Lesson Objective: Comprehend the implementation of Focused Logistics in the Services and the role TRANSCOM plays in supporting our national strategy.

Questions for Study and discussion:

1. What are the primary logistics functions and key responsibilities of the component commands?

The primary logistic functions are supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services and other services (like mortuary affairs, etc). Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics for assigned forces. Component commands are responsible for implementation and execution of the logistics functions. (pp. 152-3)

2. What are the tenets of Focused Logistics and how are they designed to optimize the warfighter’s logistics support?

The tenets of Focused Logistics are Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution, Information Fusion, Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control (Joint Log C2), Multinational Logistics, Joint Health Services Support (JHSS), and Agile Infrastructure. The tenets are designed, working in combination with each other, to provide highly responsive support to the warfighter across any level of warfare, any type of engagement. (pg. 159)

3. How will the various roles of the Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution system support future military operations?

The JD/RD system will support future military operations by moving the various forces into an op area while simultaneously accelerating delivery of logistics resources by leveraging improved transportation and information networks. This will provide improved visibility and accessibility of assets from their source of supply to its final destination (think In Transit Visibility/ITV and Joint Total Asset Visibility/JTAV). (pg. 160)

4. Why is it essential that Information Fusion be understood and used in future campaigns?

Information Fusion is the timely and accurate access and integration of logistics data across units and support agencies. It provides the ability to track material in the logistics process and the access to resources throughout the world in support of the warfighter. (pg 166)

5. What are the basic concepts of the Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control System (JTLOG C²)?

The basic concepts are: to make clear lines of authority, through a single entity in a joint warfighting environment responsible for logistics support so that in theater scarce resources can be prioritized and allocated, capitalize on cross service support capabilities and eliminate redundancies where possible as well as excess capabilities. (pg 169)

6. Why is it important to establish effective logistics concepts of operations with our coalition allies in future conflicts?

It is important because we need to share the burden with our allies, promote operational efficiency, reduce the multinational footprint, strengthen regional contacts and reduce the costs of international peace operations. The bottom line is that through mutual support agreements and effective use of contingency contracting, the cost and logistics footprint will be reduced. (pg 170)

DLO 2: Explain how USTRANSCOM and its subordinate commands support US national strategy.

7. Why was it necessary to create a USTRANSCOM versus continuing to operate individual mobility forces as separate, service-operated entities?

The reason USTRANSCOM was established was to be the DOD’s single manager of common user lift during peace and wartime. (pg 180) Transportation prior to that was intrinsic to the Services and was not coordinated with others in times of crisis. Each of the Services had their own transportation assets and in many cases, duplicate organizations performing the same tasks, competing for scarce assets sometimes to the detriment of a more pressing requirement.

8. How is USTRANSCOM organized and what is the mission of each of the transportation component commands?

USTRANSCOM executes its mission through Transportation Component Commands (TCC), reserve components and commercial partners. The components are:

USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC) – provides common user and exclusive airlift, air refueling and aeromedical evacuation services for deploying, employing, sustaining and redeploying U.S. forces wherever they are needed worldwide. They are also the worldwide aerial port manager and operator of common user aerial ports of embarkation/debarkation. AMC is the POC for with commercial industry for contracting DOD airlift services and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

USN Military Sealift Command (MSC) – provides common user and exclusive sealift services to deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy U.S. forces around the globe between seaport of embarkation and debarkation.

USA Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) - provides common user ocean terminal, commercial ocean liner service, and traffic management services to deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy U.S. forces on a global basis. MTMC also conducts transportation engineering to ensure deployability and feasibility of present and future military systems, administers the Contingency Response (CORE) program, serves as the single port manager to the geographic CINC, and develops integrated traffic management systems as well as the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement.

Reserve Component – Reserve and Guard forces comprise roughly one half of USTRANSCOM’s organic capability. No other unified command is as dependent on early call up personnel. (pg 181)

9. How the Defense Transportation System (DTS) support national objectives during peacetime and contingency operations?

The DTS supports national objectives during peacetime and contingency operations by providing modern, flexible and responsive global transportation capable of integrating military, commercial and host nation resources. It provides the interface (procedures, relationships and interrelationships) with federal, commercial and non-U.S. activities that support DOD transportation needs. (pg 180)

10. How will the Army’s Objective Force employment be dependent on AMC?

The Army vision for Objective Force is to develop a force that is "deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, sustainable, and dominant at every point along the spectrum of operations." The Army expects the Objective Force to able to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world in four days, a full division in five days and five divisions in thirty days. The only way a brigade could be deployed that quickly would have to be by airlift. The Army has also predicated the Objective Force’s physical characteristics on the carrying capacity of the C-5, C-17 and C-130. This basically makes the Army reliant on air mobility to achieve their mission requirements for quick insertion. The Objective Force will also be dependent on AMC to support operational level missions such as forced entry by light forces that are then reinforced by medium weight units to defend or launch offensive operations. Offensive firepower will be in the form of long range land units or air forces. Additionally, the incidence of deep, non-linear operations anticipated for some of the Objective Force’s employment lend themselves to further dependence on theater airlift. (pp 211-12)

11. How will the Objective Force’s airlift requirements differ from those of transitional brigades?

Objective Force’s will rely totally on airlift for deployment and sustainment while engaged in operations in a hostile theater. Transitional brigades will predominantly rely on airlift and sealift until the technological and advanced vehicles become available. The big difference between the two is that Objective Force is totally reliant on airlift for tactical deployment, redeployment and sustainment. (pg 211)

12. How will the Future Combat System (FCS) impact AMC’s support requirement?

The FCS airlift requirements are supposed to be less than required now, but it will impact AMC’s ability to support it because no single aircraft design will optimally fill all of Objective Force’s movement requirements. Objective Force will require a high rate of throughput capacity because of its reliance on airlift, which could directly compete with other NCA priorities. AMC would be hard pressed to identify assets and support deployment if mission planners don’t consider many factors such as infrastructure available in theater and the internal dimensions of cargo bays which are the limiting factors will constrain them most. (pp 211, 213)

13. Explain why USAF strategic airlift is considered inadequate to support two widely separated MTWs fought in close succession, and what are the proposed fixes?

The GAO reported that "DOD does not have airlift and aerial refueling capability to meet the estimated two MTW requirement." This finding was based on estimates that determined that 29% of the airlift and 19% of the refueling requirements could not be met. Some of the proposed fixes are increasing the reliability of the C-5 with a re-engining program, extend the life of C-141B’s past their planned retirement, possibly purchasing more C-17’s, finding ways to better determine structural and corrosion problems on the KC-135 and fully funding spare parts. (pp 221, 223-4)

14. How will sealift augment Objective Force projection?

Sealift will augment Objective Force projection by providing pre-positioned equipment able to be deployed rapidly in support of contingency requirements. This equipment will marry up within 120 hours (division requirement) with its airlifted troop contingent. Additionally, surge sealift requirements will be met by instituting the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Program supplementing DOD assets with commercial carriers to assist in maintaining the warfighters needs. (pp 226-8)

DLO 3: Describe Agile Combat Support as it applies to the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Concept.

15. What are the five basic components of the EAF global infrastructure and how does employment of this strategy impact current policy?

The five basic components of the EAF global infrastructure are forward operating locations (FOLs), forward support locations (FSLs), CONUS support locations (CSLs), responsive/resupply/transport system and a logistics command and control system. Its impact on current policy is that the concept cannot be effectively implemented. This is due to current logistics procedures not being able to support the timing requirements and most is too heavy to heavy to deploy rapidly, thus the impact is actually minimal until new technology and policies can improve the situation in the mid to long term. (pp 232-3)

16. How are basing structure decisions analyzed? How are quantitative metrics a reliable assessment based on results and conclusions?

Logistics support models for five major resource categories were developed to analyze basing structure decisions. The five categories are munitions, fuels support, unit maintenance equipment, vehicles and shelter. The models may focus on single commodities, but they cut across organizational lines where necessary. Each model has three components:

• Mission requirements analysis that specifies the critical mission parameters determining each support commodity’s requirements based on the mission to be flown;
• A set of employment-driven logistics process models to determine timelines to set up the process and the materiel, equipment and people to establish and operate the process;
• A support options analysis that evaluates the performance of alternative infrastructure options in providing these requirements.

Quantitative metrics provides a mechanism to measure the results of different scenarios through key metrics. Through this process, modeling of the key metrics can provide planners with how the requirements change under different scenarios and the tradeoffs that can be made. (pp 234-5, 249)

8. What are the key variables affecting the Agile Combat Support?

The key variables affecting the ACS system design include:

• Options for force composition, employment time line, operation tempo.
• FOL capabilities, including infrastructure and resources, as well as political and military risks associated with prepositioning resources at specific locations.
• Technology options affecting performance, weight and size of test equipment, munitions, support equipment, and other support.
• Resupply time, particularly as it affects initial operating requirements and follow on operating requirements.
• Alternative support policies, such as conducting repair operations at deployed or consolidated support locations.
• Strategic and tactical airlift capacity.

(pp 242)

8. Why does prepositioning assets remain a key element for ACS effectiveness?

In order to get close to the execution order plus 48 hour deadline for getting weapons on target, substantial materiel will need to be prepositioned at the FOL. A bare base can only be used only if the deployment line is extended to 144 hours and substantial material is prepositioned at a regional forward support location, and if intra and inter theater transportation is available to move resources to the FOL. The reason for this conclusion is simple: current support resources and processes are heavy and not designed for rapid deployment to FOLs having limited space to unload strategic lift. Vehicles and material handling equipment are required and airlift of this type of gear will conflict with other mission requirements. Lastly, shelter places another hindrance on quick deployment as it is lift and manpower intensive requiring 100 C-141 (72 C-17) to move and 150 personnel to erect it in 4 days. (pg 244)