What distinguishes revolutionary war from guerrilla war

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Lesson Objectives: Comprehend the application of air power in the Post Cold War or "Postmodern" World.

Desired Learning Outcomes:

1. Explain the current contributions of aerospace power to the national security of the United States.

2. Contrast the strengths and weaknesses of aerospace power in MOOTW.

Predict the relationship of future uses of aerospace power to success in national security.

Questions for Discussion:
DLO I.

	Category I	Category II	Category III
Combat Risk	HIGH	MODERATE making it the most problematic category	LOW
Missions	Raids,Strikes, Counterdrug (directaction), Noncombatant evac (non-permissive), recovery ops, quarantines, insurgency, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism	Peace enforcement, sanctions enforcement, exclusion zone enforcement, maritime interception, ensuring navigation freedom, shipping protection, peacekeeping, show of force, arms control	Noncombatant evac (permissive), peace building, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign int’l defence, humanitarian assistance, counterdrug support, domestic civil support, disaster relief
Effectiveness of Airpower	High for counterinsurgencies Moderate for all others	High for peace and sanctions enforcement. Moderate for all others.	Moderate for Noncombatant evac (permissive), peace building, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign int’l defense, counterdrug support,
ACCEPTABILITY: Will the proposed use be accepted by political leaders, the international community, the public?	Usually high and generally now War Power Act implications. Counterterrorism and counter/insurgency is more problematic b/c of sovereignty concerns	Problematic with Congress considering restricting the President's ability to commit troops. Mission issues: dangerous, protracted (biggest issue) , and high cost.	Easily obtain political acceptability Counterdrug ops -- issue sovereignty considerations
FEASIBILITY: are the mobilized and usable resources sufficient for the proposed use of military force in the specific OOTW?	Exceptional d/t proper resources, capabilities, explicity support in doctrine, and will garner popular support	Short term these missions are ideal but if protracted then Reserves need to be called up, add to significant ops tempo, decreased morale d/t difficulty measuring success, difficult to maintain readiness status - esp. training	Eliminating combat generally negates most challenges but these missions do little to enhance combat capability esp when costs taken out of military budgets
SUITABILITY: is the proposed employment technically capable of promoting//defending/pro-tecting the political aim?	High. Major exception counterinsurgency d/t US has no proven capacity	Historically technical capability for promoting the political aims, force protection issues	Generally have been widely successful. Issue is when mission creep b/c of military capability

1. If MOOTW is an attempt to shape the international environment through prevention diplomacy, are there not better ways of intervention?

Text doesn’t specifically address this particular question but does discuss various historical criteria for making the decision:

- Even Clausewitz noted that "There are some political aims for which military force is not appropriate." (308)

- Weinberger Doctrine attempted to match military means with political ends where he put forth six tests to determine the appropriateness of military force.

- Weinberger viewed military force as a separate element of national power, equal to diplomacy, economic, and informational elements as policy tools.

-- Provided guidelines for determining acceptability (political support of our leadership and eventually our populace), feasility (appropriate levels of forces and resources), and suitability (well-defined objectives matched by an effective plan).

- George Schultz focused on the "popularity test." Saw military force as a subset of diplomatic power. Stated that public support was not required in advance for such clearly legitimate uses of military power as liberating a people or preventing abusive aggression when military force was to be applied in measured doses.

-- Current National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement definitely adopts the Schultz view. National security policy focuses our resources to promote democracy abroad and seeks to become more proactive in the OOTW environment.

2. Why should this be done at all?

The US must weigh its national interests before deciding to employ military power.

List of critical questions for our national security strategy:

1. Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success?

2. What types of US military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military forces carefully matched to our political objectives?

3. Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?

4. Do we have time lines and milestones that reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?

The new criteria for employment of force is:

Acceptability – Does the public accept the OOTW environment?
Feasibility – Are the mobilized and usable forces sufficient for the proposed use of military force in the OOTW?
Suitability – Is our military suited to the conflict, can it achieve the desired results?

3. If MOOTW is the operation of choice, how well is airpower suited to it?

All services recognize that airpower plays a key role in OOTW.

The impact of airpower remains significant but becomes less decisive in OOTW as one moves along the military spectrum of conflict away from war and towards peacetime uses of the military. Other elements of airpower such as transportation, logistics supply, intelligence collection, command and control, reconnaissance, and PSYOP have proven decisive in OOTW in which the US could not use coercive airpower.

4. Is air occupation a feasible goal under the MOOTW rubric?

Yes. The overall goal of MOOTW is to pursue US national policy initiatives and to counter potential threats to US National security interests.

Dfn: air occupation (Warden): airpower permits the virtual occupation of enemy territory by aircraft without requiring a potentially entangling and costly ground operation. But air occupation missions can be complex, persistent, and costly. These common objectives for gaining control over enemy territory are to (1) coerce the opposition, (2) enforce sanctions, (3) obtain a buffer zone, (4) obtain raw and natural resources, (5) control cultural assimilation, (6) annex territory, and (7) exact revenge. It is important to note that the attainment of these objectives does not necessarily require actual fighting. Merely the threat of force has prompted some governments to abandon objectives or relinquish control of their country. (Haiti)

MOOTW missions that lend themselves to air occupation (or air intervention) include: enforcing sanctions, enforcing exclusion zones, and conducting peace operations. Air occupation allows successful intervention without risking a significant number of lives or incurring high logistics costs, and is generally easier to consolidate both domestic and international will. The advantage that air occupation offers is the ability to intervene sooner, when the risks are lower, and the chances of success are greater. BUT, there’s also the issue of you can't call it occupation b/c that has a very specific meaning under international law so it needs another name and the issue of doctrine . . .

5. Do we still need a viable doctrine for air occupation?

Yes, we need to learn and develop our use of air occupation primarily because none exists. AF Basic Doctrine states that doctrine development is never complete and states that air and space power are best used as offensive weapons, but occupation seems more of a defensive employment. Dippold states that USAF must develop and publish air occupation doctrine to provide guidance on what it believes to be true about applicability, objectives, tasks, techniques, and procedures. The danger with current thought and employment is that air occupation is used because we can, not because we should. The problem is the perception that air occupation is a low cost fix and but the danger is that it is used for problems that require long-term commitment to achieve lasting conflict resolution.

Dipplod suggest that rather than build our definition on a classical perception that relegates Airpower to a supporting role, we should consider the likely air occupation objectives: reducing the control of enemy forces to the (1) coerce the enemy, (2) enforce sanctions, and (3) deny use of enemy territory. He suggests that to do this we need to combine existing technology and systems in new and innovative ways. Main purpose in developing this doctrine is the statement "Airpower has the advantage of immediate availability as a disciplinary force. It has the further advantage of being able to exercise discipline without interference in the normal routine of any nation’s peaceful affairs. And in the third place it can reach any area on the earth’s surface without effective intervention." One other impetus for Air Occupation Doctrine is the ability to intervene sooner while the stakes and risks are lower and the chances of success greater.

There must be more to airpower theory than "we can, therefore we should"
USAF must provide guidance on what it believes to be true about applicability, objectives, tasks, techniques, and procedures

DLO II.

MOOTW Operations	Strengths of Aerospace Power	Weakness of Aerospace Power
Enforcement of Sanctions	Popular foreign policy tool	Problem that can't necessarily shoot down aircraft d/t moral or international outrage. C2 issues with partner states. Protracted and indecisive lead to force/readiness issues
Enforcing Exclusion Zones	Another popular foreign policy tool and generally less problematic	Some multinational C2 issues. Mission stretched to deny movement on the ground compromising peacekeepers there.
Humanitarian assistance	In association with suppression of enemy air and other coercive airpower, they have protected humanitarian assistance	Defensive force has compromised neutrality of relief aid. Failure of airpower doctrine to address coordination with multiple relief agencies
Show of Force/Coercive Diplomacy	Can communicate martial intent in constructive manner	Might not fit with political nuances required for the situation. Initiative remains in hands of belligerents. Also suggests indecisiveness and graduated pressure e.g. Vietnam
Strikes/Raids	Doctrinally most straightforward	Who do we hit -- e.g. retaliation raids?
Peace Operations	Unlike peacekeeping, allows for measured use of coercive force.	US is doctrinally mixing peace enforcement with peacekeeping whilst our allies state that one force used compromises peacekeeping

6. Why did NATO launch Allied Force?

Clinton administration said that it was acting to save lives
NATO goal was to prevent the forced displacement of the Kosovar Albanians
Protect the precarious political stability of the countries of the Balkans
NATO waged war not for its interests but on behalf of its values

7. What policy assumptions and strategic objectives were made?

Policy assumption: The Clinton Doctrine" or humanitarian intervention

"If the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing"

Strategic objectives:

"To deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo"

"To seriously damage the Serbians military capacity to harm the people of Kosovo"

To make the Serbian leaders stop the ethnic cleansing

8. What kinds of policy restrictions shaped and limited Allied Force?

The war policy was to launch air strikes on military targets but no ground troops.

These air strikes did not stop but accelerated the Serbian’s brutal campaign to crush the Albanian rebels, driving over a million from their homes.

NATO threat of invasion caused Milosevic to withdraw forces from Kosovo.

US, UK, and France (who played the skeptic) chose the bombing targets

9. How effective was the campaign and what factors affected the final outcome?

How Effective:

Failed to deter bloody offensive against innocent civilians
Failed to seriously damage Serbian military capacity to harm the people of Kosovo
Failed to protect Kosovar Albanians
Strategic damage to relations with China and Russian

Succeeded in providing a better life in the province for the Kosovar Albanians
Successful strategic bombing campaign- effective and low-cost (in terms of coalition lives)

Final outcome:

Military success:

Air forces carried out their missions with dispatch; the assault forced the Serb military ‘s withdrawal from southern Yugoslav province of Kosovo.

Political failure:

People of the Balkans worse off than before the war.

Failed to establish a new principle governing the use of force in the post-Cold war world.

10. Did NATO achieve its stated objective – its real objective?

NATO’S decision to launch the air campaign while ruling out the use of ground forces lifted a key constraint on Milosevic. As a result the allies utterly failed to achieve two of the three objectives Clinton listed the day the bombing started: "to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo and, if necessary seriously damage the Serbian military’s capacity to harm the people of Kosovo. The other war was fought to achieve Clinton’s third objective: "demonstrate the seriousness of purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course." The alliance won this war without question…

Considering both its effectiveness and relatively low cost, NATO’s air campaign was probably the most successful use of strategic bombardment in the history of warfare.

DLO III.

11. How does AFDD-1 contrast what it calls the traditional view of war with the new "halt phase" view of war?

- Traditional view of war was fought in three phases:

-- Halt the invading force

-- Build up combat power and weaken the enemy

-- Mount the decisive counteroffensive

- New "halt phase" view of war

-- Halt phase may be planned as the conflict's decisive phase

--- Not as a precursor necessarily to build-up of ground forces

--- The global range, speed, and flexibility or air and space forces bring the "decisive halt" opportunity to reality

--- SHAPE the international environment by promoting regional stability, thus preventing emergence or growth of conflicts

--- RESPOND to crisis across the spectrum of conflict to deter, resolve, contain, or engage and win

--- PREPARE for the future with innovation and hedges against asymmetric strategies of potential adversaries

12. How does the AFDD-1 view of airpower compare with the strategic concepts of Douhet and the Air Corps Tactical School?

Air Force Core Competencies contain many of the same tenets of Douhet and the ACTS.

Air and Space Superiority

Precision Engagement¾ apply force exactly where required

Information Superiority¾ collect and control information and deny the enemy the same.

Global Attack—attack anywhere rapidly and persistently with a wide range of munitions.

Rapid Global Mobility¾ mobility to the point required

Agile Combat Support¾ responsive force support

Douhet

That an AF must achieve command of the air (Air Supremacy).
"Air strikes need to be rapid and carried out in masse."
Aircraft fleet in being must attack immediately and relentlessly once hostilities begin. A country not ready for war would lose command of the air (air supremacy)

ACTS

¾ Precise attacks upon carefully chosen key points in the enemy’s national structure. Collapse of this structure, it was thought would lead the enemy population to surrender.

¾ War’s purpose was seen as the elimination of rival production by destroying economic facilities or by alteration of the enemy will to produce.

¾ Bombardment was the leading concept of the Tactical School that theory called for extreme accuracy in destroying small targets like plants and power stations. (198)

¾ Strategic bombardment--or striking at vital industrial centers, food, medical and military supplies, and lines of communication behind enemy lines--would prove decisive in any future war and destroy the enemy army's ability to resist.