Compiled by:

LtCol Galin Hernandez

PJELAs: 1c,d, & e—National Security Strategy; 2a—National Planning Systems and Processes; 3b—National Military Strategy and Organization

USAF Core Values: Integrity First, Excellence in All We Do

USAF Core Competencies: Information Superiority

1. Illustrate how the "rational actor" and bureaucratic politics models explain the decisions produced by the national security decision-making process.

2. Explain how the changing nature of the presidency, relative to other players, is shaping the decisions that flow from the national security decision-making process.

3. Explain the influence of the key actors on national security decisions.

- Tardy Problem recognition - Decision makers often neglect evidence of an impending problem until it confronts them directly or reaches crisis proportions, as people seldom foresee improbable events.

- Inadequate Information - incomplete and outdated information, or unavailable data critical variables are not provided. Another problem is information overload. As well, as discrepant and contradictory information makes distinguishing the significant from irrelevant difficult.

- Inaccurate Information - Decision makers are provided choices information which is screened, sorted and rearranged by their advisors.

- Deficient Information Gathering - Similar to inadequate information, this factor indicates that decision makers choose to act with the initial data, instead of conducting a thorough search for facts, despite having the available resources.

- Ambiguous National Interests - The decision to rationally identify what action to take is compounded since it involves first to figure out what is in the best interest of the nation and its goals

- The Constraint of Time Pressure - Many of the above are directly attributed to the decision makers not have the luxury to gather up all the facts, conduct and in-depth study of the possible actions and repercussions.

- Satisficing - "Good enough for government work", Policy makers do not choose the option or set of options that has the maximum chance or realizing desired goals.

- Psychological Restraints - The decision making process cannot be separated from psychodynamics and decision therefore may be rooted less in logic than in the subconscious needs and drives of decision makers. They need to be liked and reelected.

Procedural Rationality vs Instrumental rationality - Procedural is the above, instrumental is narrower in that it says that individuals have preferences, and when faced with two alternatives, they will chose the one that yields the preferred outcome.

- Parochialism - The protection of their jurisdiction is paramount to politicians, if they wish to be reelected. They are not immune to place organizational interests in front of national ones.

- Competitiveness - Each department and agency comprising the foreign affairs government frequently competes with one another for influence. While not insensitive to the national interests, each tries to further the importance of their organization and advance their own interest.

- Imperialistic Task Expansion - Along with competitiveness, comes the thrust to increase their prerogatives and functional powers. The reason; size is a sign of security. No one wants to lose their job. "Every king has their kingdom"

- Endurance - The next step after task expansion is endurance. The need to survive is overwhelming. If you can justify why you need to stay, your secure your job

- Secrecy and Exclusiveness - The effort to survive needs to include some measure of secrecy, which minimizes interference in, and the regulation of their operations. Playing low-key has its advantages.

- Attitudinal Conformity - Hiring those who have the same ideas as the organization will ensure survival. "Don’t rock the boat, and you’ll fit in"

- Deference to Tradition - Bureaucrats are prone to defer to tradition and SOP instead of invent a new way to deal with the problem.

- Reliance on Historical Analogies - "This is the way we always did it"

The first article’s pitch on role theory indicates that it’s far more important to know the individual’s position, not their beliefs. "Each role carries with it social and psychological demands and expectations that shape perceptions of how it should be performed…thus, every individual behaves similarly to others who have occupied the same role. Most act subconsciously in the manner they believe is expected. [There] are pressures that push the new occupant of an office to think and act like his predecessor…[and] orientations toward crucial issues will be similar. The old adage of, ‘Where you stand depends on where you sit’"

There is, however, one exception noted by the author—where a forceful personality may actually redefine the role to extend the boundaries of acceptable behavior (FDR, Reagan). Furthermore, particular roles permit more than one interpretation…so a position with wide latitude will not fit very well with a role theory argument.

Why is this important? "Role theory’s premise—that people’s conduct conforms to their roles—means that to understand the nature of American foreign policy we must examine the behavior most often associated with foreign policy-making roles in addition to examining the individuals themselves. Because roles shape goals, policy innovations may derive from changes in major policy-making roles or individuals’ conceptions of them." Also as quoted: "Typically, cabinet officers come to define themselves as spokespersons for the departments they run instead of servants of the president who appointed them."

Deeply ingrained beliefs, objectives and desires as well as the underlying desire for personal survival. These factors can be personal, organizational or cultural. Within the different services and/or the Defense Department these factors come to light during the annual budget allocations. The DOD will fight with other agencies, sometimes to a point against nation interests, in order to maintain specific interests. Within the DOD, the individual services do the same. The "carving up" of different MAJCOMS is a good example. There are commands that go to specific "traditional" services, regardless of who is most qualified at that particular moment. Things like large standing traditional armed forces in face of significantly reduced traditional military threats go against the nation's interest. Everybody wants a "kingdom" and when you have one, it is difficult to relinquish it in favor of another "king or kingdom". Part of this answer goes back to the psychological restraints of the rational actor model, where "decisions may be rooted less in logic than in the subconscious needs (to be liked/popular) and drives (personal agendas) of decision makers…which may interfere with rational judgment and ultimately sacrifice the nations’ welfare." In the bureaucratic model, both competitiveness and imperialistic task expansion can cause the interests of the services or DoD to diverge from the interests of the nation. Consider the Commerce Department’s push to sell arms to Iraq in the years preceding the Gulf War, and DoD’s posture against such a policy. While DoD ultimately proved correct, there were clearly competing interests among the agencies that were divided against the competing national interests (security and economic expansion). Another example is "why the three military services have found it ‘absolutely essential’ that each develop its own capabilities in areas where other services specialize…creating functions that are duplicated."

4. When the United States enters a foreign policy crisis, does the impact of organizational routines and interests become less or more important? What about the role of individual beliefs? Opinion Question

Opinion #1

Organizational routines would become more important during crises, as in times of stress, we always fall back on the familiar. In this way, bureaucracies would fall back on SOPs, historical perspectives, and habit patterns to formulate a new policy…or restructure an old policy to meet a new problem. As for individual beliefs, the role theory seems to lead you down the path that individuals will act according to the expectations of their position regardless of their loyalty to the president or their own personal belief systems. However, in times of crisis, I’d disagree with the role theory and argue that individuals, like organizations, will fall back into familiar routines to handle the crisis. As such, the "familiar routines" would be related to their personal attributes. In addition, the rational actor model also seems to indicate that in a crisis, decision makers would not have ideal info and would be subject to time constraints. Thus, with less time and info, decision makers would rely on gut feels when sorting out their rational decision.

Our foreign policy, like all other policies is a mesh of personal, organizational and cultural interests mixed with perceived national interests. There is no "nation" to provide exact guidance as to what these interests are, a human must interpret and decide them. Humans will always be influenced by factors that in some cases are totally irrelevant to the crisis or situation at hand. The glass in which the situation is viewed colors the national interests as well as the policy. As the size and implications of a particular crisis grows the impact of organizational routines and interests are reduced. However, It is impossible to completely remove the impact of organizational routines and interests from any action a bureaucratic nation takes. The best we can hope for is minimization to the point where it does not affect correct actions.

Presidents in the second half of the twentieth century have increasingly felt comfortable acting unilaterally when using military forces against others. Instead of coming to Congress for authority, they typically have justified resorting to military actions either on the Commander in Chief clause in the Constitution or on decisions reached by the UN Security Counsel or NATO. They typically justify their actions not only on broad interpretations of the Constitution but cite "authority" granted by multinational institutions in which the US is but one of many state actors.

As mentioned in the previous answer, both Bush and Clinton sought approval from the U.S. public for deploying forces before ever considering Congressional approval. So, in many ways, it appears at least one of Weinberger’s tenets rings true. In addition, Holsti claims that there is "growing evidence that public opinion is more structured, coherent, and influential than suggested by the earlier consensus." In today’s world, it’s clear the public favors a policy of internationalism, where the U.S. should take an "active part in world affairs." Yet, in very few cases (only Soviet or Iraqi aggression) did the majority of the public favor deployment of U.S. troops. While some scenarios enjoyed an increasing tolerance of force deployment (Israel and N. Korea), most Americans would rather not see forces on foreign soil in hostile situations. Ironically, in nearly every case governmental leaders favored the deployment of U.S troops and have been more willing to use force.

The readings aside, I think you can readily point to the public’s influence in force deployment in Vietnam, the Gulf, Somalia, and Bosnia…especially when the U.S. begins taking casualties. So, the bottom line is that public opinion greatly affects decisions about the use…and continued use…of military force. However do not intermingle an opinion poll with actual public opinion. They can be very different.

Legislation - Lawmaking Power

- The preeminent power in government

- Capacity to create legal authority of certain actions and forbid others altogether

- Congress uses its lawmaking power to shape policy in several ways

-- Can adopt legislation that directly defines US policy

-- Delegate certain tasks and powers to the President

-- Influence foreign policy indirectly by structuring the executive branch and stipulating its budgetary resources and legal authority

Appropriations - Power of the Purse

- Legislative control over revenue raised by the federal government

- Congressional control over how money is spent

- Exercised only by the Senate

- Foreign policy makers like the Secretary of State must win Senate approval

- Confirmation hearings allow the Senate to influence policy process

- Sometimes highly public forums used to air substantive policy controversies

- Rejection of Presidential appointee is ultimate use of confirmation power to affect policy

- The power to review how the laws it passes are being implemented by the executive branch and the actual affects of the policies it creates follows logically from lawmaking power

- Studies, hearings, and investigations

- Executive branch officials are required to provide testimony to congressional committees

- Congress established new intelligence committees and required President to authorize covert activities and report to intelligence committees

- More dramatic form of oversight is when Congress conducts special investigations

- Only Congress has the power to declare war

- Actual power to initiate and carry out wars tilted from Congress/Executive branch balance to a pronounced strengthening of President’s role

- More than 200 instances of US armed forces used abroad and only 5 have been sanctioned by formal declarations of war

- War Powers Act of 1973 passed to restore inter-branch balance

- Presidents may make treaties with foreign governments, but they must be ratified by two thirds vote of the Senate

- Congressional treaty power, like confirmation power, is assigned to the Senate alone

- Treaty ratification requires an extraordinary majority (two thirds)

- Constitution deliberately made it difficult for countries leaders to enter into foreign "entanglements"

- Threats and opportunities in the international arena give both Congress and the administrations in the post cold war era an inordinate amount of material to wage interbranch disputes over whether and hot to react.

- Public Opinion - Once considered insignificant, it has grown to be a substantial force in swaying policy maker’s decision and opinions

- Interest Groups - Individual interest groups significantly influence how policy makers react and vote, and consequently how US reacts

- Mass Movements - Less common and more transitory, occasional mass movements engulf members of Congress in a wave of public sentiment

- Media - Media can both impact and be used by legislators

- Presidential preferences

- Bureaucratic preferences

- Party leaders

- Standing Committees and Subcommittees

- Congressional Bureaucracies

- Congressional Caucuses

- Ideology - The single, most important factor in members’ decision making on foreign and defense issues

- Increasingly ideological partisanship - Party line

- Anticipated reaction - members will try to anticipate the reactions of the president and other top administration actors, as well as public reaction to the issues