NSC Structure: Advises the president on national security (defense and foreign) policy. Some Presidents have wanted to use the NSC as a decision making tool, but all have instead ended up using small groups of others. Various presidents had used or circumvented the NSC or "machinery", since its creation in 1947, in different ways, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The general conclusion was that, quite in contrast to its founders’ hope, the NSC seldom had been the central forum for decisions on crucial issues or the primary source of advice. The structure of the NSC also fluctuates as the president chooses. During its life, the NSC has ranged from a strict bureaucratic policy engine without competition to an ad-hoc non-entity which played no major role in policy decisions.

Going beyond particular personalities and procedures, the NSC itself today bears little resemblance to its ancestry, particularly the Eisenhower years. Today most people asked about the NSC would think of the national security adviser and his small staff in the West Wing and Old Executive Office Bldg. Ultimately, the personal preferences, priorities, and the operating style of the president become determining variables. The NSC has its own budget line and authority and is not counted as personal staff by the White House.

Truman: Did not use it extensively at first, fearing it imposed a parliamentary type cabinet system for foreign policy decision making that would encroach on his decision making options. After the outbreak of the Korean War, used it more extensively to coordinate policy and action—major foreign policy recommendations came to him via the council. The council was an "advisory body".

Eisenhower: Turned the NSC into a highly formalized structure that was at the center of policy formulation and promulgation. Transformed NSC into a highly formalized system viewed by him as "the central vehicle for formulating and promulgating policy" and "the primary means of imparting presidential direction and over-all coherence to the activities of the departments and agencies." He created a planning board and an operations coordinating committee that were chaired by the special assistant for national security affairs, which he also established. He tried to place the NSC at the center of policy formulation process. However, he often convened meetings of a small group of advisors outside the NSC process to deal with urgent matters.

Kennedy: Did not widely use the NSC but instead initiated the use of interagency task forces designed to serve presidential needs rather their respective agencies. Established the Executive Committee of the NSC (Ex Com) made up of 13 advisers which was the most well known and helped develop the response to the Cuban missile crisis. Similar but less well-known ad hoc groups dealt with other crises. The NSC itself proved far less important in ensuring presidential control than these less formal groups tasked the NSC to assist Kennedy in obtaining advice from and coordinating operations of the government agencies concerned with national security. The Bay of Pigs fiasco caused him to distrust the "experts" of the NSC and many less formal decision making groups were formed and relied heavily upon.

Johnson: Resembled Kennedy’s informal style – the NSC as a formal deliberative mechanism languished. The famous "Tuesday lunches" of the Vietnam era are an example of how informal decision groups determined policy without the involvement of the full NSC mechanism.

Johnson’s foreign policy efforts were dominated by the Vietnam War. His lack of formal use of NSC was partially to blame for the Vietnam morass. He relied on a small group of advisors made up of SecDef, SecState, NSA Advisor, DCI, chairman of the joint chiefs, and his press secretary who met each Tuesday for lunch and discussed the Vietnam War ("Tuesday Lunch"). He left behind a non-coherent policy making legacy.

Nixon: Moved rapidly to restore coherence to foreign policy making by placing the NSC at the hub of the system. Appointed Kissinger as special assistant for national security affairs and also (later) as secretary of state. Directed establishment of an "Eisenhower NSC System but without concurrences." In contrast to Eisenhower’s approach (which encouraged the NSC system to focus on compromises among departments/agencies), and in contrast to Kennedy/Johnson styles (which saw NSC meetings as forums for its members to advocate views), he wanted all policy options to be laid out for subsequent consideration and, above all, to maintain his flexibility. He clearly preferred to make decisions, solo.

Carter: Reaffirmed determination of the White House to exercise foreign policy. Established two NSC committees (The Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee) to replace all prior ones. The Policy Review Committee assumed responsibility for long-term projects and was chaired by the cabinet member who had the greatest stake in the issue. The Special Coordination Committee, chaired by the national security assistant, was responsible for all short-term projects including covert intelligence operations and crisis management. The latter became the most influential. The State Department played a subsidiary role in foreign policy development compared to the White House staff. Consensus toward the end of the administration was that the NSA should perform an "insider" role (facilitator) rather than an "outsider" role.

Reagan: Restored primary control of foreign policy to State Department. Denied NSA direct access to the Oval Office. Replaced the Policy Review Committee created by Carter with three senior interdepartmental groups (SIGs). His NSC never functioned as intended and real influence came from the National Security Planning Group, a less formal group of the president’s closest personal advisors similar to Ex Comm or the Tuesday Lunch.

Reagan himself was largely detached from foreign policy-making and took a hands-off management style. The most distinctive characteristic of the NSC system during the Reagan administration became it’s involvement in operational activities well outside the parameters established by previous presidents and NSAs (Iran-Contra Affair) The NSC under Reagan was continually plagued by turnover of the NSA and shifting influence of the key players that degenerated into less formal decision making groups having huge amounts of authority. The controversial Iran-Contra Affair was a result of this fragmented approach to decision making. Powell became NSA in 1987 and tried to restore the credibility of the NSC by taking it out of operations and reestablishing its "honest broker" role.

Bush: Bush’s NSC looked quite similar to his predecessors’ with a Principals Committee at the top of the structure charged with viewing, coordinating, and monitoring the development and implementation of national security policy. Positioned below the Principals Committee was the Deputies Committee acting as the senior sub cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues. It was served by a series of NSC policy coordinating committees similar to those in previous administrations.

Bush’s formal NSC structure did not function as intended. He preferred to make decisions in secret and preferred to a tight inner-circle of confidants chosen on the basis of loyalty and friendship, not institutional ties. NSC maintained its "honest broker" role and remained out of operations. However, due to Bush’s tendency to use "secrecy" in decision-making, once again informal close-knit groups were used by the president at times and usurped the role of the NSC.

Clinton: At outset of his presidency, announced his intent to make foreign policy in the White House and look to State Department to implement. For the first time, added SecTreas, assistant to the president for economic policy, and White House chief of staff to NSC membership. Midway through his presidency, NSC system wasn’t working (Somalia). Tried several fixes without results.

Clinton showed little interest in foreign policy issues and less in policy-making procedures. Formal policy meetings never held to discuss policies towards Russia. Instead, Russian policy discussed in less-structured settings among administration’s foreign policy principals (SecState, SecDef, DCI, chairman Joint Chiefs, and White House chief of staff. Directed the NSA to be an "inside operator" – to not engage in policy or discussions with the news media, but later debated the practicality of this approach. NSA was to provide him with decision-making alternatives and information. Clinton added economic matters & advisors to the NSC’s charter for the first time.

At the top is the NSC, whose statutory membership includes the president (chair), vice-president and secretaries of state and defense. The director of central intelligence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as statutory advisors. Others participate as necessary including SecTreas, Atty Gen, US Ambassador to the UN, DirOMB, etc.

The second level is the NSC Principals Committee chaired by the NSA. Membership includes SecState, SecDef, DCI, Chairman JCS, Us Rep to UN, Asst to Pres for Economic Affairs, SecTreas, Atty Gen.

The third level is the Deputies Committee chaired by the Deputy Asst NSA. Membership includes Under Sec of State for Political Affairs, Under Sec of Defense for Policy, Dep Dir of Central Intel, Vice Chair JCS, Asst to VP for NSA, Dep Asst for Econ Policy, and Designee of Atty Gen.

The fourth level is made up of various Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) (permanent and ad hoc) on Foreign Policy Issues, Defense Policy Issues, International Economic Issues, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Crisis Management.

By bringing together the major government agencies and departments associated with foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, treasury, commerce, legal, and economics as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) to address national security crises/issues. Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table. This diversity is the strength of the interagency process, providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

The interagency process has not been able to achieve effective coordination within the Executive Branch. Every President has to some extent revised the NSC structure in hopes of enhancing the process, however, personal preferences, priorities, and the operating style of the president and other principals have become determining variables in how well the systems ultimately function. Differences in organizational cultures, structures, and methods of business are also frequently very different between agencies and make coordination difficult.

Regardless of the difficulty in achieving it, interagency coordination is extremely important. It enhances power through the integrated and synergistic use of the various instruments of power. There must be a close, interdependent relationship among economic, diplomatic, and military instruments—especially in crises. The interagency process drafts, coordinates and assesses national strategy and oversees its implementation. It is the heart of the national security decision-making system of the US government and shapes the critical decisions.

When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of Federal departments and agencies… The clear articulation of aims and objectives and the resulting strategic focus is essential. This is the case not only for war involving simultaneous major combat in multiple theaters, but also for the more likely case of regional crises. In such cases, a single combatant command is normally supported, with others providing that support, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the NCA as coordinator of the whole effort. Even here, use of American military power directly or indirectly affects the other combatant commands and Federal agencies. Unity of effort, directed and arranged at the national level, is critical.

As we become involved in more military operations other than war (MOOTW), the inter-relationships between the military, non-military government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and private volunteer organizations (PVO’s) grow more intertwined. Not all problems have a military solution - some require both military and civilian action. The NSC, an interagency organization, must be able to use all available means to solve these problems. As military officers who have the potential to serve in an interagency assignment, it’s important we have an appreciation for the interagency process and its part in our national security strategy.

The military often plays a supporting role to other national agencies. Because the Department of Defense will often be in a supporting and not in the lead or supported role, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying participating agencies. The NSC staff normally designates the lead agency for situations in which the Department of Defense will participate, but lead agency responsibility can be situationally dependent, with the NSC staff setting the agenda.

At the highest levels, the Chairman JCS is the principle military advisor to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. He ensures that defense capabilities and limitations are taken into consideration in policy determination.

At an operational level, military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the US Government as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs and PVOs) and regional and international organizations. These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. The military is an "equal" player when coordinating with outside agencies. However, frequently the US military CINCs are the only government officials with the wherewithal to pull together US interagency actions on a regional basis and will continue to provide the leadership—even while in a supporting role.

Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity at home and abroad is matched in part, by an increase in situations – primarily overseas – in which civil agencies face emerging Cold War factors and military threats not previously confronted. With the breakdown of nation-states, there is greater need for developmental, civil assistance, and humanitarian relief organizations to alleviate human suffering. The new, rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the growth of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even greater interagency cooperation, with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the US Government (USG) as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. Success in undertaking interagency operations is dependent upon mutually supporting actions taken in a logical sequence and the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power.

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political, diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs .

In today’s environment, all major operations, whether war or MOOTW will involve a broad range of involvement from agencies and organizations outside the DOD. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation. Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on our ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.

The Complex Contingency Operations Handbook was made specifically to create a system by which the interagency can effectively integrate the operations of all US Government actors in a complex contingency operation. There are too many meetings that have to happen before a recommendation to the President is made. Depending on the type of emergency crisis, this is the process:

-Interagency meeting begins in its usual structure

-Information about the crisis is provided to Interagency Working Groups, generally by assistant secretary level representatives of the appropriate agency

-Issues are then framed for discussion in the Deputies Committee

-Deputy Committee further refines the issues and prepares policy options for the Principal Committee

-The Principal Committee then recommends appropriate action to the President.

There are some cases where individuals may do initial planning for a complex contingency operation, although official interagency planning does not begin until the Deputies authorize it. Developing coordinated, strategic guidance for a crisis operation requires adding mechanisms between the decision making authorities at the Deputies level and the agencies tasked to execute the operation. After authorization, the NSC charters the Executive Committee, and the integrated interagency planning begins in earnest.

Insights into the interagency process and some of the general problems associated with the current system reveal a theme that defense and economic issues deal with primarily defense issues and can often cause a large amount of in-fighting between DoD, State, and Commerce, as each view its case parochially. The National Security Advisor (NSA) is not a position defined in law, yet wields tremendous power in the name of the president. Also, the NSC Staff’s functions are not well defined and, as we saw in Iran-Contra scandal, the possibility for abuse of power is great. Finally, military officers can have a positive impact on the shortcomings of the interagency process. The defense predominance of the Cold War no longer applies and the increasing globalization of economies and more MOOTW require a much broader scope, in order for the interagency process to be successful.

A weakened State Department: Presidents have long used ambassadorial appointments to reward their political supporters, but the propensity to make political appointments reflects their profound distrust of "careerists". Careerists, and those SecStates who included them in policymaking, were viewed as slow to react and effectual when compared to their political appointee counterparts. This State Departments lack of leadership/responsiveness and insensitivity to politics has resulted in many recent presidents deciding foreign policy in the White House. Lack of resources and bureaucratic muscle is a further factor contributing to a weak State Department and is related to presidential dissatisfaction.

NSC stagnation/loss of control: Lack of presidential involvement with and use of the NSC coupled with the small group approach to foreign policy/national security decision making have resulted in a number of instances damaging to NSC credibility and functionality. The Iran-contra affair, the Vietnam War morass, Somalia, owe their beginnings to a presidential "hands off" approach to foreign policy (NSC operating on it’s own outside of normal parameters) or presidential national security decision-making in secret and/or with a small group of advisors outside the scope of the NSC.

Presidential Use of the CIA: Various presidents have significantly alternated emphasis on use of the CIA, failed to keep Congress informed of CIA operations, and, in some cases allowed the CIA to be misuse/abuse it’s authority. These factors raised questions about propriety, legality, secrecy, and control as central issues surrounding the role of intelligence in American foreign policy that hampered the CIA’s (and the NSC’s) effectiveness. The Iran Contra affair was evidence of Reagan’s NSC structure gone awry. "The NSC had become a "government within a government" spurred on by "presidential inattentiveness, ideological fervor, frustration with a Congress that seemed determined to micromanage foreign policy and the desire of the DCI to find an operational channel less vulnerable to congressional scrutiny than the CIA". The fact that Poindexter diverted the funds from weapon sales for Iran to the Contras was further evidence that Reagan’s hands-off management style had produced consequences.

- Establish more permanent membership in the interagency process to increase experience in crisis management. Membership currently varies from crisis to crisis. While providing flexibility in tailoring appropriate teams, this approach leaves members operating for the first time in an unstructured environment, which provides little compensating support. The establishment of permanent IWGs is a step in the right direction on this issue. This will also dissipate the chaotic and disruptive effect new personalities sometimes have on the process.

- Insure the decision makers give the required feedback to those who must develop the implementing plans.

- Insure lead agencies have the resources and expertise to oversee implementation of the plan.

- Flatter NSC structure with permanent IWGs dedicated full time to reviewing foreign policy and national security issues in a proactive manner vs. reactionary mode.

- Establish clearly defined operating/communication procedures, common operating language, environment, strategy, and planning process.

- Professionalize IWG and NSC members through comprehensive training and education program on interagency process

CONGRESS: Congress in the past has felt left out when it comes to matters concerning National security policy making. Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, each President has attempted to establish an interagency process that will effectively support his ability to make the right decisions in national security and foreign policy. It depends on the president, and what relationship he wants to have with congress as to how much involvement congress will have.

Any administration is faced with multiple pressures between formulation and implementation of foreign policy, pressures from congress, public at large, the international community, and the president’s own ideas of how foreign policy should be implemented. Congress frequently is an intimate part of the complex interagency process, particularly in the politicking in which government agencies often become engaged. The congress has the capacity to affect their political influence within the executive branch through the use of legislative threat, nonbonding resolutions and hearings, and public opinion.

Involvement from Congress in an interagency example would be the creation in 1970 of the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence. This committee was created following revelations of abuses committed over the previously quarter century b intelligence agencies, including illegal activities against American citizens as well as questionable operations abroad. This particular committee authorizes appropriations for the intelligence community, receive reports on intelligence analysis and production, and oversee the conduct of covert activities once the President has presented a finding on the need for such activities. Additionally, the because of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act, the President is required by law to keep the Congress fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities. Interesting is the fact that Congress appropriates all money for the intelligence community, including money for intelligence activities tucked away in the Pentagon budget.

MEDIA: The media often has a dramatic influence on the interagency process. The formulation and execution of any national security policy must consider the public’s traditional values if the policy is to be successful. Because of this, the media can be a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development.

Military plans that include interaction with other agencies should anticipate the importance that public affairs and media relations have on the operation and in the interagency process. Responsibility for interaction with the media should be established clearly so that the media hears from a single voice.

The NSC was created in 1947 during the Truman Administration. Its purpose was to advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.

Statutory members of the council include: President (chair), Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State.

Statutory advisors are: CIA Director, JCS Chairman

This reading describes how each president since the inception of the National Security Council (NSC) has utilized the council. It traces the evolution of the NSC from 1947 until the Clinton administration. The NSC is a statutory body charged with advising the President towards integrating domestic, foreign, and military policy into a coherent national security strategy.

This article looks at the NSC with more of a focus on the NSC staff. Because the article was written in November 2000, it only has recommendations for the new president. One change that may be significant is the NSC staff under the new administration will be 30 percent smaller than the Clinton administration NSC.

Background: In practice, the NSC has become a presidential staff of foreign policy experts headed by the assistant to the president for national security affairs, who has been a key foreign policy player in every administration since JFK.

The NSC has expanded from a small presidential staff of 10 people in the early 60s to an agency like organization of 225 people, including about 100 substantive professionals. Reasons for the expanded power are the half-century development and legitimization of the NSC as presidential coordinator for mainstream national security issues; the post cold war expansion of the foreign policy agenda, with more issues that require coordination across more agencies; and the deepening of partisanship in Washington, particularly over the last 10 years.

Any president elect faces a critical decision on how to staff and organize his foreign policy team. The president needs to choose capable, compatible people to head the major foreign policy and national security departments and agencies. Their ability to function as a team ultimately depends on how the president decides to staff and structure the NSC.

The reading discusses eight features of an effective NSC, which must be:

Strong: The NSA adviser and key aides must be tough enough to coordinate policy, pull agencies and officials together, and ensure presidential decisions are implemented, and give the president substantive advice.

Straight: Adviser must be trusted by senior colleagues to fairly represent their views. NDC communications and its operational involvement must be undertaken with the knowledge of other principals.

Sharing: The NSC must establish a modus operandi of inclusion, building strong informal relationships with counterparts from the departments and agencies to get the work done, assuring a seat at the table for all with a substantial stake in an issue.

Subdued: The NSC must be self-consciously constrained. The adviser and staff must keep a low profile, limit press contacts, and work principally within the executive branch. Policy implementation should fall to the departments.

Senior: Most of the staff should have government experience, be knowledgeable in their issues, and able to work well with senior and upper middle class level officials (under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and their deputies). This staff should have a few young thinker-operators, but senior staff should set the tone.

Small: Staff should be limited in size to 40-45 substantive professionals. Many routine activities, such as congressional correspondence, should be assigned to State Department or other relevant agencies.

Slim: No more than five regional offices and five functional regional offices should be the norm. Each directorate should normally have a maximum of four substantive officials.

Self-disciplined: The NSA and staff must exercise an uncommon degree of professional restraint, by resisting the natural temptation to take on new tasks, to broaden the focus of their work, and as a result, to grow in size.

Only the President has the power to properly structure the NSC during his respective administration. If this is not accomplished, then the NSC will not play the crucial role it is set up to play in any Presidential administration.

This reading describes those government agencies that have key roles in national security policy decisions, and examples of interagency bureaucracies and how the different agencies interact to produce national policy.

Executive departments discussed are:

Department of State: This is headed up by the Secretary of State and is the principal agent of the executive branch of government responsible for managing US foreign relations.

Department of Defense: This department, headed up by the Secretary of Defense, together with the Secretary of State and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bears the heaviest responsibility for advising the president on national security policy.

Central Intelligence Agency: The CIA has played a prominent role in American foreign policy for nearly half a century because of the preferences of elected officials and their advisers. The intelligence community is a vast complex of operating agencies and interagency oversight communities. By law, the President is required to keep congress fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities. The Congress as a whole appropriates all money for the intelligence community, including money for intelligence activities secretly tucked away in the budget for the Pentagon.

The CIA was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as a subsidiary of the National Security Council, and was assigned respo9nsibilities for: Advising the NSC on intelligence matters relating to national security; making recommendations to the NSC for coordinating the intelligence activities of the various federal executive departments and agencies; correlating and evaluating intelligence and providing for its dissemination; and carrying out such additional services, functions, and duties relating to national security intelligence as the NSC may direct. The reported budget for the CIA in 1994 was $3 billion.

Department of Treasury: Responsibilities include tax policy, tariffs, the balance of trade and payments, exchange rate adjustments, and the public debt. The Treasury Department is the principal department in which domestic and international financial and fiscal policy recommendations are formulated.

Department of Commerce: This department is concerned with foreign economic policy issues that relate to the expansion and protection of American commerce abroad. Unlike the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of commerce and the Commerce department as a whole historically have not been principal actors in foreign economic policy making.

Department of Agriculture: The Department of Agriculture interests include promoting the sale of agriculture commodities abroad, including the sale or distribution of surplus commodities owned by the government under Public Law 480.

Department of Labor: This department’s responsibility is placed with a view toward the importance of the American wage earner rather than agriculture, business, or financial communities, and is carried out by the Bureau of International labor Affairs headed by the deputy under secretary for international affairs. They are also interested in immigrant labor and assessing the impact of trade agreements, such as NAFTA on American workers. Gathering information, proffering advice, administering selected programs, and participating in international negotiations of the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation are also the international affairs functions of the Labor Department.

This reading introduces the doctrine of interagency operations to the military community, and is broken down in 8 sections:

1- Understanding Interagency Operations. The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. Military operations must be synchronized with those or other agencies of the US Government as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. Successful interagency coordination enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

2 – Synchronizing Interagency Operations. The common thread throughout all major operations is the broad range of agencies that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements towards the objective. The use of military elements of power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military often plays a supporting role to other national agencies.

3 – The Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the US within the Interagency Process. Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity at home and abroad is matched in part by an increase in situations, primarily overseas in which civil agencies face emerging post Cold War factors and military threats not previously confronted. With the breakdown of nation states there is greater need for developmental, civil assistance, and humanitarian relief organizations to alleviate human suffering. These organizations are drawn closer to military forces by necessity, because their missions may fail without military support or protection.

4 - Systematic Integration of Procedures for Effective Cooperation. Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation should not be equated to the command and control of a military operation. Conflicting goals, policies, procedures and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. There is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations. There is also not an overseeing organization to ensure that the many agencies, departments, and organizations have the capability and the tools to work together. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.

5 - Interagency Operations at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels. A principal difficulty of coordinating operations between agencies is determining counterparts among them. Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other organizations, particularly at the operational level where is seldom a counterpart to the geographic combatant commander.

6 - The Interagency Environment. If he interagency process is to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. The essence of interagency coordination is the interplay of multiple agencies with individual agendas. Key points to remember for the interagency to be successful are: understand the nature of interagency bureaucracy; gain consensus with in the Department of Defense; develop an understanding of other agencies, departments, and organizations; establish unifying goals, reaching consensus on a unifying goal is the most important prerequisite for successful interagency operations; determine mutual needs and develop interdependence; consider long term and short term objectives. These objectives should be considered separately.

7 – Building Interagency Coordination. The following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination: Define the problem in clear and unambiguous terms that are agreed to by all; Define the Objective; Establish a Common Frame of Reference; Develop Courses of Action or Options; Capitalize on Experience; Establish Responsibility because when all participants in the interagency process understand what needs to be done, agree upon the means to accomplish it, and identify who will do what through policy operations coordination, a common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution will help achieve unity of effort; Plan for the transition of key responsibilities, capabilities, and functions; direct all means toward unity of effort.

8 – Media Impact on Interagency Coordination. The formulation and execution of any national security policy must consider the public’s traditional values if the policy is to be successful. The media can be a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development. Military plans that include interaction with other agencies should anticipate the importance that public affairs and media relations have on the operation and in the interagency process. Responsibility for interaction with the media should be established clearly so that the media hears from a single voice.

The Complex Contingency Operations Handbook was made specifically to create a system by which the interagency can effectively integrate the operations of all US Government actors in a complex contingency operation. This reading identifies two chapters out of the Handbook, chapters 2 and 3. It briefly identifies the interagency process, principal committees, deputies committees, interagency working groups, and functions of the interagency process.

The role of the interagency in the day to day management of national security issues are: identify policy issues and questions; formulate options; raise issues to the appropriate level for decision within the NSC structure; make decisions where appropriate; oversees the implementation of policy decisions.

Under the National Security System, the deputies committee is responsible for crisis management. In a complex emergency, the deputies will establish an Executive Committee as the principal coordinating mechanism of interagency activities, and they are tasked with day-to-day management of US involvement in complex contingencies. The Executive committee’s purpose is to provide unified policy guidance for agency planners of the operation; develop a US Government pol-mil plan for the operation; integrate mission area plans within the overall US Government pol-mil plan; monitor the operation; revise policy guidance as needed; update the pol-mil plan as necessary; implement Deputies and Principals policy decisions; oversee an after-action review at the conclusion of each operation; disseminate lessons learned and improvements in interagency planning.

This article is a case study on policy evolution and the interagency process. It traces the movement of the administration’s policy and shows the interagency bureaucracy at work and the influence of Congress and other factors on the process. This article examines the rise and fall of assertive multilateralism, which was the Clinton administration’s early attempt to grapple with second-tier fragmentation and to establish a new policy for dealing with these conflicts in a post-cold war world. The case study demonstrates that given the international environment, American political culture, and the institutional context of the early post cold war period, assertive multilateralism was not a viable strategy for dealing with second-tier fragmentation.

As a presidential candidate, Clinton had argued that the US needed to be more assertive in second-tier conflicts and to develop and rely upon multilateral mechanisms to deal with them. This would essentially allow the US to reduce the resources it devoted to acting as the worlds policeman. Many of Clinton’s foreign policy advisors argued that in dealing with second-tier conflicts, the US should expand UN peace operations and the US role in them.

Clinton’s assertive multilateralism was abandoned when his Somalian policy was under attack from all quarters. Clinton had little choice but to abandon this as it was unlikely that he could have obtained congressional approval for US involvement in the Bosnian peacekeeping mission.

Having little foreign policy experience, Clinton was initially neither comfortable with nor interested in foreign affairs. During his campaign Clinton had made it clear that foreign policy would be a lower priority in his administration than domestic issues.