The Army’s primary mission is "to fight and win the Nation’s wars". It must do this while transforming the Army into a force that will be responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations. It no longer is just involved in conventional war fighting. Today’s Army is fully engaged in executing and preparing to support the full spectrum of military operations required by the NSS and the NMS. They were involved in peacekeeping in Kosovo, engaged in Korea and Southwest Asia, involved in demining and counter drug operations, and assisted in national disaster assistance both here and abroad. The Army is also in the process of transforming itself into an Objective Force by providing the nation with an Army that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. The Army will pursue a conditions-based strategy that will ensure appropriate conditions are met before implementing subsequent changes. Changes to the operational forces will be the most visible aspects of transformation; however, the simultaneous transformation of the Institutional Army, along with the preservation of a core of trained and ready forces able to address CINC requirements, is an integral part of the strategy. In all of its modernization attempts, the Army strives to sustain interoperability between the AC and RC as well as with other Services and allied forces. (Caldera & Shinseki)

By law, the Army is assigned to defend the US and its territories, support national policies and objectives, and defeat nations responsible for aggression that endangers the peace and security of the US. These tasks, in the context of the National Security environment, drive the size and shape of the Army. As the nations largest land combat force, globally engaged and comprising a wide range of specialized skills, the Army is the force the nation relies on most heavily to perform the full spectrum of military operations. While executing missions, the Army remains ready at all times to meet the war fighting requirements of the NMS: to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs). The Army was involved in the following roles and missions since 1999: continuing to facilitate civil implementation of the Dayton Peace accords in Bosnia in support of NATO; in combination with allies, participated in Desert Fox and Task Force Hawk, and in Korea to deter aggression; with USAREUR, involved in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and other engagement programs to promote stability and interoperability with allies and partners. Army soldiers have been deployed in the Sinai for peacekeeping operations, and continued security and civil assistance in Haiti; involved in humanitarian demining operations in 22 countries, supported the war on drugs at home and abroad, and performed civic assistance missions from Mongolia to Latin America. Ten WMD Civic Support teams have also been fielded to improve the Nation’s posture for responding to incidents regarding WMD.

MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Forces) is the Marine Corps principal organization for the conduct of all missions across the range of military operations. Provides combatant CINCs with a versatile force for responding to a broad range of crisis and conflict situations. They are organized as follows:

• Command Element (CE)-contains MAGTF HQ and other units providing intel, comm., and administrative support; provides C4I2 necessary for effective planning and execution of all operations
• Ground Combat Element (GCE)-task organized to conduct ground operations to support the MAGTF mission; may include infantry, artillery, recon, armor, engineer, and other forces as needed; may vary in size and composition as needed; can include Army, Marine or Allied divisions
• Aviation Combat Element (ACE)-conducts offensive and defensive air operations and is task organized to perform those functions of Marine aviation required to support the MAGTF mission; formed around an aviation HQ with appropriate air control agencies, combat, combat support, and combat service support units; can vary in size and composition.
• Combat Service Support Element (CSSE)-task organized to provide the full range of combat service support functions and capabilities necessary to support the continued readiness and sustainability of the MAGTF as a whole; formed around a CSS HQ and may vary in size and composition.

1. How are Marine capabilities utilized by regional CINCs compared to Army forces?

Marines are used for those contingencies requiring rapid deployment of amphibious or maritime forces. They are considered the nation’s rapid reaction force. They are able to deploy large, combat-ready MAGTFs of any size, on short notice, for operations of any length (pp 76). Because Army elements are larger and heavier, they are more dependent on airlift, and are slower to deploy with the exception of Special Forces or Rangers. The Army also is employed for longer periods of time for various purposes (i.e., Korea, Bosnia, Somalia, etc.)

2. In general terms, how have recent conflicts and an uncertain future threat environment influenced the Army and Marines?

Army-Face with a dynamic international security environment, increased commitment of the Army abroad, and the requirement to prepare for an uncertain future, the Army’s senior leaders announced a new Vision for the Army in October 1999. The Vision will guide the Army’s transformation into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable force: a force designed to meet the challenges of frequent operations in an uncertain international security environment and achieve dominance at every point on the spectrum of operations. They also prepared by including a rigorous program of training, deployments, and exercises, establishment of new multi-component organizations, and continued emphasis on strategic mobility, missile defense, domestic preparedness, and information assurance (pp 11).

Marines-The Marines are committed to exploiting strategic inflection points in military affairs by focusing experimentation, research, development and procurement strategies on bringing the doctrinal concept known as Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) to fruition. It is the marriage between maneuver and naval warfare. The heart of OMFTS is the maneuver of naval forces on the operational level to exploit enemy vulnerabilities to deal a decisive blow. It is directed against a center of gravity whose seizure, destruction, or neutralization will profoundly impact an enemy’s capability to continue the struggle. OMFTS is distinguished from all other species of operational maneuver by the extensive use of the sea for operational advantage (pp 45).

For DLO 2:

3. How do the Army and Marines intend to ensure force relevancy for the future -considering the nature of future conflict, force projection requirements and the lethality of future battlefields?

Army-The Army is focusing on becoming more deployable. They are focusing on three phases:

• The first phase of the transition consists of fielding BCTs at Fort Lewis, WA, that will develop the operational and organizational model for follow-on brigades using existing equipment
• The second phase consists of fielding follow-on or interim brigades using a yet-to-be-determined IAV
• The third phase consists of the total transformation to the Objective Force

Since the Army will be a hybrid force consisting of the transformed and legacy forces until the final Objective Force is realized, sustaining coherent doctrine and institutional support is essential to preserve interoperability (pp.14).

Marines-focusing on seven capability areas: command and control, mobility/countermobility, measured firepower, survivablilty, adaptability, awareness and sustainability. The Marines are also focusing on MOUT (military operations on urbanized terrain) to meet future challenges. They are focusing on a multi-step process requiring an examination of their doctrine, organization, training and education, and support systems by the following means:

• first, they must study and understand the nature of the urban environment and its implications for operational and tactical level operations;
• second, they must determine the techniques, tactics and procedures required to apply maneuver warfare to the urban environment;
• third, they must explore new technologies that will facilitate the conduct of maneuver warfare in future MOUT;
• fourth, they must enhance their ability to train in urban environments;
• fifth, they must consider potential organizational solutions to the challenges of future MOUT;
• lastly, they must integrate their approach to the development of their capabilities for future MOUT (pp. 68-69)
1. Perhaps the greatest challenges facing the Army as it looks to the 21^st century is the pace and magnitude of the changes themselves. How is the Army maintaining current capabilities while transforming itself into a 21^st century Army?

The Army will develop the enhanced capabilities of the Objective Force by combining the integrations of information technologies that have been part of the Army modernization programs for several years with advanced S&T still under development. Based on the initial Brigade Combat Team-validated structure, the Army will field the Interim Force: a force with the characteristics of the Objective Force but within the constraints of available equipment. Through a process called Force XXI, the integration of information technologies into combat and supporting systems-a broad effort known as digitization-is well on the way to realizing tremendous advances in warfighting effectiveness. During the transition, the continuation of Force XXI process is vital to sustain the capabilities of current forces and minimize the cost of operating aging equipment (pp 21-22).

2. How does the Army plan to project power from CONUS into any theater?

The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) is a comprehensive program that addresses infrastructure requirements such as rail, highway, port, and airfield improvements, to facilitate movement of personnel and equipment from bases in CONUS to air and sea ports of embarkation. Under ASMP, the Army also monitors the procurement of the Air Force’s C17 Globemaster III aircraft and additional Navy Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ships to correct the shortfall in strategic lift required to meet Army deployment requirements. The Army’s Global Prepositioning Strategy further strengthens rapid deployment capabilities by prepositioning heavy brigade sets of unit equipment in different strategic regions of the world (pp. 11-12).

3. What complexities appear in timely projecting and employing Army forces in response to varied crises anywhere in the world?

Staying ready to respond requires a rigorous training program. To that end, the Army conducted training at home station, deployments to combat training centers, and major joint and combined training exercises. The integration of AC and RC forces is essential to the employment of the Army. The Objective Force must be responsive to allow the Army to meet frequent contingency requirements with any element of the force. The Army Enterprise Strategy (AES) is the capstone effort to unify and integrate a wide range of command, control, computers, communication and intelligence information (C4I/IT) initiatives from the foxhole to the sustaining base. It is a comprehensive blueprint for information systems that cuts across functional domains and Service boundaries (pp. 15-26).

4. What is the impact on the Air Force and Navy from proposed Army power projection?

To be responsive requires the ability to put forces where needed on the ground, supported by air and naval forces, to directly affect the outcome of the situation or crisis at hand within hours of a decision. The Army does not have control of these assets. Decreasing the heaviness of the Army is something the Army is also working on, using focused logistics as one answer to the problem. The Army is also seeking systems that can be deployed by C130s, see before they can be seen, engage before they can be engaged, and survive a first round engagement. The Army is still very dependent on the other services for airlift and sealift, as well as prepositioning of assets.

5. What are the political barriers or risks of employing ground forces?

Expense, loss of life, long-term commitment of troops, inability to meet all the demands placed on the services

6. How will OMTFS enable Marine forces to respond to the challenges of the strategic environment?

OMTFS (Operational Maneuver From the Sea) is a new concept for amphibious operations published in 1996. The driving idea was to harness the capabilities of new technologies and to make amphibious warfare of continuing usefulness in the post-Cold War world. By applying the percepts of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations, it offers commanders a powerful tool in a joint campaign. It seeks to avoid the frontal assault aspects of historical amphibious assaults and replace them with maneuver against enemy weaknesses. It also seeks to move directly inland without stopping on the beach. It thus avoids the operational pause that has caused many otherwise well-executed amphibious landings to fail. OMTFS sees clearly that the purpose of a landing is not merely to establish a beachhead but to accompany something ashore. Finally, by using training, doctrine, and technology to generate a high tempo of operations, it enables Marines "to act so quickly that the enemy will not be able to react effectively until its too late" (pp.50).

For DLO 3:

7. What is the Army Objective Force; what does it seek to do; how is it being implemented; and what will result from these efforts?

The new Vision charts the course for the Army to transform itself into a force that has the desired characteristics and can sustain dominance at every point on the spectrum of operation. The Objective Force will meet the challenges of the 21^st century by providing the Nation with an Army that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. For specifics on the transformation process, see pp. 18-21.

8. What are the impacts of trying to maintain the "status quo" and implement a new "objective force" simultaneously?

The Army must retain some of its current forces (heavy and light legacy forces) while they transition to the IBCTs. They must be kept as a hedge against potential trouble. New equipment must be developed to create vehicles that are lighter but more survivable. Training and doctrine will also need to be changed. This will require a new way of thinking for the force, seeing mindsets and institutional obstacles as potential problems.

Junior officers will require new and different types of training experiences to command these new units effectively (pp. 29-34).

9. How would you describe expeditionary warfare?
• Going quickly and easily where there is no infrastructure and operating on arrival
• Deploying and employing tailored economical forces and accomplishing the mission, without having to wait for additional assets or personnel
• Immediate operational availability without reserve mobilization
• Force structure dedicated to deployability, self-reliant and self-sustaining for all functions, while en route to and upon arrival; although shaped for joint operations, not dependent on jointness
• Immediately deploying and employing balanced, combined arms and integrated air-ground components of almost any size and configuration
• Educated, trained, and exercised embarkation specialists at all levels, all the time, from the highest command element to the smallest unit
• Organizations, to include aviation squadrons, capable of equipment maintenance at more that one location and as far forward on the battlefield as possible, without support from civilian contracts or depots
• Active duty structure that marshals and manages all supplies to make them readily available from the earliest stage of the deployment or contingency, without having any excess that impeded maneuver and efficiency
• A mindset that accepts exceptionally austere living conditions while on deployment as normal and in the best interests of the US
• Stepping lightly in all areas of support and infrastructure when deployed, to minimize any potential adverse cultural and political impact
• Exceptional flexibility and personnel of all ranks with the initiative to solve problems with minimal support and only broad guidance
• Getting with the people wherever deployed, winning hearts and minds
• Having an innovative mindset, ready to engage in original thinking to solve problems
• Success in those missions where action delayed is action denied, and large base areas to support large forces are unacceptable
• Not done part-time or as an additional duty
1. What influence will the expeditionary warfare environment have on the way it will be fought?

Expeditionary warfare will continue to be fought in the littoral areas of the world-those areas where the sea meets the land-and primarily between the latitudes of 45degrees North and 45 degrees South. All the great crises of this century have occurred within these boundaries, and the following significant facts indicate how important they are:

• 70% of the planet is covered by water and over 80% of the world’s nations are in the littorals
• 7 of every 10 people on earth live within 200 miles of the sea
• 4 of every 5 national capitals are located within the littorals
• 125 cities with a population of over 1 million are located in the littorals, and within 10 years that number will rise to 300 cities

The challenges we face in the littorals are marked by increased crises, increased involvement, and steadily diminishing access-over 867 overseas bases have been closed, replaced or reduced in the last 4 years. This decrease in forward presence, combined with the increase in littoral areas, requires that we concentrate on our ability to undertake expeditionary warfare (pp.70-71).

1. Why is the Marine Corps involved in developing the concept of military operations on urban terrain (MOUT)?

The Marines are also focusing on MOUT (military operations on urbanized terrain) to meet future challenges. They are focusing on a multi-step process requiring an examination of their doctrine, organization, training and education, and support systems by the following means:

• first, they must study and understand the nature of the urban environment and its implications for operational and tactical level operations;
• second, they must determine the techniques, tactics and procedures required to apply maneuver warfare to the urban environment;
• third, they must explore new technologies that will facilitate the conduct of maneuver warfare in future MOUT;
• fourth, they must enhance their ability to train in urban environments;
• fifth, they must consider potential organizational solutions to the challenges of future MOUT;
• lastly, they must integrate their approach to the development of their capabilities for future MOUT (pp. 68-69).