It is clear that civilian control of U.S. Military is weaker than in the Cold War Period.

Domestic explanation does not fit the bill

-during WWII and Cold War civilian leaders knowledgeable about and attentive to military affairs; military highly cohesive, externally focused; civilian and military ideas about use of force and nature of international politics compatible

From the beginning of the republic, American political leaders took steps to ensure that a standing army would not pose a threat to domestic liberty. Civilian leaders have historically been concerned to limit military influence on foreign policy.

Before WWII: widespread concern that American democracy and large standing army incompatible.

During WWII U.S. was model of military subordination to civilian authority.

Between WWII and Cold War: "revolt of admirals in 1949" = Naval officers criticize re-org plans and canceled supercarrier in public media; Truman’s ends racial segregation in 1948 despite military, congressional and public opposition.

Cold War: Period of relatively firm civilian control. Ex: Truman fires MacArthur, Civil prefer limited war in Vietnam

Post Cold War: Gen Powell unprecedented political role (publish op ed articles); Military’s public disdain for Clinton.

Reasons for change: New generation of civilian leaders with little military experience/interest in military; weakening civilian institutions; civilian leaders trying to politicize the military; military unity decreased-interservice rivalry increased; diverged ideas about new missions (MOOTW), use of force and nature of international system (Powell Doctrine);

Two social issues deeply divided civilians/military: women in combat; homosexuality exclusion policy

Conclusion: State facing significant external threat/few internal threats likely to have firm civilian control; in contrast, a state facing diminishing external threat and few internal threats is likely to have less firm civilian control of the military.

[The Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society; 4,900 person survey]

"Absent an urgent threat to the nation’s security, a democratic state will not nurture and support an adequate military, and the military’s loyalty to civilian authority will diminish.."

Not a new concern: 1950’s-- Huntington: Civilian society should tolerate, if not embrace, conservative values of military…politicians should allow armed forces cultural autonomy. However, Janowitz argued in a democracy, military culture adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to needs/dictates of civilians

The Real Gap: military officers much more conservative than civilian elite, but not more conservative that general public

Factors Shaping Gap:

Media plays complex role, but major daily newspaper do not generally portray armed forces in harsh light

Republicanization of officer corps: Vietnam fallout, Regan era, military academies fail to provide understanding of American society, culture, tradition of civilian-military relations

Declining personal connections to military; less veterans in congress and civilian political elite

Emerging professional norms: proper for military to insist, rather than advise on key policy, strategy

Implications:

Critiques that gap not important: not a new concern; principle challenges of retention, modernization, organization, mismatch of missions to resource are not chiefly caused by this gap

Senior military leaders understand once civilian decision made it is its duty is to execute—distrust of civilians expressed in lower ranks; divergence of opinion between senior and junior ranks

Systemic change needed: place officers in civilian internships; civ-mil relation education at all officer courses

"Over last 30 years, fundamental concepts of military professionalism in the United States have eroded, at times to an alarming degree."

Civilian-Military relationship in democracy is difficult; setting up opposing values, powerful institutions with great resources, inevitable tensions between military and statesmen. Difficulties more acute in U.S. due to two great changes: end of centuries old "mass army" with volunteer, high tech force; America’s global position—never before (including Roman Empire) has one military towered over all others on the planet, "transition to imperial role" (i.e. CINCs as policymakers).

Three levels of Civil-Mil Relations:

Relationship between military and society as a whole: military yields to trends in society (women & homosexual issues); rise of assertive individualism (barracks to dorms); redefinition of core military virtues needed

Interaction between military as set of institutions and counterparts in civilian society: increased visibility and interpentration have become norm; military becomes public institution by incorporating practices/ethics (ex: management fads)

Power relationships at pinnacle of government: military becoming accustomed to extensive political/diplomatic roles

Long term consequences:

Growing politicization of officer corps, recruitment/retention problems, collapse of junior officer confidence in leaders, antipathy between military and civilian cultures, stagnation in development of military forces for new geopolitical era

Paradox problem: increased social and institutional vulnerability to military; increased military influence on policymaking

Solution: need new professional code; DoD White Paper on Civ-Mil relations; revise The Armed Forces Officer pamphlet

Documents should include: 1) recognition of how military should/should not resemble civilian society; 2) interpret bounds of military involvement in policymaking; 3) define "military advice" to civilian leadership; 4) state principles of civilian control; 5) honestly reflect tensions and difficulties of American civil-military relations

Most important is willingness…of civilian and soldier alike to recognize the problems…treat them with high seriousness.

"..armed forces have never been a mirror of society. Nor should they be."

Over next 20 years U.S. military will revert to garrison status, largely self-contained and increasingly distinct as a separate society and subculture. Civilian-Military gap could represent failure of Clausewitz’s trinity (people, military, government).

Review of history shows gap always existed. During times of peace, it is common for military to feel alienated.. when a true national threat develops, the country and its military are likely to operate in sync once more.

How is Mirror Cracked:

Fewer bases, reduced presence means less military connection to U.S. families and communities.

Military personnel more conservative, estranged from political and moral views of society. This is not new: Prior to 1917, military lived in posts with considerable physical and intellectual isolation from civilian America. After the Civil War, military officers felt strong feeling of detachment and rejection of civilian values. Before WWII, Huntington quote "the soldier and the civilian belong to separate classes of society".

Military losing demographic ties with society: more recruits from military families, volunteer force is "economic draft"

Lack of knowledge and experience concerning military by public and government elites, new generation of civilian leaders

Uncertainty of military role model: citizen soldier tradition; all volunteer force created separate military caste

Today’s military officer more politically active and willing to criticize civilian leaders

Good Gap:

Military innovation can flourish in times of separation and neglect (professional study after Civil War, post WWI creativity)

Military should support general interests and values of society, helpful to have officer corps representative of diversity ; to reflect society military should respond to social forces and change (ex: racial desegragation and women).

Best relationship between military and society is "educated skepticism", military standards distinct from those of general society and a society that appreciates the need for the difference.

Witnessing a "return to normalcy, rather than crisis", trends seen before as U.S. turns away from war and adjusts to peace

U.S. Military , especially its brass, has long tradition of maintaining at least the appearance of being apolitical.

Many current and retired officers seemed to cross the apolitical line. Those in service more open about political affiliations. The danger critics see is more partisan rank and file could undercut support for military across the political spectrum. Willingness of retired officers to endorse political parties could prompt future presidents to select appointees to senior commands based on their political views rather than military experience. Critics warn that so many four-star officers backing a candidate, openly and in concert, undermined the military’s carefully cultivated apoliticalism.

Act designed to create more appropriate balance between joint and service interests. There were 8 purposes:

1) Reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority

"The Secretary has sole and ultimate power within the DoD on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act". Chairman (of JCS) is principal military advisor. Critics claim CJCS more influential role undermines civilian authority.

2) Improve military advice provided to President, NSC and SecDef

Created Vice Chairman as second ranking military officer. CJCS has full authority of Joint Staff. Significant improvement over "lowest common demoninator of whatever the chiefs could collectively agree upon".

3) Place clear responsibility for mission accomplishments of unified/specified commands on the CINCs of these combatant commands

"All commentaries and after action reports on Desert Shield/Storm attribute success of … changes in chain of command.."

4) Ensure authority of unified/specified CINCs is fully commensurate with responsibility of those CINCs to accomplish missions assigned

Initial service claims that it would make CINCs warlords quickly vanished. Widely agreed successful based on effective performance of unified/specified commands in operations and peacetime activities.

5) Increase attention to strategy formation and contingency planning

4 provisions: President must submit annual report on National Security Strategy; CJCS must prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans; SecDef must give written policy guidance on prep and review of plans; Under SecDef for Policy give role in assisting work on contingency plans

"Progress was modest until recently" JCS reluctant to reveal plans to civilian officials.

6) Provide for more efficient use of defense resources

"Implementation has not achieved the potential of reforms with exception of Gen Powell’s effective use of resource advisory role in formulation Base Force" (reducing Cold War force structure by 25 percent).

7) Improve joint officer management policies

"…[results of the Act] notably improved the performance of those selected to serve in joint duty assignments. … The failure over the last decade to develop a DOD directive to govern the joint officer management program confirms the lack of commitment on the part of top civilian and military organizations."

8) Enhance effectiveness of military operations and improve DoD management and administration

" The overwhelming success of JustCause and Desert Shield/Storm revealed the extent to which the act had unified the Armed Forces" In regards to improved management and administration…"remedies for …management problems were largely ineffective. The defense bureaucracy remains far too large. Duplication of effort is still a problem. DOD lacks a concept for appropriate division of work among its major components."

CINCs have evolved into modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire’s proconsuls—well funded, semiautonomous, unconventional center of U.S. foreign policy.

CINCs control HQ budgets outside Washington totaling $380 million/year. They travel non-stop, oversee multimilliondollar foreign study institutes and round-the-clock intelligence centers, host international conferences and direct disaster relief.

..the swelling institution of CINC caused by budgetary prowess and nature of post-Cold War military engagements (i.e. peacekeeping and nation-building) has steadily pushed uniformed CINCs into expanded diplomatic and political roles.

…during 1990s, Clinton Admin found it easier to win funding for foreign policy initiatives (from Republican controlled congress) if handled through the Pentagon rather than the State Department.

If today’s Pentagon is too engaged in non-military missions, it is partly because CINCs feel they need to fill a void

From vantage points of 1000s of miles from Washington, CINCs see problems with some U.S. foreign policy and their own Pentagon leadership. …as CINC demands broadended, jobs attracted different breed-military leaders not known as company men. (ex: Gen Clark & Adm Blair are Rhodes scholars & white house fellows)

CINCs routinely received by heads of state who offer gifts, share secrets and seek advice. Bountiful resources and open-ended mandate allow CINCs to engage tiny countries and on obscure foreign policy issues. Since the end of the Cold War, CINCs have helped shift America’s strategic thinking. (ex: Gen Clark push NATO troops toward nation-building in Europe)

Congressional funding for overseas missions increasingly favors the Pentagon’s regional CINCs adopting tasks previously handled by civilians. (ex: Gen Zini as CENTCOM CINC became one of U.S.’s most important diplomats—not other U.S. official in the region spent more time trying to build relationships with nations where virtually none existed.) CINCs have access to highest levels of government. …Gen Zini’s efforts were significant because "face time" matters at this stage.

CINCs command so much respect in their theaters and in Washington that they often shape foreign relations strategy. …[CINC] philosophies on building alliances abroad…sometimes clash with civilian views…most pronounced…involve how to treat foreign militaries that commit human rights abuses. (ex: Guatamala, Chile, Columbia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Indonisia).

Adm Blair’s promoting of military alliances or "security communities", initially opposed by DoD and Dept of State..now filtering into U.S. policy.

Adm Blair visit to Indonisia not welcomed by U.S. Ambassador Gelbard, but "ironed out differences". Blair pressed U.S. case (for accountablility trials for Army human rights abuses). In the end Blair and Gelbard sent joint cable to Washington, agreed to cut out the middlemen and talk directly to each other.

American officer corps has adopted the post-Cold War peacekeeping mission with considerable reluctance…most clearly manifested [by] Gen Powell…who…cautioned against extensive U.S. commitments to global peacekeeping efforts.

U.S. Army War College offers peacekeeping courses only as electives, outside the core curriculum…the few American officers …who do take them tend NOT to be mainstream, combat arms officers.

Military reluctance to peacekeeping attributable to 3 sources:

1. Victory Problem: peacekeeping seldom yield clear cut victory; protracted indecisive operations erode military support
2. Politics Problem: complex contingencies of peacekeeping do not fit military answers; warriors uninterested in politics
3. Readiness Problem: peacekeeping missions sap funds for training and spare parts

Gen Powell’s Skepticism: During senate hearing Powell aware of civilian control issue, "soldiers are supposed to do what our civilian leaders wish us to do… We are not fighting the President". However, his opposition to Bosnia was not concealed.

Critics claim Powell’s accumulation of power as dangerous: Civilian leadership must get blessing of CJCS before they do anything. Powell accused of devising bureaucratic strategies and using political savvy under Goldwater-Nichols Act to assure his view of peacekeeping would dominate in Washington during his tenure.

Enter Gen Shaliksashvilli as new CJCS: Familiar with noncombatant effects of warfare as immigrant from Germany after WWII. Acquanted with political-military quandaries of counterinsurgency fromVietnam. Rose through every unit of command versus Powell having high visibility Washington jobs.

Somolia and Rwanda: Lessons learned: need to inform congress and public better about inherent risks of casualties in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions—and re-inform them if the mission changes. Has undogmatic approach on use of force, "judge on case-by-case basis"

Haiti: Allowed DefSec Perry to "carry the ball", even behind closed doors. Appears to recognize that engaging in policy advocacy …would violate military professionalism. …correctly understood his job as CJCS was to design options, and seek clarification of political tasks, not generate broad definitions of American foreign policy interests or appraisals of American political willpower. After Haitian policeman kills demonstrator in full view of peacekeeper, President displeased with Gen Shaliikashvili’s explaination, SecDef Perry announces new guidelines for peacekeepers, but Gen Shalikashvili’s never comments to press. Author states this was conforming to high standard of military professionalism.

Bosnia: Had legitimate concerns about limited airstrikes, but defended limited strikes by Britain and France to avoid embarrassing the NATO allies. Directly challenged "Powell Doctrine", "challenges not built for black and white, clear cut solutions. State problems were not with Administration, but inability to convince international partners.

Published Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War: breaks with predecessors in two ways: 1) politics considered—MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations…officers must understand the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions and be prepared to adjust to a change in political objectives. 2) promulgates virtues of flexibility, MOOTW doctrine should provide President may possible options during unsettling situations.

Impact on Dayton Accord: Insisted that military annex contain "silver bullet", allowing peacekeepers the right to use force against a perceived threat. Maintained peacekeepers not be responsible for election security, conducting humanitarian missions or clearing mines (i.e. no mission creep).

Author’s conclusion: Gen Powell took a dim view of peacekeeping of violated professional norms in making sure that his skepticism was duly noted by public and civilian leadership. Shaliikashvili restored balance to American civilian-military relations. He was no military yes-man, frequently injected caution into adminstration deliberations about peacekeeping, let civilian leaders decide about invading Haiti. The central concern is that President receives highest quality expert advice, the mil-civ relation problem was exaggerated by Goldwater-Nichols Act. American civil-military tensions, the result of numerous social and political dynamics, will continue. The crisis, however, appears to have passed.

2. Analyze how changes in the national security structure derived from Goldwater-Nichols may impact civilian-military relations.

3. Evaluate the impact of changing values between civilian elites and military leaders.

Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn

[The Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society; 4,900 person survey]

Pg 441-2: Not a new concern: Opposing views of military should be allowed to be "different" or must "adapt" to society

Huntington in 1950s: Civilian society should tolerate, if not embrace, conservative values of military…politicians should allow armed forces cultural autonomy.

Contemporary heirs argue that degenerate civilian culture strayed from ‘traditional’ values…that the problem is with civilian elite. Four key claims:

- political and civilian elite values alienated from general public;

- civilian elite ignorant and hostile to armed forces—eager to use military as lab of social change;

- military maintains ethos of subordination with too much civilian control;

- public support for military is sturdy, so gap inconsequential

Janowitz in 1950s: In a democracy, military culture adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to needs/dictates of civilians.

Contemporary heirs see all volunteer military drifting too far away from ‘norms’ of society. Four principle assertions:

- military is more right-wing politically and more fundamentally religious than America as whole;

- military alienated and hostile to civilian culture;

- military resisted change with regards to women, homosexuals and peacekeeping missions;

- civilian control and military effectiveness will suffer from loss of respect and support of society.

Pg 444: Factors Shaping Gap:

- Media plays complex role, but major daily newspaper do not generally portray armed forces in harsh light

- Republicanization of officer corps: Vietnam fallout, Reagan era,

- Military academies fail to provide understanding of society, culture, tradition of civilian-military relations

- Declining personal connections to military; less veterans in congress and civilian political elite

- Emerging professional norms: proper for military to insist, rather than advise on key policy, strategy

Pg 449: Civilian-Military relationship in democracy is difficult; setting up opposing values, powerful institutions with great resources, inevitable tensions between military and statesmen.

Those difficulties have become more acute in U.S. as the result of two great changes:

- end of a centuries old form of military organization (i.e. "mass army" replaced with volunteer, high tech force)

- transformation in America’s geopolitical circumstances (US as sole world superpower).

[The Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society; 4,900 person survey]

Pg 445: Implications:

… a higher level of civil-military conflict…diminishing support for the armed forces and civilian elites understanding of military needs…causing less capable and effective military.

…while the gap is not the principle cause of recruiting and retention problems…will make it worse…reducing public respect and admiration…[because of]…narrowing personal connections to the military

Eliot A. Cohen Why the Gap Matters

Pg 453: Long term consequences:

- Growing politicization of officer corps - recruitment/retention problems

- collapse of junior officer confidence in leaders - antipathy between military and civilian cultures

- stagnation in development of military forces for new geopolitical era

James Locher III Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols

Pg 465: Of the 8 purposes listed, 2 are related to the CINCs

- Places clear responsibility for mission accomplishments of unified/specified commands on the CINCs of these commands

- Ensures authority of unified/specified CINCs fully commensurate with responsibility of CINCs to accomplish missions

Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer A Four-Star Foreign Policy?

Pg 474: CINCs have evolved into modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire’s proconsuls

- well funded, semiautonomous, unconventional center of U.S. foreign policy

- control HQ budgets outside Washington totaling $380 million/year

- travel non-stop, oversee multimilliondollar foreign study institutes and round-the-clock intelligence centers, host international conferences and direct disaster relief.

- swelling institution of CINC caused by budgetary prowess and nature of post-Cold War military engagements (i.e. peacekeeping and nation-building) has steadily pushed uniformed CINCs into expanded diplomatic and political roles.

Pg 475…during 1990s, Clinton Admin found it easier to win funding for foreign policy initiatives (from Republican controlled congress) if handled through the Pentagon rather than the State Department.

If today’s Pentagon is too engaged in non-military missions, it is partly because CINCs feel they need to fill a void

From vantage points of 1000s of miles from Washington, CINCs see problems with some U.S. foreign policy and their own Pentagon leadership

Pg 476. …as CINC demands broadended, jobs attracted different breed-military leaders not known as company men. (ex: Gen Clark & Adm Blair are Rhodes scholars & white house fellows)

CINCs routinely received by heads of state who offer gifts, share secrets and seek advice. Bountiful resources and open-ended mandate allow CINCs to engage tiny countries and on obscure foreign policy issues.

Pg 477 Since the end of the Cold War, CINCs have helped shift America’s strategic thinking. (ex: Gen Clark push NATO troops toward nation-building in Europe)

Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer An Engagement in 10 Time Zones

Pg 480: Congressional funding for overseas missions increasingly favors the Pentagon’s regional CINCs adopting tasks previously handled by civilians. (ex: Gen Zini as CENTCOM CINC became one of U.S.’s most important diplomats—no other U.S. official in the region spent more time trying to build relationships with nations where virtually none existed.) CINCs have access to highest levels of government. …Gen Zini’s efforts were significant because "face time" matters

Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer Standing Up to State and Congress

Pg 485: CINCs command so much respect in their theaters and in Washington that they often shape foreign relations strategy. …[CINC] philosophies on building alliances abroad…sometimes clash with civilian views…most pronounced…involve how to treat foreign militaries that commit human rights abuses. (ex: Guatamala, Chile, Columbia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, Indonisia).

Adm Blair’s promoting of military alliances or "security communities", initially opposed by DoD and Dept of State...now filtering into U.S. policy.

Adm Blair’s visit to Indonisia not welcomed by U.S. Ambassador Gelbard, but they "ironed out differences". Blair pressed U.S. case (for accountablility trials for Army human rights abuses). In the end Blair and Gelbard sent joint cable to Washington, agreed to cut out the middlemen and talk directly to each other.

Lyle J. Goldstein General John Shalikashvilli and Civil-Military Relations of Peacekeeping

Pg 492: Gen Powell’s Skepticism: During senate hearing Powell aware of civilian control issue, "soldiers are supposed to do what our civilian leaders wish us to do… We are not fighting the President". However, his opposition to Bosnia was not concealed.

Critics claim Powell’s accumulation of power as dangerous: Civilian leadership must get blessing of CJCS before they do anything. Powell accused of devising bureaucratic strategies and using political savvy under Goldwater-Nichols Act to assure his view of peacekeeping would dominate in Washington during his tenure.

Pg 495: Haiti: Gen Shaliksashvilli Allowed DefSec Perry to "carry the ball", even behind closed doors. Appears to recognize that engaging in policy advocacy …would violate military professionalism. …correctly understood his job as CJCS was to design options, and seek clarification of political tasks, not generate broad definitions of American foreign policy interests or appraisals of American political willpower. After Haitian policeman kills demonstrator in full view of peacekeeper, President displeased with Gen Shaliikashvili’s explaination, SecDef Perry announces new guidelines for peacekeepers, but Gen Shalikashvili’s never comments to press. Author states this was conforming to high standard of military professionalism.

Pg 499: Author’s conclusion: Gen Powell took a dim view of peacekeeping of violated professional norms in making sure that his skepticism was duly noted by public and civilian leadership. Shaliikashvili restored balance to American civilian-military relations. He was no military yes-man, frequently injected caution into adminstration deliberations about peacekeeping, let civilian leaders decide about invading Haiti. Shaliikashvili took civilian control seriously—telephoning reporters to praise President Clinton when Sen Helms suggested he not dare visit any military bases.

Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn The Gap: Solders, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding

[The Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society; 4,900 person survey]

Pg 442: The Real Gap:

- military officers much more conservative than civilian elite, but not more conservative that general public.

- social values, the military diverges from both the elite and the public, fitting somewhere between the two-considerably more conservative than the elite, but not as conservative as the public

Eliot A. Cohen Why the Gap Matters

Pg 451: Three levels of Civil-Mil Relations: one of which refers to society’s impact

Relationship between military and society as a whole: broadly speaking military yields to trends in society (women & homosexual issues); rise of assertive individualism (barracks to dorms); redefinition of core military virtues needed

Commander Erik J Dahl The Mirror is Cracked, Not Broken

"..armed forces have never been a mirror of society. Nor should they be."

Pg 460: The Good Gap? Military should support general interests and values of society, helpful to have officer corps representative of diversity ; to reflect society military should respond to social forces and change (ex: racial desegragation and women).

Pg 460: Best relationship between military and society is "educated skepticism", military standards distinct from those of general society and a society that appreciates the need for the difference.

Witnessing a "return to normalcy, rather than crisis", trends seen before as U.S. turns away from war and adjusts to peace

Eliot A. Cohen Why the Gap Matters

Civilian-Military relationship in democracy is difficult; setting up opposing values, powerful institutions with great resources, inevitable tensions between military and statesmen. Difficulties more acute in U.S. due to two great changes: end of centuries old "mass army" with volunteer, high tech force; America’s global position—never before (including Roman Empire) has one military towered over all others on the planet, "transition to imperial role" (i.e. CINCs as policymakers).

Three levels of Civil-Mil Relations:

Relationship between military and society as a whole: military yields to trends in society (women & homosexual issues); rise of assertive individualism (barracks to dorms); redefinition of core military virtues needed

Interaction between military as set of institutions and counterparts in civilian society: increased visibility and interpentration have become norm; military becomes public institution by incorporating practices/ethics (ex: management fads)

Power relationships at pinnacle of government: military becoming accustomed to extensive political/diplomatic roles

Lyle J. Goldstein General John Shalikashvilli and Civil-Military Relations of Peacekeeping

Pg 492: Gen Powell’s Skepticism: During senate hearing Powell aware of civilian control issue, "soldiers are supposed to do what our civilian leaders wish us to do… We are not fighting the President". However, his opposition to Bosnia was not concealed.

Critics claim Powell’s accumulation of power as dangerous: Civilian leadership must get blessing of CJCS before they do anything. Powell accused of devising bureaucratic strategies and using political savvy under Goldwater-Nichols Act to assure his view of peacekeeping would dominate in Washington during his tenure.

Pg 495: Haiti: Gen Shaliksashvilli Allowed DefSec Perry to "carry the ball", even behind closed doors. Appears to recognize that engaging in policy advocacy …would violate military professionalism. …correctly understood his job as CJCS was to design options, and seek clarification of political tasks, not generate broad definitions of American foreign policy interests or appraisals of American political willpower. After Haitian policeman kills demonstrator in full view of peacekeeper, President displeased with Gen Shaliikashvili’s explaination, SecDef Perry announces new guidelines for peacekeepers, but Gen Shalikashvili’s never comments to press. Author states this was conforming to high standard of military professionalism.

Pg 499: Author’s conclusion: Gen Powell took a dim view of peacekeeping of violated professional norms in making sure that his skepticism was duly noted by public and civilian leadership. Shaliksashvilli restored balance to American civilian-military relations. He was no military yes-man, frequently injected caution into adminstration deliberations about peacekeeping, let civilian leaders decide about invading Haiti. Shaliksashvilli took civilian control seriously—telephoning reporters to praise President Clinton when Sen Helms suggested he not dare visit any military bases.

Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn The Gap: Solders, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding by

[The Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society; 4,900 person survey]

Pg 446: Systemic change needed: place officers in civilian internships; civ-mil relation education at all officer courses

Eliot A. Cohen Why the Gap Matters

Pg 454: Solution: need new professional code; DoD White Paper on Civ-Mil relations; revise The Armed Forces Officer pamphlet. Documents should include:

1) recognition of how military should/should not resemble civilian society;

2) interpret bounds of military involvement in policymaking;

3) define "military advice" to civilian leadership;

4) state principles of civilian control;

5) honestly reflect tensions and difficulties of American civil-military relations

Most important is willingness…of civilian and soldier alike to recognize the problems…treat them with high seriousness.

Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn

[The Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society; 4,900 person survey]

Pg 445: Implications: … a higher level of civil-military conflict…diminishing support for the armed forces and civilian elites understanding of military needs…causing less capable and effective military.

…while the gap is not the principle cause of recruiting and retention problems…it will exacerbate them…reducing public respect and admiration…[because of]…narrowing personal connections to the military

Eliot A. Cohen Why the Gap Matters

Pg 453: Long term consequences:

- Growing politicization of officer corps - recruitment/retention problems

- collapse of junior officer confidence in leaders - antipathy between military and civilian cultures

- stagnation in development of military forces for new geopolitical era

Steven Lee Myers When the Military (Ret) Marches to Its Own Drummer

Pg 463: U.S. Military , especially its brass, has long tradition of maintaining at least the appearance of being apolitical.

- Many current and retired officers seemed to cross the apolitical line.

- Those in service more open about political affiliations.

- The danger critics see is more partisan rank and file could undercut support for military across the political spectrum.

- Willingness of retired officers to endorse political parties could prompt future presidents to select appointees to senior commands based on their political views rather than military experience.

- Critics warn that so many four-star officers backing a candidate, openly and in concert, undermined the military’s carefully cultivated apoliticalism.