NCA The National Command Authorities (NCA) are the President and the SecDef (or persons acting lawfully in their stead), with the President holding the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense, and the SecDef as the principle assistant to the President in all matters relating to the DoD. They will direct the Armed Forces in their execution of military action. No one else can direct movement or execution of military action but the NCA, unless action is taken in self-defense. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the Nat’l Security Act of 1947 to be the principal forum to consider national security issues that require Presidential decisions.

Four statutory members, President, VP, SecState and SecDef. Chairman of JCS and the Director of the CIA are statutory advisors. But it was the Nat’l Security Act of 1947 that created the separate, cabinet level military services, co-equal with the secretary of the National Military Establishment (NME). The 1949 National Security Act changed the name to DOD and moved the Services to military departments within DOD. Under a strengthened DOD and with the Reorganization Act of 1958 clear direction, authority, and control of the DOD rested with the SecDef. Likewise the operational chain of command was clarified to run from the President to the SecDef to the combatant commands.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders (CINCs), and oversees their activities as directed by the SecDef, but does not exercise military command over any combatant forces. Acts as the principle military advisor to the NCA.

2. Does the national military command structure define the balance of power between the CINCs and the Services? How are competing interests balanced?

The operational chain of command runs directly from the President, through the SecDef to the CINCs. This direct chain of command, from the NCA to the CINCs, preserves civilian control of the military and assists in the expeditious flow of political guidance and military objectives from the political leaders to the war fighters.

The translation of political guidance into military objectives is also aided by the requirement in the Goldwater-Nichols act that the SecDef publish annual Defense Planning Guidance to the heads of DoD components. This guidance then becomes the basis for service budget requests and for deliberate and crisis planning done by the CINCs. Competing interests are not really balanced.

3. In the past the U.S. has postured for a 2 ½ war, then a 1 ½ war requirement, and now has a 2 "near simultaneous" Major Theater War strategy. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach? Are there alternatives to scenario-based force planning?

PLACE YOUR OPINION HERE:

By law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principle military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The CJCS alone functions within the chain of command by transmitting communications to the commanders of the combatant commands from the President and the SecDef, but does NOT exercise military command over any combatant forces (1953 amendment to the NSA of 1947).

• Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces
• recommending changes in assignment of functions, roles, and missions to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces

• Strategic Planning
• Contingency Planning and Preparedness
• Requirements, Programs and Budget
• Advisor to the NSC establishing combatant commands, reviewing plans, consulting with the CINCs and Service Chiefs, providing representation to the UN.

4. What are the roles of the CINCs, the Service Chiefs, and the Joint Staff in this process?

CINCs: The Commanders in Chief (CINCs) or commanders of combatant commands directly responsible to the NCA for performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands, and exercise combatant command (COCOM) of all assigned forces. The CINCs develop strategy and plans; organize, deploy ans employ forces; and conduct military operations necessary to achieve the assigned objectives.

Service Chiefs: The service chiefs insure the individual services organize, train and equip forces with special capabilities that are dominant in their fields and supply them to the CINCs. They have principal responsibility for research, development, test and evaluation of weapons systems for their individual medium as well as for developing and articulating innovative concepts and methods for their employment. They support the CINCs in the accomplishment of their warfighting mission.

Joint Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the Chairman (the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces), the Vice Chairman (the second highest ranking member of the Armed Forces), the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Responsibilities of the Joint Staff take precedence over the duties of the military services. The Joint Staff translate the vision, policy and strategies provided by civilian leaders into a national military strategy and strategic objectives that provide the foundation for service and unified command strategies and plans.

5. How does the current organization lend itself to the effective translation of political guidance into military objectives? Are there any problems? What impact do political factors have on the selection of military objectives?

Congress intended the Goldwater-Nichols Act to clarify the command line to the combatant commanders and to preserve civilian control of the military. The Act made combatant commanders accountable to the NCA for performing their assigned missions. For purposes of directing non-operational forces assigned to combatant commands, authority flows from the President through the SECDEF to the Service Secretaries--who exercise authority, direction and control through the individual Service Chiefs. The result has been greater autonomy for the CINCs to conduct combat operations. Proponents of the act viewed service chiefs and service commanders in the field as obstructionists to smooth national military command advice and cohesive multiservice cooperation in the field. The law has proven effective in various ways. The services seem to understand each other better and work together more efficiently. The development and upward flow of military advice are unquestionably smoother, and that advice is arguably as good or better than it was in the past. Interservice relationships are stronger.

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD reorganization act strengthened the role of the Chairman JCS with one hand and weakened it with the other by failing to provide adequate resources in four crucial areas. CJCS is charged with developing joint doctrine but is so understaffed and underfunded that doctrinal development must be passed to the services, which seem unable to handle it. Further, the CJCS must asses service capabilities, yet a more rigorous evaluation is needed. Joint training also pose a dilema: the services train forces for joint operations but no one has responsibility for training CINCs and their staff to use those forces. Finally, the Joint Staff evaluates preparedness (readiness) under a uniform system that is not up to the job.

It strengthened the SecDef position by clarifying that the position is in the operational chain of command. (pg. 9: "The ‘chain of command’ runs from the President to the SecDef, and from the SecDef to the commander of the combatant command.")

The law also strengthened the CJCS by designating the position as the principal military advisor to the President and transferring to him the functions and responsibilities previously assigned to the corporate body of the JCS (i.e., oversight of the Joint Staff and advice to the NCA). Additionally, Goldwater-Nichols explicitly stated that the JCS have no executive authority to command combatant forces.

For DLO 3:

6. What major changes resulted from the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986? Have those changes strengthened or weakened the system?

Goldwater-Nichols made the combatant commanders accountable to the NCA for performing their assigned missions. The SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, is now required to provide annually to the heads of DoD components written policy guidance for the preparation and review of the program recommendations and budget proposals of their respective components. This guidance will include: (a) national security objectives and policies; (b) the priorities of military missions; and (c) resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such recommendations and proposals are to be effective.

Strengthened

Empowered by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, DoD has made great strides in preparing for joint operations and managing defense resources. Major accomplishments include:

Distinguished between the operational contributions of the services and unified commands. This provided for effective and efficient operations by assigning the specific responsibilities for organizing, training and equipping forces to the services, while delegating the planning and execution of those operations to unified commands. This eliminated previous ambiguity.

Changed the role of the CJCS in relation to the service chiefs and CINCs, made him principle military advisor to the President and SecDef, assigned the JCS to him and made clear the chain of command ran from the President through the SecDef to the CINCs. This diluted the influence the services had over DoD activities and increased the authority of the CINCs. The Goldwater-Nichols act tipped the scales in favor of jointness over service interests.

Weakened

Destroying service individuality risks losing balanced military judgement and combat effectiveness that is dependent on that same individuality.

The creep of the Joint Staff into service responsibilities as regards resource allocation and program evaluation and their imposition on unified commanders threaten the national level focus on strategic military planning and advice and defuses the operational focus at the combatant commandeer level.

By the CJCS casting a "muzzling vote" instead of deciding vote compromises the quality of military advice provided to, and the implementation of decisions of, the President and the SecDef.

Service views and advice must not be ignored at the peril of balanced, joint military advice and cohesion within the joint system.

7. What further changes need to be made in the future and why?

Several changes can be made including some method of assessing and evaluating CINC staff in the utilization and execution of joint operations. May invite retired CINC's to rate active ones. Enhancing exercise evaluations, enacting legislation to bolster the doctrine process and lifting the manpower cap on the Joint Staff. The CJCS can conduct analysis and evaluations of the CINCs and their staffs for the SecDef who has direct authority over the CINCs.

8. What impact has this reorganization had on the interplay between the military and the Congress?

The Act made combatant commanders accountable to the NCA for performing their assigned missions. It brought greater direct civilian oversight to the military and at the same time greater interaction between senior military officials and political leaders.