Col. L. Mark Johnson

Thursday, 6 December 01

USAF Academy, CO

When you boil this lesson down to the essentials, it’s really about four competing "grand strategy visions" for our nation: "Neo-isolationism", "Selective Engagement", "Cooperative Security", and "Primacy". There is a spectrum here, and each of these views falls at a different point along the spectrum. They want us to understand the pros and cons of each of these approaches to foreign policy, and also the "national interests" which drive each of them. This lesson is very interesting, because all of the readings were written before the 11^th of September, and our entire concept of National Security has changed because of what happened on that date. (obtw - I have taken the liberty of answering DLO #1 and DLO #2 in reverse order)

Best Readings:

- for instruction and actual learning – Reading #1 by Posen & Ross

- for enjoyment – Reading #2 by Kagan, #3 by Gholz, and #7 by Ignatieff

The easiest, and probably the best way to do this, is to describe all four approaches, and describe the advantages (pros) and disadvantages (cons) of each one.

(1) First, let’s start with Neo-iso (aka – Restraint): (Neo-iso is on pages 70-73)

"Neo-isolationism" -- this one is described as the least ambitious, and (among foreign policy professionals) probably the least popular option. It embraces a constricted view of U.S. national interests. Essentially, the protection of the security, liberty, and prosperity of the American people (ie – the American way-of-life), is the only vital U.S. interest. Neo-iso focuses on power. It asks "Who is able to threaten the sovereignty of the United States, or its territorial integrity?" The answer is: Nobody. We have oceans on both sides, and our neighbors to the north and south are friends who are militarily weak. We are inherently a very secure country, and we have the most powerful military force on the planet. Indeed, the U.S. can be said to be "Strategically Immune." Therefore, whenever we are tempted to get involved with someone else’s problems around the world, we should exercise restraint. If Saddam is killing Kurds, and the Serbs are gang-raping Albanian women, and Somali children are starving to death, that is no reason for us to mobilize a military response. After all, there is a whole ocean separating us from those areas of conflict, so we should not feel threatened, and we should not get involved.

Neo-iso is strongly motivated by an understanding of Nuclear Weapons. Nukes make it nearly inconceivable for any power to win a traditional military victory over the U.S. Furthermore, Nukes assure the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of our nation. There is no rational motive for any country to explode a nuclear weapon on North America. The retaliatory response from the U.S. would be devastating.

We are not responsible for, and cannot afford the cost of maintaining world peace. Promoting values such as Democracy and Human Rights inspires ill-advised crusades, that serve only to

generate anti-American resentment; consequently it is a poor guide to policy and strategy.

Pros: a. Most of the difficult Foreign Policy issues we now struggle with, would disappear under Neo-iso. Bosnia? – let Europe sort it out. In the Middle East, Arabs and Israelis would be free to settle their differences without U.S. meddling. Iraq’s "No-fly" zones? Hell, let ‘em fly. Why should we care? That’s way over in SWA, not near our borders. The North Korean threat would be left to South Korea, the country whose national interests are actually threatened.

b. Whenever we intervene in a conflict overseas, the other side views us as the enemy. So, if we stop intervening and interfering, we will have fewer enemies. Furthermore, we would need only a small military force structure under Neo-iso. The defense budget would probably fall to around 2% of GDP. Just think of all the money we would save. Those dollars could be poured into domestic programs here at home. We would finally be able to enjoy our national wealth.

c. Traditional alliance relationships that obligate us to respond (ie – NATO), could be dismantled. While not totally self-sufficient, we are actually in a pretty good position to "go-it-alone", if we needed to do so. And, we would no longer have to defend wealthy allies. Let them defend themselves. We can bring our forces home from England, Germany, Japan, and Korea.

Cons: a. Global Disengagement is unlikely to make the U.S. more secure. The disappearance of America from the world stage, would most likely precipitate a great deal of competition (ie – conflict) abroad. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons, would see more opportunities. Nations formerly defended by us would have to build up their own military capabilities. Some states would likely turn to WMD, because they were unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. The world would become a more dangerous place. There would likely be more war. WMDs might be used in some of these wars, with unpleasant side effects, even for those not directly involved in the conflict.

b. As competition (conflict) intensified, U.S. decision-makers would continuously have to reassess whether their policy was working. What if their original assumptions about the balance of power in Eurasia, and the deterrent power of Nukes, were no longer valid? At what point would a policy-shift be in order? And -- U.S. foreign policy is a very tough thing to change. How much trouble would have to occur, before the U.S. returned to a more active role? How much influence would we have abroad, after years of inactivity? Would we be able to re-engage in time, to prevent an aspiring hegemon (ie – Hitler, Saddam) from getting the jump on us?

c. Even though we would save a pile of money, these savings do not seem commensurate with the international influence we would lose. Neo-isolationists seem willing to trade away considerable international influence, for a relatively modest improvement in domestic welfare. Given the potential stakes in international politics, this trade-off is imprudent. And, should re-engagement become necessary, there would be a huge price-tag.

(Neo-iso is on pages 70-73. Also read "Come Home, America" by Gholz on pages 107-127)

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(2) Next, let’s look at SE: (SE is on pages 74-77, and 119-121)

"Selective Engagement" – SE endeavors to ensure peace among the "great powers." Russia, the wealthier European states, China, and Japan matter most. The purpose of U.S. engagement, should be to affect directly the propensity of these great powers to war against one another. These are the areas of the world where World Wars have originated, wars that have managed to draw the U.S. into the fight, in spite of our strong inclination to stay out. Like Neo-iso, SE tends to focus on large concentrations of power. And also like Neo-iso, SE is concerned about resources. We simply cannot afford (monetarily) to keep global peace worldwide, or to preserve the U.S. as the undisputed leader in a unipolar world. SE favors the preservation of NATO, but not its expansion.

Pros: a. SE seems to make sense. It is certainly a viable compromise between Neo-iso and global, widespread, indiscriminate engagement. If we refrain from involvement in small regional areas of conflict, and focus only on the "great powers", we can save a significant amount of resources, which can then be spent to address some of our domestic problems at home.

b. Twice in the twentieth century, the U.S. pulled out of Europe, and both times a World War followed. Then, America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European "great power" peace ensued. So, we know that with SE, we can prevent "great power" war in Europe.

Cons: a. SE lacks a certain romance. Can SE win the political support of any major constituency in our country? It just doesn’t have the same "sex appeal" as some of the others. There is little idealism or commitment to principle behind the strategy. It lacks the exuberant nationalism of Primacy, or the commitment to liberal principle of Cooperative Security. It focuses rather narrowly on interests defined in terms of power. Can such a strategy sustain the support of a democracy, long addicted to viewing international relations as a struggle between good and evil?

b. SE expects the U.S. to ignore much of the trouble that is likely to occur in the world. Our prestige and reputation might suffer from such apparent indifference. Would our tendency to avoid involvement in issues that do arise, affect our ability to then engage, and pursue our more important interests? And, SE does not provide clear guidance on which issues have "great power" implications, and thus merit involvement. Since trouble in peripheral areas is much more likely than trouble in core areas, SE opens up a real can of worms. Every situation that arises will be subject to intense media scrutiny and public debate.

c. SE is not as selective as it appears. Europe matters, most of Asia matters, and the Middle East matters. Therefore, most of the world matters! Developments that arise on the periphery of this large expanse of the Earth, will invariably produce intense media coverage, and the argument will be that "what matters" must be pacified, in order to protect "what matters." Beware of "mission creep."

d. According to Gholz (Neo-iso // Restraint), the biggest disadvantage of SE is that it raises the likelihood of being drawn into a faraway "great power" war. The next time a "great power" war happens, the best thing for the U.S. would be to stay as far away as possible. Even if a "great power" war happens, for us it would be survivable, and we should stay out. (pp. 119-121)

(SE is on pages 74-77)

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(3) Now, the one that’s been described as "global police duties" -- CS: (CS is on pages 77-80)

"Cooperative Security" – CS says that peace is effectively indivisible. CS begins with an expansive concept of U.S. national interests, that is -- the U.S. has a huge national interest in World Peace. CS is the only one of the four that is fueled by liberalism rather than realism. It’s the Rodney King approach to Foreign Policy ("Can’t we all just get along?") Aggression anywhere, by anyone, cannot be permitted. Advocates of CS want to act cooperatively, through international institutions (particularly the U.N.) as much as possible. CS does not view the other great world powers as a security problem. Most of them are now democracies, and democracies tend not to war with one another. Russia and China are admittedly rather troublesome in this model, but the answer is to help them toward democracy. This is what Clinton tried to do. Advocates of CS favor military action for humanitarian purposes. We also must make our armed forces available to multinational forces when needed.

Pros: a. If world peace is actually possible, then CS is one way to try and make it happen.

Cons: a. We spend much more on "Defense Spending" than anyone else in the world. This deprives American taxpayers of the fruit of their labor, and deprives American society of the resources to effectively address domestic problems. We simply cannot afford to pursue a military policy that spends billions of dollars to promote world peace, and encourage democracy around the globe.

b. Fighting to alleviate human suffering is a worthy but misguided goal. Money spent for humanitarian missions will do far less good if it is spent on the military, than if it were used for food and vaccines. Besides, America’s military are not properly trained to promote democracy, fight hunger, and battle pediatric diseases. The military’s primary job is to kill people and break things.

c. Cooperative Security assumes that individual states will rise above their narrow ideas of national interest, to act on behalf of the common good. This is a false assumption. For example, it is unlikely that our NATO allies would ever fight China, no matter how much we wanted them to.

d. Deterring aggressors would be very difficult. It is likely that under CS, we would be involved in a large number of wars over many years, before there would be any hope of deterring all of the ambitious "regional hegemons" around the world.

e. Democracies are problematical partners in this CS arrangement, because they must persuade their publics to go to war. Since those publics tend to be increasingly "casualty-sensitive", the case for risking lives in distant wars is inherently difficult to make.

f. CS places a heavy burden on Arms Control. It is not clear that Arms Control can bear that burden. Nonproliferation efforts have met with mixed success. Verification, and especially enforcement, remain problematic.

g. The Clinton Administration learned that CS sounds pretty good on paper, but actually making it happen is another thing altogether (see p. 86-87). Even the "good guys" can conceptualize their national interests in opposition to one another. (CS is on pages 77-80)

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(4) Finally, Primacy (aka – "Sustained Global Pre-eminence"): (Primacy is on pages 81-86)

"Primacy" – Primacy, like SE, is motivated by both peace and power. This strategy holds that a preponderance of U.S. power, ensures peace. Both the "new world order" and U.S. national security require that the U.S. maintain the primacy with which it emerged from the Cold War. The collapse of bipolarity cannot be permitted to allow the emergence of multipolarity. Unipolarity is essential.

Pros: a. Kagan (pp. 97-106) presents a very compelling argument for Primacy. Right now - is our opportunity to ensure a world era of peace and harmony, and we must not blow it. We must not allow the international order that we created – to collapse. Our role in the world is not to await the emergence of the next Hitler or Stalin. Our role is to shape the international environment in such a way, that we prevent such a threat from arising in the first place. Maintaining a decent and hospitable world order, requires continued American leadership (ie – hegemony), in resisting and undermining any rising dictators or hostile ideologies.

Cons: a. It is likely that some states will rise up, and balance against the U.S. They will not wish to remain in a position of military inferiority. Primacy underestimates the power of nationalism. Some states, simply out of national pride, may not accept U.S. leadership.

b. American hegemony and perceived arrogance, may engender resistance and resentment, that could then undermine the effectiveness of any future multilateral arrangements.

c. Should the U.S. wage a "preventive war", to restrain a large state (Russia? China?) from rising to the position of challenger? How will our allies react to such a "preventive war"?

d. Beware of "imperial overstretch." How much power and influence is enough? A little bit more power would certainly be better. Primacy may be a good recipe for draining the national treasury. Posen calls it the "continued pursuit of Cold War policy and strategy in the absence of an enemy." (p. 86)

e. For more anti-Primacy arguments, see pp. 121-R and 122-L of the Gholz reading.

(Primacy is on pages 81-86. Also read "The Present Danger" by Kagan on pages 97-106)

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(5) The lesson mentions a couple of other terms:

"Continuing Engagement" – This term refers to Clinton’s policy of "Engagement and Enlargement", which is essentially a mix of Cooperative Security and Selective Engagement, with a dash of Primacy thrown in (p. 86, top right).

"Collective Security" – This policy asserts that world peace can be maintained through a binding, predetermined agreement to take collective action to preserve it. It says that any illegal use of force by any nation against another, should trigger the combined force of all the rest. (see the Miller reading on pp. 144-160). This concept is what led to the League of Nations, and then the United Nations.

U.S. policy under Clinton ("Engagement and Enlargement") has been described as "Continuing Engagement", which is essentially a mix of Cooperative Security and Selective Engagement, with a dash of Primacy thrown in (see p. 86, top right).

The interests that drive Restraint are: a) U.S. Power, b) concern for Resources, and c) Realism

The interests that drive SE are: a) Power and Peace, b) concern for Resources, and c) Realism

The interests that drive Primacy are: a) Power and Peace, and b) Nationalistic Idealism tempered with some Realism

The interests that drive CS are: a) desire for World Peace, and b) Liberal Idealism

To answer this DLO, let’s look carefully at the Roberts & Utgoff reading (pp. 163-178).

A) When fighting aggression, Multilateral Coalitions are important, because they:

- Facilitate a sharing of military costs and political burdens

- Add depth and flexibility to a military campaign

- May have a deterrent effect on the aggressor

- Dilute the aggressor’s ability to portray the conflict as simply bipolar

- Offer international legitimacy to the intervention, and the choices made (p 164, L)

B) If the aggression involves NBC/WMD, Coalitions offer additional benefits:

- They facilitate a sharing of responsibility for the course and outcome of the war

- Key parties participate in decisions, related to the use of Nukes (this helps establish broad public acceptance)

- There is less chance of stumbling inadvertently into a WMD war, through failure to communicate and coordinate

- Coalitions help channel and moderate the strong public emotions associated with WMD use (rage and fear // shame and guilt)

- They would help the U.S. defend itself against charges that would follow such a war

(pp. 164-5)

C) What are the three key ingredients that are essential to forming a Coalition? There must be:

- A common interest in responding to the aggression

- A feasible means of fighting the aggression (a realistic plan)

- The major player must be firmly committed to the end (pp. 166-7)

D) Roberts and Utgoff draw the following conclusions --

- Coalitions will be important to the U.S. in meeting the challenges of NBC aggression. When faced with the necessity of intervening against an NBC-armed regional aggressor, the U.S. should form an international coalition that it can then lead into war and victory.

- The past offers lessons for the future, but some lessons have been poorly drawn, and thus are dangerous. Conventional vs. NBC, are two entirely different scenarios, so be careful.

- The U.S. brings strengths, as well as some liabilities, to the task of "Coalition Leader"

- Forming Coalitions against NBC-armed aggressors will be easier than is generally assumed, but leading such Coalitions will be more difficult.

- Building the constituencies from which coalitions are formed, and the institutions (UN, NATO) through which they act, should not be left until the moment of crisis. Much work can be done ahead of time.

(if you wish to see these conclusions listed in an expanded format, read p. 177 R, and p. 178)

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E) With regard to "working through the United Nations" – we should turn to the Miller reading (pp. 144-162). Miller points out that twice in the Twentieth Century (1950-53, and 1990-91), the U.S. used the United Nations as a means of accomplishing its military ends. We persuaded the Security Council to join us in an action that we would have taken anyway. In fact, some might even say that the U.S. had acted less as the "agent" of the UN, than it had made the UN the agent of U.S. foreign policy. In Korea, the action was overwhelmingly in the hands of the U.S., right from the very start. We supplied 50% of the troops, 85% of the naval force, and 90% of the Airpower. In the Gulf War, it was a "U.S. – led Coalition" that won the war, not a "UN armed force." At the end of 1990 (two weeks before the war broke out), 80 percent of the Coalition troops in Saudi Arabia were from the U.S.