Lesson Objectives: Comprehend force planning as it relates to creating and supporting military capabilities to support US national security strategy, defense strategy, and military strategy, including the purposes, linkages, advantages, and limitations of major elements integral to force planning.

1. Describe US national security strategy, defense strategy, and national military strategy and explain the interface between them.
2. Identify the components of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), explain how each product is used and summarize its sequence of events, from threat evaluation and strategy formulation to planning and force allocation.
3. Describe the roles and purpose of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)..

1. Why do we have a "defense strategy" and a "national military strategy"?

"Defense strategy" [Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)] is the guidance provided from the Secretary of Defense to the military departments for developing their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for the defense planning period. The DPG is the major link between the JSPS and the PPBS.

The NMS is CJCS’ advice to the President, NSC, and Sec Def as to the recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained force structure required to support attainment of national security objectives.

2. How does US defense and national military strategy relate to the National Security Strategy Report?

The national military strategy (NMS) articulates the Chairman’s recommendations to the NCA on how the United States should employ the military element of power in support of the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS).

Consistent with the strategic guidance contained in the President’s NSS and upon NCA direction, the Chairman develops an NMS, which serves as his advice to the NCA on how to employ the military in support of national security objectives.

3. Do significant force requirement changes come from the top down or from the bottom up? Does it change in peace and war? Why?

4. What components of the JSPS provide strategic direction, and what is the function of each component?

Strategic direction in the JSPS consists of three elements that define long, mid, and near-term concepts and objectives and provide the framework for the development of integrated, Service, combatant command, and Defense agency supporting policies and guidance.

CHAIRMAN’S GUIDANCE (CG). The Chairman’s Guidance provides a common set of assumptions, priorities, intent, and critical planning factors, which are required in the development of future strategies and plans. JOINT VISION 20XX (JV 20XX). The Joint Vision document is a long-range vision that provides a common focal point for future planning. The vision recommends concepts for operating within the projected security environment. The Joint Vision provides a conceptual template for follow-on Service and combatant command visions while recognizing the unique aspects of warfighting embodied in each organization’s core competencies. Joint Vision provides a means to study the implications of emerging threats, technologies, and global changes and their effects on joint doctrine, future force structures, requirements, and capabilities. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (NMS). The NMS is one of the vehicles by which the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, fulfills the obligation of providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. The NMS defines the national military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these objectives, and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The NMS describes the strategic landscape and includes a discussion of the potential threats and risks. It also provides strategic direction for the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint Planning Document (JPD).

5. What component of the JSPS provides the formal means to prepare strategic plans?

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasks the CINCs to develop deliberate plans, including operations plans (OPLANS), concept plans (CONPLANS), and functional plans for contingencies and deterrence. It also tasks CINCs to develop theater engagement plans (TEP) for peacetime engagement. The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders on the strategic objectives and priorities for theater engagement activities.

6. Collectively, what statutory responsibility does the JPD, CPA, and CPR address?

The JPD, CPA, and the CPR address the statutory responsibility to "advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the requirements of the combatant commands, individually and collectively and communicate as appropriate, the requirements of the combatant commands to other elements of the Department of Defense." (The Chairman’s planning and programmatic advice to the Secretary of Defense.)

7. What are the functions of the JPD, CPA, and CPR?

Joint Planning Document (JPD): Represents the best possible early authoritative planning and programmatic advice of the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense as he begins the process of developing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The Joint Planning Document (JPD) informs the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) processes of the broad strategic planning and programming direction and priorities of the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The focus is on strategic programming direction.

Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR): Provides more specificity on programs of greatest concern to the Chairman much later in the DPG process. Provides CJCS advice to shape final DPG. It supports the strategic direction of the JPD and adjusts priorities. Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA): Builds on the information developed in both the JPD and CPR preparation process. It provides the Chairman’s assessment of the adequacy of the Service and Defense agency POMs and where applicable, provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on specific alternative program and budget proposals. The CPA focuses on specific requirements to meet objectives.

8. Which components of the JSPS provide the CJCS the means to carry out strategic assessments, and how does each component contribute to this effort?

The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) provides the primary means for the Chairman, in consultation with the CINCs, Services, and Defense agencies, to analyze strategic concepts and issues relevant to strategy formulation. The JSR process continuously gathers information through an examination of current, emerging, and future issues related to threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions. The JSR scrutinizes current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives in order to assess US requirements and objectives in the near, mid, and long term.

The Joint Net Assessment (JNA) process provides the mechanism to assess force strengths and deficiencies and their effect on US ability to meet national security objectives. Additionally, strengths and deficiencies are assessed in terms of their effect on strategic plans. The JNA process provides a strategic-level risk assessment and provides the basis for developing risk associated with alternative force structures and strategies.

9. How does the JSPS identify and evaluate threats? When does this take place in the process?

The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) is the JSPS process for continuously gathering information and examining current, emerging, and future issues, threats, technologies, doctrinal concepts, force structures and military missions. Whenever significant changes in the strategic environment are identified, the JSR working group submits JSR Issue Papers. These papers are initial discussions of proposed changes to the National Military Strategy (NMS). Each year by August 1, a JSR Annual Report is published and summarizes issues studied over the previous year and recommends changes to the NMS.

10. Does publishing the National Military Strategy on an "as needed" basis have an adverse impact on our planning process? Why or why not?

Publishing the NMS on an "as needed" basis does not have an adverse impact on the planning process because the strategic environment is constantly changing and the planning must reflect these significant changes.

11. Does the JSCP adequately assist the JPEC in planning, fighting, and winning future wars?

The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant commanders’ n pursuit of national strategic objectives and to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of the JPEC. The JSCP is the link between strategic planning and joint operation planning conducted through the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The JSCP initiates deliberate joint operation planning by: Assigning planning tasks to the combatant commanders. Apportioning major combat forces and resources. Issuing planning guidance to integrate the joint operation planning activities of the entire JPEC within a coherent, focused framework.

12. Where in the JSPS are forces apportioned? What aspect(s) of the JSPS drive this decision, and what parts of the system are effected by this decision?

Forces are apportioned in the base document of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The decision is driven by such as aspects as; capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. The JSCP results in a directive, which requires the CINCs to revalidate operational plan requirements. It is the principal vehicle that assigns tasks to the combatant commanders to develop operational plans, Concept Plans and functional plans.

13. What is the charter of the Joint Requirements Process and how has it evolved over time? Have the changes improved the overall product of the JROC process?

JROC should:

(1) Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements (including existing systems and equipment) to meet the national military strategy;

(2) Assist the Chairman in considering alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet military requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the program and of the identified alternatives; and

(3) As part of its mission to assist the Chairman in assigning joint priority among existing and future programs meeting valid requirements, ensure that the assignment of such priorities conforms to and reflects resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense through DPG.

Changes:

1986 - VCJCS added to membership

1989 – "Assumes a broader role in the threshold articulation of military needs and the validation of performance goals and baselines for all DAB programs at their successive milestones."

1994 – Owens transformations:

• Increased frequency and length of JROC sessions
• Expanded agenda (into traditional service areas)
• JROC becomes principle method for CINCs to input requirements and priorities into the program and budget process, and their voice for articulating their needs
• Established Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment teams aligned into nine functional areas

Pros:

• Provides a forum where senior service officials must routinely gather, learning more about the programmatic content of the other services’ and, more importantly, their major shortfalls and challenges.
• Provides a mechanism to force a more complete consideration of acquisition programs from the joint perspective.
• Served to highlight serious disconnects between strategic directions and programs before they reach criticality.

Cons:

• JWCAs have become requirements validation and generation bodies rather than sophisticated integrating mechanisms for assessing the most strategically relevant and cost-effective approaches for providing needed military capability.
• Poor record for producing "alternative" program and budget recommendations "within projected resource levels."
• Not timely

14. In the assigned reading, "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?" the author makes a case that the JROC process, as codified by Goldwaters-Nichols and modified by Admiral Owens, is still operating at less than full potential. He highlights structure, consensus and the simple fact that the Services control the budgets, as chief inhibitors. What are his arguments for each and do you agree?

• Structure -- Too service-focused…recommends DCINCs as priniples
• Consensus –
• Services control the budgets -

15. "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?" author suggests improvements to the JROC as follows to change the composition of the JROC … include DCINCs, synchronize JROC products with the PPBS process: CPR … DPG … POM guidance; CPA in time to shape agenda for OSD’s post-POM program review and to renew the focus on connecting warfighting requirements to the longer range planning process and the defense program (i.e. JROC should limit its involvement in the formal budget process and maximize its efforts towards enhancing planning direction and programmatic choice) CPA with goals and tasks. What do you think?

16. Considering the roles and purpose of JROC, does it effectively fulfill its roles and meet its purpose, particularly in regard to maximizing the warfighting capability of the United States and representing the interests and preferences of the warfighting CINCs?

As much as can be expected.