Sign In Sign-Up

Welcome!

Close

Would you like to make this site your homepage? It's fast and easy...

Yes, Please make this my home page!

No Thanks

  Don't show this to me again.

Close

LATIN AMERICA—12^TH EDITION

DLO 1: Identify the developmental trends and security challenges that face the region.

Q1: What are the threats to security in Latin America? The most important identified by the Clinton administration are "drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, firearms trafficking and terrorism." Other security related concerns include the stability of international borders, nurturing the fragile and relatively new democracies in the region, human rights, and civil-military relationships (encourage civilian control of the military…discourage coup-de-etats), and helping nations cope with many and varied internal security challenges (insurgencies, etc.).

Q2: How do the problems in Colombia affect its neighboring countries? The problems associated with the drug war (to include quasi-communist paramilitary groups Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional—ELN, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarieas de Colombia—FARC, supported by the Soviet Union) have displaced an estimated 1.6 million individuals within Colombia. Many of these are emigrating to Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama creating a large refugee problem in these surrounding states. Other effects include drug and arms trafficking, guerrilla and paramilitary activity. Brazil is particularly concerned with the drug and arms trafficking as well as FARC incursions. Other threats to Brazil include smuggling contraband ranging from guns to exotic animals; direct assaults against the environment and economy from illegal loggers, gold miners, fisherman, and hunters. Equador is also negatively effected.

Q3: What are the various threats to democracy in Latin America? The greatest threats are illegal migration, arms trafficking, crime and corruption, and illegal drug trafficking. Collectively, these transnational threats destabilize fragile democracies by corrupting public institutions, promoting criminal activity, undermining legitimate economies and disrupting social order. Another key threat is a rise in authoritarian democracies there. Eight trends epitomize this phenomena: 1) enlargement of the military’s presence in civilian instituitions; 2) the growing use of authoritarian practices by civilian governments; 3) creation or resurrection of domestic security and intelligence doctrines and missions for the military; 4) use of political intelligence organizations by civilian governments; 5) the continuing impunity for human rights violators; 6) the growing resort to the use of paramilitary groups and unregulated private security agencies; 7) a growing trend toward "continuismo;" 8) tendency for retired military officers to enter presidential politics.

Q4: What effect did Mercosur have on its member countries’ defense policies? MERCOSUR has meant the lowering of barriers to the free flow of goods between the member countries Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil and has helped associates Chile and Bolivia. They have benefited economically from this which has provided some momentum for defense collaboration between the states. There are signs of military cooperation but not integration. Members are participating in cooperative confidence building measures to include: military visitations, informational exchanges and joint exercises. Command centers and combat units have opened to periodic visitation by officers from each of the MERCOSUR countries. Navies have set up liaison offices for such visits. Some air force war colleges have joined in a student exchange program.

DLO 2: Summarize the range of US security interests in the region.

Q5: What issues face the US in managing its security relationship with Mexico?

First the relationship with Mexico has improved and deepened due to increased trade associated with the NAFTA. It has increased democratization in Mexico. Key problems with Mexico continue to be corruption and violence (much related to the drug trade), cleanup of corruption in political institutions, as well as poverty, and illegal immigration from Mexico to the US. The US wants to continue the democratization of Mexico with the elimination of corruption in government in order to more fully stabilize the country and curtail poverty.

Q6: Why does the US still maintain an adversarial relationship with Cuba, despite its diminished strategic importance in the post-cold war era?

Reasons include:

1) "Distribution of power in the international system, as it changed with the end of the cold war in Europe, is a major explanation for both the dramatic redesign and curtailment of Cuban foreign policy and the repositioning of US policy toward Cuba". This means: at the end of the cold war, Cuba lost it’s main ally and economic/military supplier (the USSR).Hence, it cut back on it’s formidable overseas military adventures; plus, trade dropped of dramatically. They could no longer afford to be a player on the world stage, and their military was no where near as well financed as before. The US, sensing their weakness, responded by using it’s economic muscle to make it clear to other nations seeking US assistance that they would not get any (assistance) if they remained friends with Cuba. Hence, the ‘reason’ (referring back to the original question) that we maintained the adversarial relationship is because our relative power made this position attractive (because ‘we could’).

2) Ideological differences. US policy towards it’s ‘near neighbors’ has long been to prescribe the nature of domestic politics and economics (see Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary). Nothing in this area has changed since the cold war except perhaps that Cuba has lost it’s revolutionary belief system. Hence, Cuba is more vulnerable to the spread of alternative belief systems, and the stronger nation (the US) has adjusted by expanding it’s intrusive ambitions beyond shaping international behavior toward determining the structure of domestic politics. The US Helms-Burton Act re-enforces this theme. Helms-Burton claims for the US the unilateral right to decide a wide array of domestic policies and arrangements in a nominally sovereign post-Castor Cuba.

3) A third explanation considers the role of domestic politics in both countries, arguing that hardliners in each have, perhaps unwittingly, helped each other in sustaining or fostering confrontational policies. In particular, members of Congress and certain Cuban American organizations have succeeded in reshaping US policy toward Cuba in the 1990s by making use of "mobilizing incidents"; namely, public events that have served as opportunities to encourage the hardline Congressional minority to push through new legislation. Examples:

a) The Cuban Democracy Act: partisan politics during the Bush-Clinton presidential campaign was sufficient to get this signed into law (to attract swing voters).

b) Helms-Burton Act: popular pressure forced this bill into being signed after the "Brothers to the Rescue" aircraft shootdowns in 1996 (p129-131).

4) The ‘ultimate question’: why hasn’t the US invaded Cuba. It is argued that this is due to successful deterrence on the part of Cuba. This deterrence has two important aspects:

a) The Cuban military, while a shadow of it’s former self, is still powerful, and could potentially inflict numerous casualties on an invading force.

b) The second dimension of this deterrence is political. US stated policy is for ‘peaceful transition’ to democracy in Cuba. Also, US policy toward Cuba, particularly the Helms-Burton Act, is opposed by most US allies. An invasion would most certainly be met with much criticism by the world community.

Q7: What difficulties in Latin America threaten US security? Ranked in order they are: Narcotics (Extremely High), Proliferation of major weapons systems (High), Proliferation of sensitive technology (High), Terrorism (High), International Crime (High), Small Arms (High), Environmental Damage (High), Immigration (Medium-High), Natural disasters (Low), Domestic Crime (Low), Resource disputes (Low) Social violence (Low), Fishing disputes (Low). What important and humanitarian interests does the US have in Latin America?

Q8: What challenges does DoD face in supporting US policy in Colombia? Becoming directly involved in a war against the FARC, ELN and drug lords with the Colombian government by our side. We are already spending large amounts of money there and could get more and more involved in the internal affairs of the state as this country vacillates and the people suffer under drug lord directed attacks and pressure.

DLO 3:

Q9: What is the USSOUTHCOM strategy for shaping regional security?

In two words: "Regional Engagement" in an economy of force theater and counternarcotics operations.."We believe that if we skillfully shape the hemispheric security environment, we will not have to respond to crises…"

Five aims that provide the foundation for our regional engagement strategy:

1) Sustain, strengthen and expand multilateral security cooperation with and among security forces in the region.

2) Assist in development of roles and missions, and appropriate modernization of regional security forces.

3) Assist in peaceful resolution of disputes and promote confidence and security building measures.

4) Promote and support democratic institutions and civilian control of military and security forces.

5) Promote and support respect for human rights and the environment and adherence to the rule of law.

To achieve these strategic aims Southern Command uses a wide array of engagement tools.Among them are combined operations, combined exercises, combined training and education, military to military contact programs, security assistance programs and humanitarian assistance programs.

Q10: How do security interests differ amongst states in the region? Widely… For example. In Costa Rica, they have a well established democracy and a police force. They have signed agreements with the US for the US to come to their rescue in the event of any rogue invasion. They’ve taken the savings and applied it to their school system. Even in the Mercosur countries there are significant differences: Argentina is aggressively international in its security stance; Brazil’s defense concerns, however, have much more to do with protection of sovereignty and civil defense, especially in remote areas in the Amazon, surveillance of coastal areas, and development of national scientific capability. The increased proximity of the Argentines to the US has given rise to misunderstanding by Brazil about US intentions---for example, training exercises—in the region. For its part, Chile, an associate member of the Mercosur, has a more traditional focus on national security missions as external defense; the military exhibits greater autonomy form civilian oversight, and it is able to rely on earmarked copper funds for modernization. Internal civil-military relations in Paraguay are unstable.

Q11: What are the costs and benefits associated with the current level of emphasis placed upon counter narcotics efforts in the US security approach to the region? What have the US and the countries of Latin America been doing to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the US?

First question: Costs include lives and billions of dollars. Sadly, none of our measures have had a marked effect on the availability or price of cocaine in the US. Many argue that the current approach of attacking the ‘supply-side’ is ineffective. The ‘demand’ in the US must be reduced. They further argue that continued emphasis on the supply-side will incur high costs in the areas of human rights and democratization throughout the region. Interdiction successes are widely publicized and touted, but no responsible government official has claimed significant success. It could also be argued that the US has done little to curb the flow of automatic weapons South, through Miami, to Latin America. Automatic weapons in Latin America are somewhat analogous to cocaine in the US, in that they represent a legitimate threat to regional security; and ironically, their ready availability thwarts the local authorities’ ability to combat drug manufacturers and traffickers.

Second question: "We have devised a three part strategy to achieve our counternarcotics goals:"1) application of innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures (smart application of scarce resources to hit ‘choke’ points, and continually refine strategy to match evolving strategy of the traffickers); 2) promoting effective regional responses (move from bilateral to multi-lateral and regional responses); and 3) pursuing better coordination and more effective employment of interagency resources (Coast Guard, DEA, Dept of State).

The US philosophy has changed and evolved since the late 1980s…from information gathering and training of indigenous military/police forces, to spending large amounts of resources to detect and monitor air and sea shipments of drugs to the US(radar/sensors)…interdiction in ‘transit zones’. Then, in 1993, Presidential Directive 14 shifted the emphasis away from transit zones to stopping drugs at their source in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru…crop eradication and substitution programs. Most of the US militaries energy, at least in terms of public promotion, is now being spent on source country programs, and in particular it’s attack on the so-called air bridge that connects coca growers and coca paste manufacturers in Peru and Bolivia with Colombian cocaine refiners and distributors. This has been combated by the drug lords through ‘verticalization’ and by changing the modes of movement for material (eg. Rivers and overland). Part II of the question—what have Latin American countries been doing to stem the flow of drugs: Increased militarization of anti-drug efforts. Many argue that this is encouraged through economic incentives from the US (direct military assistance, "certifying" countries receiving US assistance in the drug war. It is also argued that this detracts from democratization by making the military a police force, spying on it’s own citizens, etc.. ‘Hot pursuit’ issue: the US has attempted to create bilateral agreements with Latin American nations regarding ‘hot pursuit’ of narco-traffickers, but has met with resistance in some cases, due to concerns about sovereignty. Intense US pressure was required to extract agreements from some nations.

Q12: What are the prospects for a political transition to democracy in Cuba? It is still some way off. What should the US do now to influence such a change? Continue decreasing the strength of the embargo. Bolster funding to democracy-building and humanitarian aid to nongovernmental sectors in Cuba. Host Cubans in the United States, especially professionals and undergraduate students. The cap on remittances should be lifted (currently restricted to $300 / month) because those receiving such money have relatives in the US. Permit "Cash-and Carry" sales of certain products like food and medicine (since Castro uses the limitations on these with respect to the US embargo to attack the US). Permit conditional US investment on the island. Open the US to goods produced by self employed Cubans. Reinvigorate the voice of freedom to Cuba—Radio Marti and also TV Marti. Lift the travel restriction to Cuba. Enforce reciprocity in the treatment of diplomats. Pursue an enforceable international convention on property rights. Seek new allies to promote democratic change in Cuba.

Q13: What effect will continued economic integration in Latin America have on security for Latin America and the US? It will enhance the economy, and increase military cooperation--increasing security for Latin Americans and make them more of a significant entity to deal with for the US. This of course is good and bad. Good in that they will be more stable and responsive to each other, but bad because if they disagree with US policies they will have much more muscle to do as they please.