Lesson 36

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Lesson 36

Smaller-Scale Contingencies
By

Professor David Sorenson and Lt Col Nelson Perez-Otero, USAF

Air War College Faculty

The U.S. military stands prepared to fight and win its nation’s wars. However, on an ever-increasing basis, the military finds itself in operations other than Major Theater Wars (MTWs). These operations are frequently referred to as Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs) and sometimes as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (see lesson 8). The potential exists for the U.S. military to become so enmeshed in these SSCs, that it may not have sufficient forces available in the event a MTW occurs.

"Small-scale contingencies present starkly different operational challenges than major theater wars. They require restrained, small-unit operations to prevent war. Because they are usually multinational, the United States should improve coalition preparations, especially in NATO. Because SSCs are seldom purely military operations, the United States should improve its civil-military coordination and capacity to provide and restore the civil infrastructure. SSCs place severe strains on the forces used, especially if those forces are also expected to be ready for MTWs. (Findings, 1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace)

Desired Learning Outcomes:

1. Describe the full breadth of U.S. military SSC activities.

2. Explain the positive and negative impacts of SSCs on the military.

Questions for Study and Discussion

For DLO 1:

What is a "smaller-scale contingency"?

It is a subset of MOOTW and includes: military strikes and other limited intervention; noncombatant evacuation operations; counterdrug operations; shows of force; maritime sanction and "no fly" enforcement; peace accord implementation and other forms of peacekeeping; support for humanitarian operations (p 258, 259). Their aim is protect American citizens and interests, support political initiatives, facilitate diplomacy, promote fundamental ideals, disrupt illegal activities.

2. Explain the rationale for U.S. military involvement in SSCs, in general.

"In general, the United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts and crises before they require a military response. If, however, such efforts do not succeed, swift intervention by military forces may be the best way to contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly…Therefore, the US military must be prepared to conduct successfully multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations worldwide, …" p. 258

3. Cite examples of smaller-scale contingencies (and the rationale for U.S. military involvement in those examples).

1995 Peru-Ecuador border conflict required (50 military personnel for noncombat observer mission)
1991 Somalia (500 personnel for noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO))
1996 Taiwan Strait (18,000 personnel, two carrier battle group used in show of force) p. 260, 262
Bosnia, Iraq, Haiti (enforce naval embargoes simultaneously)
Bosnia (enforce no-fly zones)
Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean (carrier presence)
Liberia, sierra Leone, Zaire, Central African Republic, Cambodia (marines and spec ops forces used for NEOs)
Northern and southern Iraq (enforce no-fly zones)

4. What are the reasons for U.S. military involvement in counter-drug operations?

The use of the military should be considered whenever the nation is severely threatened by any circumstance to which no other adequate response is possible. Cheney stated that the drug trade constituted a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the nation. Note: Three Presidents declared the drug trade a threat to US National Security (President Reagan, Bush declared a war on drugs, President Clinton). Americans waste $49 billion buying illegal drugs/ years; fed and state authorities spend $39 billion trying to prevent distribution and use; the social cost is estimated at $67 billion / year; there are 25,000 drug related deaths per year and 100,000s of babies exposed to illicit drugs in-utero, as well as other costs. No nation can afford to lose $146 billion/year. P.316, 317
In states highly dependent on drugs, democracy is undermined, bribery and corruption abound, justice is thwarted, criminal violence is rampant, and public confidence in elected and appointed officials is weakened. P. 316
For many units and personnel their wartime mission is virtually identical to those of the counterdrug mission. P. 316

5. What should be the military’s role in homeland defense?

Prepare first responders and the national guard to take care of WMD terrorist activities—especially since the threat is waning—according USMC Capt Aaron Weiss, the author. P 335

6. What unique capabilities does the Coast Guard provide?

It is capable of protecting and defending US citizens, interests, and friends, in waters under national jurisdiction (inland and coastal waterways in particular) as well as in overseas areas. There is a humanitarian element dedicated to protecting and preserving lives and property at risk at sea and within inland waterways and coastal areas. A policing element focused on national security and homeland defense. A diplomatic element and military element. Deep water capabilities include: response to oil spills, aircraft flight disasters, search and rescue, international ice patrol, humanitarian response, protection of living marine resources, foreign vessel inspection, alien migrant, drug, and maritime interdiction, forward deployed support, environmental defense, US homeland defense, port security (many of these not unique). P 314

For DLO 2:

7. How might U.S. military involvement in SSCs improve our ability to respond to a MTW?

Many units report that SSCs are good for morale and provide excellent training. P. 302. In addition, SSCs likely reduce the likelihood of MTWs. P 297, 298.

8. What types of forces might benefit from engaging in SSC; what forces might be harmed?

Benefit: "Some units report that participation in peacekeeping operations provided solid training for their primary missions" (i.e. Army units in Bosnia showed good cohesion, satisfaction, strong spirit). Anecdotal evidence suggest that peacekeeping missions can increase morale, unit cohesion, and important aspects of war fighting readiness. "The 1^st Armored Division was a better division when we came back from Bosnia than when we left." Reenlistment rates higher for deployed peacekeeping forces. P. 302

Harmed: The longer SSCs last the greater is the negative effect on preparedness of forces that must be ready for MTW operations. This is particularly true for such units as light infantry and helicopter squadrons (deployed more frequently for peace operations), as well as combat support and combat services support units. Equipment tends to wear out. Army is arguing that it needs around 50000 more troops to handle such activities. P. 302

9. Can our military forces be involved in several SSCs and, at the same time, maintain the readiness to fight in a MTW? If not, how do we mitigate the impact of SSCs on readiness?

No, if no additional resources are allocated.

Yes, but… 1) "a higher priority must be given to training, planning, and equipping for an increased number of general-purpose forces (those trained for MTW) for a variety of operations" i.e. for SSCs. Currently only the marines and SOF meet the QDR standard in this regard. 2) training for asymmetric NBC weapons or terrorists attacks needed. Reorganize the Army Reserve and National Guard to increase the number, readiness, and rapid mobilization of combat support and combat service support units for such specialties as civil affairs, psyops, special forces, combat engineers, and military police… or increase the number of combat support and combat support service units. 3) Relax congressional, doctrinal, and accounting restrictions on shifting the allocation of funds for a contingency reserve force to respond to unforeseen contingencies. P.266, 267

Through reforms such as the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Forces and Army’s shift toward lighter forces, shorter tours and greater reliance on the Reserves, the services believe they are making significant progress in spreading the burden of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. P 302

10. If smaller-scale contingencies are becoming the environment in which our armed forces will predominately operate, does DoD (and the NCA) need to re-look our force structure from the ground up?

Yes, to reduce duplication and enhance coordination—make sure readiness does not suffer with respect to homeland defense or MTW. However, the process is on going…Navy transitioning from "blue water" to "brown water" force, with the Air Force’s AEF and Army’s lighter more mobile forces being tailored for rapid deployment and peace engagements. P 298, 299