadat announced a suspension of food subsidies in response to conditions demanded by the International Monetary Fund for a loan. After some 800 people died in countrywide rioting, Sadat had to roll back the price increases and raise wages. While Arab pride had been restored, there seemed no easy solution to Egypt’s continuing economic crisis. Sadat decided that one answer lay with Israel.

Egypt initiates the Peace Process. In November 1977 Sadat arrived in Israel at the invitation of Israeli’s new Prime Minister Menachim Begin. That trip began peace negotiations that isolated Egypt from most of the rest of the Arab world, but gained the support of U.S. President Jimmy Carter. After the negotiations broke down, Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David in the Maryland mountains.

Sadat bargained in a less-than-optimal way, and Begin found it very difficult to compromise on even small points, but days of painstaking negotiations resulted in a peace treaty. While Sadat hoped to gain back the entire Sinai (which he did), the president also hoped that peace with Israel would reduce Egypt’s continuing heavy defense burden and allow money for domestic economic improvement. The Carter Administration tried to oblige, offering a long-term foreign aid package to help sell the peace process. However, the economic consequences of peace ultimately disappointed the Egyptian population. Subsidies to Egypt from the wealthy Gulf Arab countries disappeared overnight after the Camp David Agreement, removing a considerable source of income for Egypt. Reducing the size of the Egyptian military risked throwing soldiers into the ranks of the unemployed. Ultimately, frustration over the laggard economy mounted throughout Egypt. Fearful of losing power to this frustration, Sadat began to rule increasingly by decree, pushing through the so-called "Law of Shame, " that criminalized a whole variety of vague acts, allowing arrests almost at will. In 1981 regime authorities rounded up almost 1,500 suspects, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Government forces closed their paper and arrested other figures as well, including some former Wafd leaders. The growing repression, along with Sadat’s opulent life style, only fueled popular discontent with his rule.

On October 6, 1981, Sadat was watching a military parade in honor of the 1973 war when a small band of radical Islamic assassins leapt from a military truck and sprayed his seat with automatic weapons fire. He died instantly. The depth of Sadat’s unpopularity among the majority of the Egyptian people was clear—throughout Egypt the Islamic celebration of Id al Adha continued as if nothing had happened. Few Egyptians mourned him.

While Sadat had endorsed a successor in his vice president, Hosni Mubarak, the former head of the Egyptian Air Force, it took a national referendum to approve him. Mubarak realized that he could not repeat the mistakes of Sadat and gradually allowed an opening of the political system. By the time elections were scheduled in 1984, five parties were allowed to contest the NDP for seats in the National Assembly, and the Wafd won 57 seats -- though the NDP swamped the opposition by winning 391 seats. In addition, despite the appearance of more openness, the 1984 Election Law excluded smaller parties by requiring an 8 percentage minimal vote to get a seat in the National Assembly. Moreover the new law redefined electoral districts so that each district was now multi-member, thus allowing the National Democratic Party to overwhelm the opposition.

In response to a growing wave of Islamist demonstrations, Mubarak called for early elections in 1987 along with a reform of election laws. Those changes included providing 48 seats in the National Assembly for independent candidates. However, the appearance of change also did not appear to persuade most Egyptians that the change was substantive—in the 1987 election, voter turnout was only 25 percent. Despite this, the New Wafd Party did win 35 seats, while the Islamic Alliance gained 60 seats, making it the largest group of opposition members. However, elections held in 1990 and 1995 saw widespread arrest and harassment of Islamist and other opposition candidates. The National Democratic Party won 93.6 percent of National Assembly positions in an election denounced as "…one of the most fraudulent elections conducted during Mubarak’s reign." Still, Mubarak himself remained popular, as evidenced by the 93.8 percent of the vote he received in the September 1999 presidential referendum for another six-year term.

The Egyptian Political System. Like many countries in the Middle East, the Egyptian political system is a legacy of many things, including long periods of foreign rule, and a nationalist response emphasizing elite rule by former military officers. The Egyptian political system has evolved very slowly, and important features remain from the past, like the concentration of power in the executive and the considerable power held by Egypt’s elites at the expense of the rest of Egypt’s population.

The pinnacle of political power in Egypt is the presidency. The office is the legacy of Nasser, and the Constitution of 1971 institutionalized its considerable power. It grants the president authority to appoint vice presidents, prime ministers, and the cabinet. It gives the president the power to run the vast Egyptian bureaucracy, and with it the power of patronage. The president also chairs the National Security Council, which is responsible for defense and military policy.

The Egyptian Executive. The composition of the executive branch from the president to the cabinet reflects the elite composition of Egyptian politics. Nasser built the first ruling elite largely from his military colleagues with which he had spent his career, with most of his top appointments coming from members of the Free Officer Movement. Nasser’s style of leadership, along with his top cadres, passed to Anwar Sadat upon Nasser’s death in November 1970. Sadat retained and even expanded the circle of elite close to the president, allowing his ministers wide leeway in domestic affairs while retaining important foreign policy decisions for himself. Sadat, though, continued to purge those who differed with him on policy matters, and a number of the original Free Officers, led opposition to Sadat’s policies and leadership. After Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak continued to delegate domestic policy decisions to his ministers. At the same time, he reduced the considerable power of the presidency that accumulated during the regimes of Nasser and Sadat. Some of that power flowed downward to the ministers. However, this did not mean that power did not still flow from the top. The Ministry of Justice, for example, continued to exercise a heavy hand over dissent, particularly when it became violent. During Mubarak’s rule a record sixty executions have taken place, many for acts of violence during protests. The military courts, which gained power under Mubarak to arrest and try civilians, imposed many of these executions. Between 1992 and 1996, military courts imposed 74 death sentences on civilians.

Under the provisions of the 1971 Constitution, a two-thirds majority of Parliament selects Egypt’s president for a six-year renewable term, confirmed by a popular referendum. The current incumbent, Hosni Mubarak, has served three terms, and won a fourth in September, 1999. The election was uncontested. Mubarak’s party, the National Democratic Party has almost monopoly control partly because of government power, and partly due to the weakness of the opposition. A recent comment is descriptive, "Opposition parties are crippled by infighting, by legal restrictions on their activity, by lack of access to the state broadcasting monopoly¾ and by the popular view that the government will never give them a break."

The president appoints the prime minister, who has considerable responsibility for the day-to-day running of the government and the implementation of policy. Under both Nasser and Sadat the Prime Minister wielded substantial influence in domestic policy. Under Sadat, for example, Abdul Aziz Hijazi was appointed Prime Minister in 1974 to implement the shift from state planning to privatization. When charges of corruption and mismanagement surfaced, Sadat fired Hijzai and replaced him with Mamduh Salim, giving Salim an even broader mandate to push the new economic policies through.

Mubarak tried to reduce the power of the Prime Minister and the ministries by bringing in his own inner circle of advisors, including some from the diplomatic corps and the private sector. Some are acquaintances brought in to solve particularly pressing problems. For example, Interior Minister Habib al-Adly replaced the fired Hassal al-Alfi in November 1997 after several terrorist attacks against foreign tourists. Within eight months al-Adly demoted or dismissed 149 police generals and 24 security brigadiers, many believed to be tainted by corruption.

The concentration of power in the hands of a few in the executive branch inspired the four opposition parties (Wafd, Labor, Nasserite, and National Progressive Unionist Grouping) to propose constitutional reform that would shift Egypt from a presidential to a parliamentary system. It is difficult, for such reforms to succeed, though, given the political dominance of the NDP.

The Egyptian Legislature. The legislature in Egypt is comprised of two houses, the lower People’s Assembly (Majlis as Shaab) and the upper Consultative Council (Majlis ash Shura). The People’s Assembly has 454 seats, with 444 elected by popular vote, and 10 appointed by the president. The Consultative Council, which is only an advisory body, has 264 seats; 176 elected by popular vote from 222 electoral districts, and 88 appointed by the president. While the People’s Assembly members serve 5-year terms, the Consultative Council members serve indefinite terms, potentially for life.

The Egyptian Constitution gives the legislature the power to pass laws, approve budgets, to question the Prime Minister, and to monitor the actions of the executive branch, including the right to level criminal accusations against the president.

Egypt was the first Arab country to have a legislative body, electing its first parliament in 1866. With such a long tradition, Egyptian parliaments might have emerged as an independent check on the power of the executive. However, that check is limited. The President’s party, the National Democratic Party, dominated the legislature, and most legislators are dependent on the government—many work for the state. In the 1995 elections, the National Democratic Party got 95 percent of the vote, giving them 421 seats in the 444-seat body. Independents won 10 seats, the New Wafd party with six, and other splinter parties hold the remainder. In that election there were widespread allegations of bribery, ballot stuffing, and a lack of attention to other candidates and parties from the state-run media. The government responded to the criticism by allowing monitors for the 2000 elections, which produced a different parliament. In the first round of elections, held in October, one-third of the winners were independent candidates. Results of Egypt's parliamentary of November 2000 saw the NDP with 388 of the 444 seats; with 38 going to independents and 16 to various opposition parties. The results are misleading, though. Voters actually elected 236 independents, but a large number of these apparently switched to the NDP after their elections, and thus the final tally recorded them as NDP winners. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the largest opposition in parliament, winning 17 seats even after its candidates suffered from official harassment.

The Egyptian legislature has little power relative to the executive. This is because of laws giving the executive much power over the legislature in many areas, such as to order decrees in place of laws that must pass the parliament. The legislature also has no real budget power, and must either reject or accept the budget from the president in its entirety. This is not to say that the parliament has no independent power – the constitution delegates certain less important matters to the body, and occasionally some significant issue gets a debate in the legislature. In the 1980s, the Housing Committee pressured the Department of Antiquities to sell some land it controlled to developers, and the Islamic parties often opened debate on social issues such as the sale of alcohol and motion picture content. On other rare occasions, the parliament expresses its "independence" by haranguing the Prime Minister, as it did in November 1998 over a trivial issue, with the session getting so raucous that the Minister of the People’s Assembly had to intervene. However, such behavior, unusual as it may be, is far short of such independence as a vote of no confidence or even a vote against a government-supported budget.

The parliamentary elections of 2000 may be the first in a long time to bring about real change. First, the NDP found itself embroiled in a corruption scandal resulting in the imprisonment of three of its legislators in June 2000. In a move that could allow opposition parties to take advantage of the scandal (and long-term frustration by many Egyptians over the NDP dominance of parliament), the High Constitutional Court ruled that the 2000 election must be carried out with full judicial supervision. President Mubarak agreed with the ruling, as did the Interior Ministry. However, other factors may limit the opposition. A military court placed twenty Muslim Brotherhood leaders on trial, and the government detained many more on unspecified charges, which limited their ability to compete in the election. The pro-Islamist Labor Party announced that it would not participate in the election due to official harassment. Moreover, the NDP is raising money from Egypt’s newly wealthy at a rate far exceeding the 1995 elections.

Political Parties in Egypt. The dominant party in modern Egyptian politics is the National Democratic Party (NDP), which holds a commanding lead in Parliamentary seats. The NDP is a holdover from Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union, and, as such, it remains a vehicle for those elites rewarded by fidelity to the party and its leadership. Other parties have simply refused to run candidates for Parliament because they have such a small chance of winning a meaningful number of seats. For example, most of the other 14 parties boycotted the June 1998 elections, with only the Ahrar party announcing that it would participate in the vote.

After Nasser’s death both Sadat and Mubarak allowed other parties to form, partly to provide a safety valve for the opposition. The regime, however, also cultivated a number of voluntary associations to serve as magnets for political grievances, but since opposition parties have no links to these groups, they are relatively ineffective in responding to discontent.

The primary opposition parties are:

The Muslim Brotherhood (see below)

The Liberal Party, formed in 1976 as a right wing party, with its primary emphasis on unrestricted capitalism and foreign investment into Egypt’s economy.

The National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) which became a reservoir of leftist opposition.

The Socialist Labor Party (SLP) formed in 1979 with encouragement from Sadat in hopes that it would replace the increasingly critical NPUP. In 1987, though, it joined with NPUP and the Muslim Brotherhood to become the Islamic Alliance.

The New Wafd Party, founded by former Wafd Party members. It became a coalition of business, landowners, and professional groups longing for the old nationalist bent of the original party. It supported Sadat, though, and under Mubarak has advocated a return to a more liberal approach to business. The New Wafd issues increasingly strident criticism against Mubarak and his rule, claiming that "…crises are strangulating the people, unemployment is increasing, corruption is rife, the sidewalks are to small to accommodate the homeless, education is collapsing…."

The Egyptian Judiciary. While the president often dominates the legislature, the state judiciary system is relatively independent from executive influence. This system enforces a composite of religious and civil law; the latter a remnant of the Napoleonic period when French-educated judges were imported to run the Egyptian judiciary. In the modern system judges are appointed for life, and the president is by law prevented from interfering with their role and decisions, something that both presidents Sadat and Mubarak have largely abided by.

In 1956 Egypt abolished the religious courts (including Islamic, Jewish, and Christian courts), and folded their jurisdiction into the civil court system. However, the civil court could apply religious as well as civil law in its cases. During the Nasser years the courts applied mainly secular law in its casework. There is, though, growing evidence that the Egyptian court system is increasingly influenced by Islam, something that began when Sadat made a 1980 change to Egypt’s constitution claiming that the shari’a (Islamic law) was "the main source" of Egyptian law. There is also evidence that judges are increasingly relying on the shari’a for a legal basis in deciding cases, as when a professor’s wife was ordered by the court to divorce him because he stood accused of apostasy.

The court system begins with district tribunals and above these a court for each governorate to hear appeals from district tribunals. Higher-level courts exist in seven cities to hear appeals from district courts, and appeals from these courts go to the Court of Cassation in Cairo. A number of special courts exist as well, including the Supreme State Security Court for political and military security, and a series of administrative courts headed by the Council of State.

Much of the work of the Egyptian court system is enforcement of civil and criminal law. However, the court system is also a part of the political system, and as such the courts do have a role to play in politics. Nasser circumscribed that role, but it expanded under Sadat. Still, there were laws preventing criticism of the government, though the courts often dismissed those charged with violating such laws -- so long as the violations were minor. The act of writing critical graffiti on a village wall was likely to gain a dismissal, though publishing an opposition newspaper might result in jail time. Sometimes critics of the regime found themselves charged with law violations, as in the case of human rights activist Saad Eddine Ibrahim, who stood accused of illegally accepting foreign funds. Ibrahim claimed that the regime targeted him because he found widespread fraud in the 1995 elections.

The courts did challenge Mubarak on several issues, including overturning his ban on the New Wafd Party and the Sadat-era decree granting women certain political and civil rights. On the other hand the Ministry of Justice, charged with enforcing court orders, could and did ignore these orders when the president determined that they would do so.

Both the regime and the courts found it more difficult to respond to a growing criticism generated by an increasingly independent press, particularly after Sadat’s death. The Islamic papers in particular reported police abuses of Islamist suspects, which ultimately resulted in trials for the police so accused. Government repression, though, comes not only in response to Islamic militancy. Regime efforts at privatizing the economy led to more efficiency, but also to higher poverty levels. Labor strife rose in the 1990s, and fears of a repeat of the "bread riots" of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to regime decisions to de-liberalize the political climate.

Islam and Egyptian Politics. Around 94 percent of Egyptians are Muslim and about 6-10 percent Coptic Christian. The large majority of Muslims are Sunni. Despite the large Muslim population, Egypt has a long tradition of secular rule, and most regimes strike compromises with Islamic tradition in areas of policy and law. Thus, while most Muslims appear to accept the current political status quo, a smaller percentage embraces Islam as a way to bring about political change.

Islamic Opposition Groups. The most significant opposition in Egypt comes from the various groups embracing political Islam. Egyptian Islamists generally divide into three groups:

The Salafi, or Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al Muslimin), in comparison to the others a relatively moderate group dating back to 1928. They espouse gradual and peaceful change, believing that the shari’a prohibits violence.

The jihadi, including al-Jama’a al Islamiyya and al-Jihad. Both groups advocate armed struggle against the regime (but not the people) based on the concepts of God’s sovereignty. They are most likely to direct violence against members of the regime and its supporters. They have also directed numerous attacks against tourists, hoping to deprive the regime of tourist revenues. These attacks included one against a busload of Greek tourists (apparently mistaken by the killers for Israelis), and the 1997 Luxor massacre that killed over 60 tourists. In July 1997 leaders of both al-Jama’a and al-jihad offered a cease-fire, but the regime rejected the offer. The regime cracked down on Jihadi members, and several of their leaders chose to denounce violence in March 1999. In 2001 two Jihadi leaders called upon their members to focus their attention on the liberation of Jerusalem, and presumably to cease fighting the Egyptian government.

The takfiri, who believe that all of society is tainted as infidels, a view taken from the notion of pre-Islamic society as jahiliyya, or idolatrous. Their potential application of violence extends to all that do not share their visions.

The two latter groups have much in common, particularly in their member’s backgrounds. Many come from Upper Egypt, displaced by poverty and rapid urbanization. Their leaders, driven by the security services out of Upper Egypt, organize in the rapidly growing urban poor areas in Cairo. They may find inspiration from charismatic leaders like Shaykh ‘Uman ‘Abd al-Rahman, who preached in the Upper Egyptian city of Minya until he illegally entered the United States. A court ultimately sentenced him to life in prison for his part in the 1991 bombing of the World Trade Center. Shaykh Ahmad Isma’il was another spellbinding preacher who included anti-Christianity and anti-Judaism in the themes of his sermons on a regular basis.

The Egyptian government’s response to Islamic militancy has been a combination of repression and social actions. The security forces rounded up many militants, the courts ordered many executed. Efforts to control the mosques resulted in their being "nationalized" under the High Committee for Islamic Da’wa, abolished popular Islamic radio shows, and established "information centers" to warn of the danger of militant Islam. The regime also launched poverty relief and education measures to counter the Islamist appeal. Traditionally these compromises start between the government and Al-Azhar University, one of the most respected centers of Islamic studies in the world. Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all sought favorable religious rulings (or fatwas) from the Al-Azhar faculty, offering increased financial support in exchange. It has also granted more authority to al-Azhar in an effort to squelch opposition from the faculty to government policies. These three presidents also nationalized most of Egypt’s mosques in an effort to control radical Islamic preachers and their congregational influence. Paradoxically, such efforts may have furthered the Islamicization of Egyptian society, through the constant reinforcement of Islam’s message through the state media.

These measures were partially successful as the numbers of Islamist acts of violence declined. They also indicated a governmental willingness to cooperate and fund activities by civic Islamists, who push civic projects like clinics, study circles, schools, and charities. However, the 1997 attack at the temple of Hatshepsut that killed over 60 tourists reminded both Egyptians and the world that the violent Islamists could still strike with devastating consequences. Still, regime actions against al-Jihad and al-Jama’a al Islamiyya caused them to splinter into cells and factions and, as noted above, their imprisoned leaders called for a truce in July 1997. Moreover, Islamic leaders both inside and outside Egypt denounced the Luxor attack, and Mubarak used this outrage to take the political initiative from the radical Islamists.

Civil Society in Egypt. Not all Islamist movements are political in nature. Some more closely resemble civil society movements, or alternatives to political action. These include charitable associations, community development groups, the Young Men’s Muslim Association, and a number of medical groups. These medical groups are typical of the role played by civil society; they compete against government hospitals, and some believe that they provide superior care.

Labor unions, once illegal, might emerge as another actor in civil society, but the unions are now a part of the government, though strikes remain illegal. Proposed new laws would legalize the right to strike, but the independence of unions remains only speculation.

The Political Status of Women in Egypt. In Egypt, as in other traditional nations, societal norms marginalize women. Egyptian women have struggled to overcome obstacles to their advance in Egyptian life and for acceptance of their worth. Therefore, they have advanced beyond some of the Arab Gulf nations, but they still hold second-class citizenship. Women remain largely excluded by the political system. In 1979 a reform proposal gave women thirty seats in the legislature, but after Sadat’s death the proposal disappeared after the Islamists expressed opposition to it. The ruling NDP slate for the October, 2000 elections reflects the continuing marginalization of women; out of 444 NDP candidates on the ballot, 11 were women.

The political status of women in Egypt varies according to area. In urban areas women hold positions in universities, government (one of Egypt’s Deputy Foreign Ministers is a women), and in the private sector. In rural areas, the possibilities for women advancing beyond traditional roles are limited, and old beliefs persist. This is also often the case in poor urban areas, where veiling is reappearing in response to Islamist pressures.

Access to education is another issue area for Egyptian women. The percentage of Egyptian girls of school age not attending school is estimated at 18 percent, below the regional average of 22 percent, but above some other nations in the Maghreb (Libya at 7 percent, Tunisia at 10 percent, but Morocco at 55 percent). The gap between the percent of boys and girls of school age actually attending school for Egypt is 13 percent, making it third highest gender education gap in the Arab world after Yemen and Morocco. This is related to a general perception found particularly in poor neighborhoods and rural areas that the Egyptian woman’s primary responsibility is raising families. In rural areas the average women gives birth to 4.5 children in her lifetime, compared to 3.4 for the country as a whole. Despite government and Western pressures for population control, Egypt’s Islamic clerics proclaim that procreation is an Islamic duty. Partially in response, the average Egyptian woman has four to five children in her lifetime, with several more pregnancies ending in miscarriage.

Divorce laws favored males before 1979. Islamic custom allows a husband to take up to four wives, and he could divorce a wife through Taliq, or uttering "I divorce thee" three times in front of a witness. A man was required to pay only a year’s worth of alimony to his former spouse, and generally the authorities did not hold him accountable when he failed to pay it. A divorce also resulted in automatic custody of children to the male.

In 1979, possibly due to behind-the-scenes pressure from President Sadat’s wife, Jahan, a presidential decree changed some of these conditions. The decree stated that polygyny was grounds for a women to sue for divorce, that alimony in divorce could extend for more than one year, and that the wife automatically gained custody of sons under ten years old and daughters under twelve years old after a divorce. However, following Sadat’s assassination in 1985, Egyptian authorities ruled that this decree was unconstitutional because it was declared during a time when the People’s Assembly was not in session. A new law negating most of the 1979 reforms replaced the presidential decree, which had sparked resistance among Islamists. Another Law, Law No. 3 of 1996, gave the prosecutor the right to initiate hisba (see Chapter 5) in domestic relations issues. The implication of this, as Sfeir notes, was that "…the new law gave credence to the Islamic legal notion that the spouses’ marital relations was a matter of public interest requiring the intervention of the state." By 2000 the moderates in the People’s Assembly apparently felt that the Islamic opposition has weakened politically, and thus passed a law granting women the right of divorce. The law did stipulate that in order to obtain a divorce, though, the petitioning woman had to return her dowry to her husband, who was freed from any future financial obligations to her.

The issue of women and divorce also arises in Egypt’s Coptic Church. A 1999 effort pushed by Coptic Pope Shenouda to revise Egypt’s 1938 personal status code, allowing violence as grounds for divorce was criticized by human rights activists. However, the Pope reiterated his stance that while he personally condemned spousal violence, it should not be grounds for divorce.

Egyptian law does not recognize the citizenship of children born to an Egyptian woman and a foreign father, thus discriminating against women, according to its critics. The roots of the law are partially in Islam (Muslim lineage runs through the father, according to tradition), but also in tribal traditions that cost one tribal identity if they marry outside of the tribe. Critics of the law argue that it marginalizes women, as one put it, "If children feel that their mothers cannot provide them with the same protection as their fathers, then the whole status of women will remain less important."

Discrimination is only one issue women face; another is female genital mutilation. Despite a government ban on it, Amnesty International reported that two young girls bled to death from the procedure. According to UNICEF an estimated 80 percent of Egyptian women suffered genital mutilation as of 1994. According to another study, 97 percent of ever-married Egyptian women were circumcised. If these numbers are correct, then the government’s ban on the procedure is widely violated. The ban itself came under fire from the Rector of Al-Azhar University, who issued a fatwa in 1995 stating that female circumcision was part of adherence to Islam. He claimed that the practice "honored women," and was necessary for social order. A group of men and women challenged the ruling in court, and, to the surprise of some observers, won their case, reinforcing the government ban.

Political Succession in Egypt. President Mubarak is now in his early 70s, and, while reported to be healthy, his life expectancy is still limited. He has purposely named no vice president, and while the president of Parliament becomes the acting president should Mubarak die in office, there is no one with the statute of Mubarak to replace him should that happen.

Some speculate that Mubarak is grooming his son Gamal as a possible successor, inspired by Hafiz al-Asad’s designation of his son Bashar as his successor. Gamal has become an expert in economic and political reform, and works to make the NDP relevant to younger voters. Such efforts raise his political profile, while his refusal to take a government position may help him avoid responsibility for its problems after his father dies.

The Structure and Performance of the Egyptian Economy. Egypt’s economy, once dominated by agriculture and small crafts, has shown a dramatic shift to the service sector and industry. It was a slow transformation, though.

During his presidency, Nasser implemented "Arab socialism," placing heavy emphasis on state ownership, central planning and self-sufficiency. Arab socialism also had as an important goal the equitable distribution of wealth and employment of both the rural and urban poor. Nasser also nationalized a considerable portion of the Egyptian economy and poured substantial investment into shipyards, steel mills, cement plants, and so on. President Sadat, however, reduced the role of Arab socialist ideals in the Egyptian economy, and the role of private investment and private incentive grew over state ownership and state planning. Sadat, though, is perhaps best remembered for his peace efforts with Israel, which brought a commitment of economic assistance from the United States. By 2000 that assistance totaled more than $25 billion over 25 years, giving a substantial boost to the Egyptian economy. President Mubarak furthered the trends pushed by Sadat, though he also resisted demands by some for a complete privatization of Egypt’s economy. However, opposition developed against Mubarak, policies from the conservative business elite and from the rural and urban poor, who were increasingly joining Islamist groups partly because of the impact of Mubarak’s economic policies. Mubarak thus found his freedom to move limited, and his policies became even more incrementalist.

Egypt faces numerous obstacles to steady economic growth. First, the country has few natural resources that are desired on the international market. Second, the population growth remains almost unchecked, with an expected 100 million people by 2020, and 150 million by 2050. Egypt’s economic growth must at least attempt to grow to accommodate this population increase or the result could well be political chaos. By reducing the growth rate to replacement levels (two children per couple), the percentage of children under 15 would decline to 21 percent by 2016 from the present 24 percent. However, if the present rates continue, children under 15 will be 30 percent of the population by 2016, placing a great strain on educational resources, in particular. Third, the economy remains shackled to subsidies, particularly for food, that drain resources from other more potentially productive activities. Bread subsidies in particular led to large-scale black marketeering and practices, such as feeding bread to livestock, since subsidized bread was cheaper than animal feed.

One of Sadat’s reforms was Law 43 of 1974, to engage in al-infitah, or "economic openness." The new law gave serious impetus to privatizing Egypt’s tourist industry by allowing the Ministry of Tourism to alter taxation and regulation of the tourism industry in hopes of expanding it. It also allowed the privatization of tourist-related assets like hotels, Nile tourism boats, and bus companies. One consequence is that tourism has become Egypt’s largest source of foreign earnings, surpassing revenues from the Suez Canal and remittances from Egyptian workers abroad. However tourism is vulnerable to fluctuations brought on by such events as the Gulf War and terrorist attacks against tourists -- some devastating in their scope. However, the industry has tended to rebound after these events, and tourism revenues grew from around $3 billion in 1997-98 to $4.5 billion in 2000/01.

Desert covers most of Egypt, with a narrow ribbon of water sustaining almost all of Egypt’s population; 95 percent of Egypt’s people live on 5 percent of its land. The traditional methods of agriculture can no longer support a population growth rate of close to 2 percent per year. The plots of land tend to be very small, often divided upon transfer from father to son. Rarely does mechanized farm equipment appear in the fields. Instead, human and animal labor constitutes the backbone of Egyptian farm activity.

Efforts to expand cropland have resulted in as many difficulties as benefits. The Aswan High Dam, built in the 1970s with Soviet assistance, was intended to store water in a huge lake (Lake Nasser) to irrigate much of upper Egypt. However, the dam is located in an extremely hot region where water evaporates quickly. So Lake Nasser became increasingly saline as water rose off its vast surface. The dam trapped the silt from the Central African mountains, and farmers lost invaluable fertilizer. The consequence is that now the dam generates considerable electricity just to produce fertilizer to replace the lost silt. The fringes of Lake Nasser became breeding grounds for snails hosting parasitical diseases, including bilharzia. Still, ambitious plans continue for irrigating upper Egypt, including the Al-Salem Canal from the Nile to Al-Arish next to the Sinai, and diversion of Nile water first to Abu Simbel and then to three branches east, all to add more than 40 percent to Egypt’s arable land.

Table I illustrates Egypt’s economic performance.

The figures show a mixed picture of both progress and problems. The 10 percent unemployment rate is considerably less than it was several years ago, when it hovered around twice that amount, but does not indicate the under-employed, or those only temporarily employed. Many Egyptians work at the margins of the economy, barely making a living carving tourist trinkets, carrying water, or collecting garbage from Cairo’s hotels. The GDP per capita does not reflect their position, nor does it reflect the wealthy Egyptians who live in Heliopolis or Madhi, prosperous suburbs of Cairo where the walled villas and well-armed security forces keep out the poor. According to Egyptian estimates, some 2 to 3 million Egyptians live "by European standards," while the rest of the 60 million live below them. The literacy rate of 51 percent is below Kenya’s at 78 percent, and the population growth rate of 1.72 percent per year exceeds Kenya’s at 1.53 percent. Both those figures indicate that long-term prospects for sustained economic growth are difficult with continuing high percentages of young people requiring expensive resources such as education.

The other figure that stands out starkly is the balance of trade. Egypt imports almost three times as much as it exports. This results in a drain on Egyptian financial resources and indicates the dependence Egypt has on the countries that sell it goods. These imports include food – almost half of food consumed in Egypt is imported, and other essential goods like transportation, machinery, metals, electronics, and military goods.

During 1999 Egypt’s economy showed some signs of improvement. Around 80 percent of the economy was under private ownership in that year, and the growth rate reached 5 percent, with inflation falling below 4 percent. Privatization extended even to the state-owned airline industry, as EgyptAir spawned a semi-privately owned competitor in Air Cairo. The International Monetary Fund approved of Egypt’s extent of privatization and end of currency controls, and foreign investment increased Tourism levels in 2000 exceeded those before the Luxor massacre.

At the same time, however, poverty remained endemic, estimated by some at 23 percent of households below the poverty line, and by others as high as 35 percent. One consequence is that some 30 percent of all children are stunted in growth by inadequate diets. Another problem is the swelling public debt, which at the end of 1999 had increased 53 percent over its 1994 level, and constituted 49 percent of GDP. Imports soared to 54 billion Egyptian pounds in 1999, up from 27 billion Egyptian pounds in 1991.

Egypt’s military has also tried to affect the Egyptian economy by providing for its own equipment. So Egypt manufacturers American-designed M1-A1 tanks in a state-of-the-art factory outside of Cairo. The plant, which employs some 5,000 workers, produces a tank that U.S. Army officials rank as better than their counterparts made in the U.S. However, the Egyptian army cannot afford to buy any more, so at the end of the assembly line is a vast room filled with brand new tanks. The plant cannot lay off workers, so it continues to produce tanks, and some officials there expressed the hope that they might be ultimately sold to Turkey. However, the Turkish military also cannot afford them, so they continued to collect at the end of the line. In addition, the Egyptian government continues to pay workers to build more tanks for a nonexistent market.

The Egyptian economy benefits from three outside sources, revenues from the Suez Canal, income from Egyptian workers abroad, and foreign assistance. However, Suez Canal receipts are falling. The growth of oil tanker size means that fewer of them can fit through the Suez Canal, and thus oil is now going around the African continent.

The Egyptian government stakes much of its future economic growth on expanding agriculture through water management. Consequently, several massive construction and water diversion projects are underway that offer both promise and problems. They include the "New Delta," in upper Egypt, where water will be pumped from Lake Nasser along a canal, to irrigate half a million acres at a cost of $1.5 billion. A related project, the Southern Valley Project, is expected to cost a whopping $88.5 billion over the next twenty years. Some funds from Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia have already contributed, and Saudi Arabian Prince al-Walid bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz al Saud is funding a 450,000-acre farm in the area. A similar canal in lower Egypt will carry Nile Water to the Sinai to irrigate that barren land. The "East Oweinat Project" taps fossil water in the desolate southwestern desert to cultivate up to a quarter of a million acres. In December 1998 President Mubarak visited the area to inaugurate a new airport, power station, and the beginnings of tourist and industrial complexes. Other projects are designed to expand water from the ancient oases in central Egypt.

Problems abound, however. The countries downstream complain that Egypt is already using too much water from the Nile and may interfere by trying themselves to constrict its flow. The East Oweinat Project draws from the same aquifer that Libya is tapping for the Great Manmade River Project (see below) and the two countries, already on unfriendly terms, may also compete over this source of water that runs under their border. Money is an additional problem. Foreign investors may well be hesitant to lend money for such ambitious projects that may not pay off the expected results.

One factor complicating the plans that might make investors wary is a traditional Egyptian tendency to stay in their neighborhoods and avoid moving. While many villagers moved to and continue to move to Cairo, they are very unwilling to move back to the country. That behavior was demonstrated when the government built so-called "satellite cities" in the desert to lure citizens out of over-crowded Cairo. Nevertheless, the result was largely empty buildings. While some of these satellite cities have finally attracted dwellers (partly due to factories located near them), it is not clear that city-dwellers will want to return to the country and work in land irrigated by these new projects.

Egypt’s economy needs investment, both foreign and domestic, to grow faster than Egypt’s population. Even a few years ago economic conditions were so grim that even Egyptians with money tended to invest their funds outside of the country. The Egyptian government is trying to improve investment incentives, streamlining the investment process in the 1997 Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law, which allows foreign ownership of projects, guarantees against nationalization of foreign-owned projects, and offers a wide array of tax incentives to foreign investors. The law, combined with recent banking reform and more rapid privatization, is drawing investment into Egypt; in 1996-97 foreign investment jumped to $2,302 million from $884 million a year previously. In addition to the agricultural investment noted above, foreigners are investing these new funds in expensive new developments like a new high technology manufacturing section in the northern Sinai, and new port facilities at Port Said and Damietta. Whether these new projects are what Egypt needs for its economic future is hard to tell at this point, but they do indicate that foreign investors in particular have some faith in Egypt’s economic future.

Some of those investors are also interested in expanding Egyptian natural gas production, taking advantage of the discovery of large gas fields off Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. Gas production was 1,600 cubic feet per day(cf/d) in 1999, but the state-owned Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation expects that figure to double by the end of 2000.

Egyptian Foreign and Security Relations. Under President Nasser, Egypt advanced the cause of pan-Arabism, but leadership of that movement shifted elsewhere after Egypt’s ultimate defeat in the 1973 war with Israel. Sadat began to recognize that the militarization of Egyptian foreign and security policy was crippling the Egyptian economy. That began the process leading to Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1974. The trip and the announcement that Egypt wanted to discuss peace with Israel shocked the world in general, and the Arab world in particular. However, Sadat pressed on with his initiative to gain back the Sinai through negotiations. That process was set back, though, by Israeli elections that brought Menachim Begin’s Likud Party to power in 1977, ending decades of rule by Labor.

Begin was more conservative on foreign policy issues than were his Labor predecessors, and he balked at discussing a peaceful return of the Sinai to Egypt. He also faced the prospect of removing by force a small band of Israeli settlers who moved into the area after 1967. But American President Jimmy Carter intervened to bring both Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, and ultimately both leaders agreed to a gradual transfer to the Sinai back to Egypt. They also agreed to improve relations in other ways, to include allowing tourists from each country to visit the other. Some Egyptians also hoped that Israeli investment might flow into Egypt, and that has slowly taken place. Israel and Egypt jointly built a clothing factory, and planned an oil refinery project, but these efforts, started under Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in the early 1990s, remain hampered by the chill in Israeli-Egyptian relations under Prime Minister Netanhayu. After the election of Ehud Barak in May, 1999, however, relations improved slowly, with Barak and Mubarak engaging in several high-level discussions about the Middle East process, and the opening in December 1999 of an oil pipeline from Egypt to Israel.

Egypt and the U.S. have maintained close ties since Sadat severed his relationship to the USSR. Next to Israel, Egypt receives more U.S. aid than any other country. In 1998 that aid totaled $2.1 billion, of which $1.3 was military aid. Egypt has purchased some expensive equipment in the past with this funding source, including frigates, artillery pieces, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and F-16 fighter aircraft. Egypt was a willing coalition partner in the 1990-91 Gulf War coalition, committing forces early. While Egypt had been the beneficiary of U.S.-supplied military equipment, Egypt also had its own dispute with Iraq. Egyptian workers labored in Iraq for years, but after the Iran-Iraq war ended some 300-400 Egyptians were killed by Iraqis, and after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait some 270,000 Egyptians fled back to Egypt, many losing all their possessions and their savings.

Egypt and Libya frequently engaged in conflict after Qaddafi came to power in the latter country. Egyptian efforts continue to reduce tensions, and mention of "promoting and consolidating relations between the two fraternal peoples" continues, though without much visible progress.

Egyptian Military and Security Policy. With the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt’s direct military threat comes from Libya and the Sudan. As one analyst put it, though, "Sudan’s army would have to use taxicabs to invade across Egypt’s border." Another described Libya’s military capacity in 1998 as "mostly, a junkyard," reflecting the deplorable condition that Libya’s military is now in because of poor maintenance Still, Egypt has a large military, partly to give it political and strategic influence, and partly for the economic reasons noted above. That military receives one of the largest U.S. military assistance packages, at $1.3 billion per year.

Egypt’s army consists of 320,000 troops, with around two-thirds of them conscripts. They operate around 3700 main battle tanks, giving them one of the largest armor forces in the region, including some U.S.-designed M1A1 Abrams built in Egypt. The Egyptian navy operates eight submarines, one destroyer, two frigates, and a number of smaller patrol and missile boats. The air force flies some 572 combat fixed wing aircraft and 125 armed helicopters, including more than 130 U.S.-designed F-16 fighters, some of them manufactured in Turkey. Egypt’s armor force is considered by military experts to be first-rate, although the air force suffers from inadequate maintenance, partially due to a decision to service at least some aircraft by local workers who are not always well-trained. Egypt also commits some 300 troops to peacekeeping in Bosnia and 124 for the same purpose in the Central African Republic. Egyptian forces also covered the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia and sent a contingent of troops in participation with the UN mission in East Timor in early 2000.

Egypt is one of a few countries to have used weapons of mass destruction. In the mid-1960s Egyptian aircraft dropped bombs containing mustard gas and phosgene on Yemeni forces during the civil war in that country. In 1996 the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency claimed that Egypt had developed a biological warfare capability by 1972, and that that capability probably still existed at the time of the report.

Summary. Egypt still faces political, economic, and social changes, but a combination of outside assistance and Egyptian determination has more than kept the country afloat. New construction cranes still tower over Cairo, and fleets of earth moving equipment reshape the desert beyond to bring water to these barren lands. While no one predicts that Egypt will dominate the region like it once did thousands of years ago, there is no question that that the Egyptian people will never simply be content to sit in the shadows of their great monuments, but rather strive to match these symbols of past greatness.