Lesson 32 Concepts of Air Force Employment
12th Edition
Lesson Objective:
To analyze and understand current and future capabilities, limitations, and employment of joint/combined aerospace power.DLO 1: Describe the application of aerospace power for attainment of political aims in future conflict.
Questions for Study and discussion:
Doctrine is a collection of experiences that form the cornerstone of Air Force thinking on the best way to fight. Since doctrine is based on experience it allows for reexamination of the way we fight today’s conflict and projecting out to tomorrow’s threats. This allows for adjustments in organization, weapons systems and force employment to address changes in the environment.
Centralized control provides strategic focus. This allows for the planning of targets to be attacked thus tasking air assets best suited for the missions while maintaining oversight of required changes due to unforeseen events or enemy reaction. Decentralized execution provides the tactical elements the operational flexibility to plan attacks. Aircrews have wide latitude on the tactical details of how they will accomplish the assigned mission.
This concept supports the inherent flexibility and versatility of aerospace power, giving commanders the tools to adapt to changing circumstances while remaining focused on the campaign objectives.
Aerospace forces can strike directly at an enemy’s COG and vital centers. Aerospace power’s ability to strike the enemy rapidly and unexpectedly across all of the critical points, from deep to shallow adds a significant morale impact to an equally devastating physical blow.
Information has evolved from being only an adjunct supporting primary weapon systems to being, in many cases, itself a weapon or target, and perhaps being a field for operational maneuver.
Aerospace surveillance as parts of IO provides the information required for formulating strategy, developing plans, and conducting operations. IW provides psychological operations, military deception, electronic combat, both physical and information attack, and a variety of defensive activities and programs.
That doctrine and the best way to wage war can be undermined by the political will to fully exploit the essence of airpower. In Operation Desert storm the destruction of Al Firdos bunker resulted in tight restrictions on subsequent bombing in the Iraqi capital. During Operation Allied Force, the need to maintain a united front provided every member of the NATO the ability to virtually veto strikes on Serbian targets, thus seriously restricting NATO’s aerial assault.
The ground component is constrained by the definition of his AOR. AOR are defined by front and rear areas and are bounded by other forces operating within their defined AOR. Airmen envision the entire theater of operations as their AOR. Aerospace power can be focused on targets in one part of a theater and transitioned to another part of the theater as conditions or war plans warrant.
The notion of "air occupation" inspired by the no-fly zones being enforced over Iraq lend to the argument that air power can lead to the denial of territory by opposing forces.
DLO 2: Analyze the synergies and frictions in the utilization of joint and combined aerospace power.
Operation Allied Force is an example of the impact coalition warfare with political constraints on military operations hampered the AF mission. Operation Allied Force had elements of (1) political immersion at the tactical level of war (2) the lack of clearly defined goals, and (3) the limited, incremental escalation of conflict. To point one, air planners were required to seek the approval of 19 NATO countries before a single target could make its way onto the ATO. Fixation on the unfortunate reality of collateral damage led to directives from the highest levels of government forbidding the use of particular types of weapons. To point two, instead of providing military planners with clearly defined political goals by which to build a target list, political leaders seemed to focus on individual targets as if the targets themselves comprised the overarching strategy. To the third point, as opposed to the application of overwhelming decisive force, a gradual escalation of number of aircraft, sorties, flown and number and types of targets attacked was the norm. Due to political constraints the fundamental airpower precepts of parallel attack, effects-based targeting, and inside-out warfare were never applied to the war in Serbia.
As opposed to ground forces’ close engagement and the immediate enemy in front of their lines or the need to fight and control territory these elements of combat do not limit aerospace power.
Aerospace power offers nearly unlimited options and unparalleled flexibility. The USAF gained independence from surface forces in order to more effectively carry out so-called independent missions- the most prominent being strategic attack. Sailors have a less constrained view of the world compared to soldiers but their view is significantly constrained by physical and psychological realities. Physical realities in that a ship cannot sail to some places; thus, the naval worldview tends to focus on the high seas and the littorals. Psychologically, because naval vessels are expensive and difficult to replace their protection has a high priority including the use of their naval aircraft for this purpose.
The unparalleled flexibility of aerospace power does not produce unlimited military utility. Aerospace power cannot seize and hold territory. The most significant vulnerability of aerospace power occurs whenever aircraft leave their operating environment. On the ground aircraft are helpless. Near-heroic measures must be taken must be taken to protect them such as hardened shelters or revetments. Additionally aerospace power has its limits:
(from Col Drew reading) As evidence indicates, if organized as part of a surface force to the culture, customs, and mid-set of the parent surface force, airmen will be much less likely to fully and appropriately exploit the unlimited employment options available to them.
American aerospace dominance composed of its force structure, weapons systems and information gathering capabilities build upon its R&D and resulting technology investments leave little doubt but for its allies to allow it to take the lead in times of conflict. America’s allies face the challenge of keeping up and in so doing may only be capable of providing "niche force" that would be of "first tier" capability fitting within an American dominated and led force. The challenge remains for the allies, as a "first-tier" element would be required to interoperate with USAF and contain leading edge systems applicable to its role.
GSTF will be a rapid reaction force employed within the AEF construct and timeline while maintaining interoperability with joint, coalition, and allied assets. GTSF will better meet the needs of CINCs by leveraging our current and near-future capabilities to overcome the challenges our experience has identified and the threat to theater access.
The F-22 and JSF are planned to play a key role in the GSTF. The F-22 will pave the way for the B-2 and other bombers by providing initial local air superiority through the traditional "sweep" role and through air to ground targeting of the enemy’s air defense network. The JSF in the air to ground and suppression of enemy air defense roles will provide continuous presence over the battlefield.
DLO 3: Explain the capabilities, limitations, and force employment considerations of the EAF in support of joint and multinational operations.
The rotational commitment is met with forces from 2 tasked AEFs and an on-call Air Expeditionary Wing, along with mobility and LD/HD assets operating below their defined "surge" lines. This concept will permit the forces and equipment to have an identified planned rotation period from which they may spend an identifiable period of home station duty prior to their next deployment.
The forces in the two AEFs and the on-call AEW could have handled all of the contingencies between Desert Storm and Kosovo without requiring a major surge. However, Kosovo is an example where the AFs engaged did reach a level of effort nearing commitments planned for MTW response. Surge requirements beyond the trigger points of the two AEF and on-call AEW with continuing selective engagement rather than disengagement by CINCs stressed the force to MTW engagement posture.
The EAF concept and the implementation of AEF have moved the AF Vision 2020 forward. The PERSTEMPO and OPSTEMPO goals of Vision 2020 are being realized with some success and some challenges. Identification of shortfalls in low density/high demand assets has placed emphasis in modernization and recapitalization. Rewriting of doctrine to fit the expeditionary mindset and to capture the unique leadership challenges is in progress.
Some responsibilities of unit command are peculiar to and sometimes magnified by, the expeditionary environment. These include determining whom and what to deploy, getting on-site as soon as possible, establishing a relationship with the host-nation commander, making the mental adjustment to the expeditionary environment, and, when the conflict ends, ensuring that redeployment is accomplished in an efficient, effective manner.
Force flow management and requirements, basing, airfields and friendly nation hosting requirements, types of aircraft that friendly nations would support, size of airfields to support specific aircraft, span of control both administrative and physical.