Lesson Objective: Analyze how space power affects US national security.

According to AFDD 2-2, space power is the capability to exploit civil, commercial, intelligence, and national security space systems and associated infrastructure to support national security strategy and national objectives from peacetime through combat operations.

The US goal is to "keep our freedom of action in space while denying it to the enemy." We must develop capability to destroy, disrupt, deny and degrade enemy space systems and ground based control systems. To accomplish this goal, we must have the ability to accomplish 3 missions: space surveillance, space negation, space protection

FOR DLO 1:

1. What are the elements of space power?

Space power includes military, commercial, civil, and national space systems.

Military space assets provide capabilities with no corresponding commercial or civil requirement. The Defense Support Program (used to detect missile launches) and the nuclear detonation detection subsystem of the Global Positioning System (GPS) are examples of military space assets.

Commercial space systems are developed or managed by private companies for profit, but DoD also depends on some of these private communications and imagery systems.

Civil space programs are often associated with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). However, the inventory of civil space assets is growing as systems originally developed for military purposes are transferred to civilian agencies of the US government. The transfer of some management responsibility for GPS to the Department of Transportation and the merging of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program with civil weather satellites, already being managed by the Department of Commerce, are examples. While these systems will still be available for military use, they will not be under direct DoD control.

While a discussion of national space systems is beyond the scope of this lesson for classification reasons, they comprise the fourth element of space power. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) currently develops and operates US national systems.

Finally, realize that space power is not limited to satellites. It includes physical and human infrastructure dimensions as well. Ground stations to control and process space-derived data; spacelift vehicles and launch sites; communications systems to connect all the pieces; and the people who design, develop, build, test, operate, and maintain space systems are all key elements of space power.

2. In general terms, what is space superiority?

Space Superiority is the capability to ensure the survivability and operational utility of friendly space forces as well as capabilities to deny the adversary use of space. Space Superiority is gained and maintained by Counterspace means (similar to the counterair means used to obtain air superiority).

3. What are the elements of space systems?

Space systems are comprised of NODES and LINKS. There are two types of NODES: Terrestrial and Space. The space nodes include satellites, space stations or reusable space transportation systems (ie Space Shuttle). The terrestrial nodes include any land, sea or airborne equipment used to interact with a space node. These nodes are connected together by information conduits called LINKS.

LINKS are classified under two types: CONTROL and MISSION. CONTROL links enable force multiplication through dissemination of mission data. (Example 2^nd Space Ops Squadron is the terrestrial node that operates the GPS satellites via the control link. The pilot in the cockpit with a GPS receiver is the terrestrial node of this space system. The data stream between the GPS satellite and the GPS receiver is the mission link.

4. What is space control, and what missions and capabilities contribute to this effort?

Space control is the means by which space superiority is gained and maintained to assure friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its used to the enemy.

Counterspace is the mission carried out to achieve space control objectives by gaining and maintaining control of activities conducted in or through the space environment. Counterspace involves activities conducted by land, sea, air, space information and/or special operations forces. Counterspace operations are subdivided into Offensive and Defensive counterspace operations. Offensive Counterspace Operations (OCS) precludes an adversary from space to his advantage. Defensive Counterspace Operations (DCS) preserve US/Allied ability to exploit space to its advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference.

Offensive counterspace operations destroy or neutralize an adversary’s space systems or the information they provide at a time and place of our choosing through attacks on the space, terrestrial, or link elements of space systems. The principal means of conducting offensive counterspace operations is through the use of terrestrial-based forces such as air attacks against space system ground nodes or supporting infrastructure. Offensive counterspace operations use lethal or nonlethal means to achieve five major purposes: deception, disruption, denial, degradation and destruction of space assets or capabilities.

Defensive counterspace operations consist of active and passive actions to protect US space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference. The objective of active defense is to detect, track, identify, intercept, and destroy or neutralize enemy space and missile forces. The objectives of passive defense are to reduce the vulnerabilities and to protect and increase the survivability of friendly space forces and the information they provide.

Three capabilities are critical to the successful conduct of offensive and defensive counterspace operations: surveillance and reconnaissance of space, ballistic missile warnings, and understanding how the space environment may affect systems through or in space.

5. What is the current Air Force doctrinal position on the application of force involving space forces?

The application of force would consist of attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapon systems operating in space. Currently, there are no force application assets operating in space, but technology and national policy could change so that force application missions could be performed from platforms operating in space. Space systems will be used when it is consistent with national policy and they are the best methods to achieve the military objectives.

6. Why is space control crucial to planning future conflicts?

The ability of space forces to collect, process, and disseminate timely strategic, operational. and tactical information on the enemy’s forces is essential to expeditionary forces who must fight effectively in potentially unfamiliar terrain against an unfamiliar enemy. Conversely, allowing an enemy access to information on US force deployments, order of battle, movements, and logistics may jeopardize our ability to stage and deploy forces and to successfully execute our military strategy. The ability to control an enemy’s information can be decisive in military operations. This means integrated information superiority, becomes a prerequisite strategic objective for future combat. Failure to attain information superiority early in the crisis or conflict could mean the difference between success or failure of diplomatic initiatives, crisis resolution or war, and the ability to maintain the element of surprise during military operations.

FOR DLO 2:

8. What threats to US interests in space must the USAF be ready to counter?

One problem is that many US satellites lack basic ballistic self defense measures like those that are integral to warplanes. Except for highly classified spy systems, most satellites can’t tell if they are tracked or targeted by ground radar, illuminated by laser beam, or even attacked outright.

DOD will need a comprehensive program to protect our assets. This would include improving our ability to detect and assess threats (surveillance), enhancing the survivability of ground stations and platforms, and using commercial assets to augment national security capabilities.

The US goal is to "keep our freedom of action in space while denying it to the enemy." We must develop capability to destroy, disrupt, deny and degrade enemy space systems and ground based control systems. To accomplish this goal, we must have the ability to accomplish 3 missions: space surveillance, space negation, space protection

The threats range from computer hackers tampering with streams of data to and from satellites, to outright jamming of the same satellite links, to antisatellite capabilities, to threats that are new and very different from those we have seen in the past.

-lasers or other devices that can blind the optical sensors on US spy satellites may be available to our adversaries.

-dispersing something as simple as buckshot could cause space pileups and collisions.

use of a crude nuclear device on a rocket which explodes could wipe out our satellites.

-computer hackers interrupting signals between satellites and their ground operators.

-commandos attacking ground stations that serve as control centers or relay points for data

-attacks on operations centers for private satellite companies

-jammers disrupting GPS signals

9. What new or improved future capabilities do we need?

Instead of using space as merely an information medium, the Defense Dept needs to start focusing on space as the "strategic high ground from which to project power." This means developing lasers or "kinetic energy rods" or other weapons that could be used to attack enemy spacecraft or missiles or even ground targets.

For the AF and DOD to emerge as space power, we need:

Foster a space power culture – re-create for space power the type of intellectual environment that Gen Hap Arnold did.

Be more creative in maximizing the cooperation between military, civil and commercial space practitioners.

Give our space warriors the tools they need – DOD must begin to dedicate a larger portion of its budget to the development and fielding of space-power systems.

Receive more data, faster

A comprehensive program to protect our assets which would include improving our ability to detect and assess threats (surveillance), enhancing the survivability of ground stations and platforms, and using commercial assets to augment national security capabilities. Certain surveillance functions now done by aircraft should be done from space – space-based radar.

A system to negate the threats posed by an adversary using high-resolution, remote-sensing systems to target our forces and facilities from space.

An antisatellite program

National missile-based defense system

10. How is the Pentagon refocusing monetary and organizational emphasis to increase our space capabilities?

The service will double the proportion of money it spends on space over the next years. And new satellites for detecting missile launches, have little value if there is no missile defense system for shooting them down

The military space budget is has remained constant while most of the other missions have declined. The space budget is around $7 billion, 85% of which is in the AF. This is to sustain/modernize the current space systems. Given the current continued budget constraints, the AF will have increasing difficulty funding the sustainment of current-space force structure while at the same time pursuing new opportunities critical to realizing our mission in space.

11. Why should the fact that commercial space continues to grow concern the US military? Why is it a positive development?

Our enemies will be able to get/use the same space technologies we have (adversaries who can access up-to-date imagery benchmarked against GPS on their personal computers through the Internet.) Space could get overcrowded (the geosynchronous belt is becoming crowded and the slots are becoming dearer.) Can be positive. Commercializing selected space functions and adopting processed and practices from space’s business would offer enormous opportunities for efficiency.

FOR DLO 3:

12. What is the command and control architecture of U.S. space forces?

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) established USSPACECOM as the functional unified command for space. USCINCSPACE has combatant command (command authority, COCOM) of all space forces as assigned by the Secretary of Defense's Force for Unified Commands Memorandum. Therefore, with the exception of activities authorized by transfer or delegation of OPCON/TACON, any activity that affects these forces must be coordinated with USSPACECOM. USSPACECOM operates assigned military space forces through its service component commands - Army Space Command (ARSPACE), Naval Space Command (NAVSPACE) and Space Air Forces (SPACEAF).

USCINCSPACE normally delegates OPCON of assigned forces to the Service component. Therefore, Commander Space Air Forces (COMSPACEAF) would normally have OPCON of Air Force space forces assigned to USCINCSPACE.

During contingency operations, theater commanders will integrate space into their campaign. Space support to the theater can be achieved via global space forces, deployable space forces and theater organic space forces. Space experts available to theater staffs facilitate space integration. Global, deployable and theater organic space forces require different command relationships and levels of coordination to achieve effects within the theater.

13. What are the vulnerabilities resulting from military dependence on space-based information?

Space systems can be vulnerable to a range of attacks. These include disruption activities that temporarily deny access to space derived products; activities that completely destroy a satellite system-the ground stations, launch systems or satellites in orbit; and those with the potential to render space useless for human purposes over an extended period of time. Any disruption of launch systems can be disastrous. After the failure of Titan launches and the Challenger explosion, the US experienced a 21 month hiatus in its ability to launch heavy national security payloads into orbit.

Communications traffic may be disrupted as it passes over only a few satellites. This is compounded by the use of defenseless commercial satellites. When the Galaxy IV satellite failed in 1998, it shut down 80% of all the nation's pagers, as well as video feeds for television systems, credit card authorizations and major communications systems. The failure of ground computers in early 2000 caused the US to loose all information from a number of satellites. Hackers are routinely probing and scanning DOD computers, especially those within US Space Command. If the GPS system was to fail, major disruption of police, ambulance, fire and military systems would be affected. Many new "smart bombs" depend on GPS information to make them smart. Without the information they are regular "dumb" bombs.

Real time up to date intelligence would be affected too. Being able to track the movements of enemy forces, the results of battles and changes in military posture would be severely limited if the satellite bases sensors would fail. More ominous would be a ballistic missile early warning system failure just prior to a rogue nation single missile WMD attack.

14. How does how the US Space Order of Battle enhance our joint forces’ ability to monitor, assess, plan, and execute military operations?

The US Space Order of Battle uses a complete force enhancement concept. Force enhancement operations consist of those operations conducted from space with the objective of enabling or supporting terrestrial-based forces. These enhancements include Navigation, communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, ballistic missile early warning and environmental sensing.

Enabling and supporting space operations increases a force's ability to detect, plan and react faster than an adversary. Force enhancement includes consideration of civil, commercial and allied space support that can augment DOD space assets. These include data, data relay, analysis or other enabling capabilities.