What distinguishes revolutionary war from guerrilla war

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Lesson Objectives: Comprehend revolutionary war as a type of warfare and why it ultimately succeeded in Indochina against the United States.

Desired Learning Outcomes:

Explain the political and military fundamentals of revolutionary war.
Summarize the weaknesses of counterinsurgency as conceived and practiced by the French and Americans.
Summarize the reasons for US failure in Vietnam.

Questions for Discussion:
DLO I. Explain the political and military fundamentals of revolutionary war.

What distinguishes revolutionary war from guerrilla war?

"Revolutionary war" refers to the seizure of political power by the use of armed force

Not war between nations
Seizure of power is by a popular or broad-based political movement
Entails a fairly long period of armed conflict
Power is seized in order to carry out a well-advertised political or social program

Revolutionary war includes guerrilla warfare
Guerrilla operations may have no revolutionary aim though their revolutionary political potential is never absent

Tactics of hit and run, avoiding costly pitched battles, eluding enemy pursuit by hiding in hills, in forests or among the populace are simply one means
Other means range from nonviolent political mobilization of people, legal political action, strikes, agitation, and terrorism, to large-scale battles and conventional military operations

Revolutionary wars occur within nations, and have as their aim the seizure of state power—more often than not, one or several "foreign" powers will intervene in a revolutionary war, changing its course and often its outcome

2. What are the three stages of revolutionary war as envisaged by Mao Tse Tung?

Stage 1: Enemy’s Strategic Offensive and our Strategic Defensive

Enemy expends large number of resources over extended period of time
Form of fighting primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare
Support from other nations
Enemy shows signs of weakening morale—signs of exhaustion beginning to appear in his finances and economy; war-weariness is beginning to set in among his people and troops; and within the clique at the war, "war frustrations" are beginning to manifest

Stage 2: Enemy’s Strategic Consolidation and Our Preparation for the Counter

Enemy forced to fix certain terminal points—enters stage of safeguarding his occupied areas
Fighting will be ruthless and country will suffer serious devastation
Sets-up puppet government and plunders people to the limit

Our forces will be switched to the enemy’s rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and coordinating with the people’s local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas, keeping the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobile warfare
Duration will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces…and on the changes in the international situation—relatively long, two big problems will be economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of traitors
Tasks will be to mobilize the whole people to unite as one
Will wear down the enemy, disintegrating its morale and stimulating the growth of homesickness—transitional stage

Stage 3: Counteroffensive to Recover Lost Territories
Rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place in the enemy’s homeland
Primary form of fighting will be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise in importance
Switch from fighting on strategically interior lines to strategically exterior lines
Very important to maintain internal unity in face of enemy’s divisive tricks

3. Why do revolutionary wars last so long?

From Mao – Object of war is "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy". Revolutionary war is war of attrition and annihilation.

Time needed to involve and mobilize masses

Revolutions are not made by states and their bureaucracies, but by raw social energies

Value is given to time and space—become weapons which promise to exhaust their enemy, if not militarily then at least politically, as he failed to achieve the quick victory demanded by the Western tradition

4. Why did revolutionary wars succeed in China, Indochina, and Algeria, but fail in Malaya, the Philippines, and Greece?

China

- Exhibited patience over Japan

Won the "hearts and minds of the people"

Japanese ethnocentric view; did not see other Asians as equals

- Massed forces to attack isolated strategic points

- Achieved international acceptance and aid

Indochina (Shy and Collier)

- Ho Chi Minh had read Mao, even taught Chinese troops

- Vo Nguyen Giap recruited refugees and trained them as guerrillas

- Both wrote/spread their vision/propaganda

-- Vietnamese independence - an easy sell

- Slowly made military advances

- Ho effected coup d’etat when Emperor Bao Dai abdicated

- "This swift change from protracted war to coup indicates that Ho was a master –

not a slave - of Maoist doctrine

- Advanced slowly when they had to, faster after receiving aid from China

Decisive battle was Dienbienphu in 1954
"Using Chinese supplies, a strong political base, and widespread guerrilla organization to rebuild his forces in 1951, Giap left the next move to the French Commander, Tassigny."

Algeria

- France was completely out of touch with Algerian people

- Tried "psychological impregnation" by repeating their desired "truth" propaganda

style

-- An attempt to outdo the insurgents with a war of rhetoric

-- Some messages were offensive, especially references to Christendom, most

Algerians were Muslin

- de Gaulle offered independence, partly due to his own "falling out" with his army

Malaya and Philippines

- Communist – led popular – front parties reactivated wartime guerrilla forces versus

central governments

- Well – conceived and coordinated civil and military programs over many years defeated

insurgents

- British in Malaya, US in Philippines

- Mao’s ideas appeared in part

- "Ruling power" understood the people, gave them what they wanted/needed

Greece

- Conflict decided largely on the basis of foreign support

- Greek Communist rebels were supported by Yugoslavia

-- Yugoslavia may have been motivated to antagonize Greek government by dispute

over Macedonia

- Support stopped in 1949 just as US-backed Greek Army attacked major rebel bases

DLO II. Summarize the weaknesses of counterinsurgency as conceived and practiced by France and the US.

5. What are the ingredients of successful counterinsurgency?

US, two basic packages of counterinsurgency; "hearts and minds" and "cost-benefit;" both failures in Vietnam
"Hearts and minds" attribute insurgency to the trauma of modernization, the revolution of rising expectations, and Communist meddling—stresses development over security

Aim is the transform the passive parochial into at least a subject, if not true citizen, of a modern state
Three key areas; physical control of territory and populace, penetration of authority throughout the country, and promotion of economic and social development—the three great "oughts"
First problem is protection of the populace from insurgent predators—threatened governments must receive assistance to strengthen the military and develop popular defense force which actively involve the people (In Vietnam, analysts recommend the physical relocation of people to defended villages, "strategic hamlets"—big mistake)
Two basic political problems behind insurgency: bad administration and under administration—governments ought to be law-abiding, administratively strong and responsive and ought to address distributional, racial, and communal problems and remove corrupt or abusive officials
Governments ought to provide the benefits provided by the insurgents
All must be managed simultaneously (Unity Principle)

In "cost-benefit," (gives priority to security) focus changes from concern about overwhelming popular demands to underwhelming state repressive capabilities (developed by Leites-Wolf from RAND)

Argue that there is no simple connection between economic aid and support for the government
Contend that popular preferences simply do not matter
Present a simple model: inputs > process > outputs
Counter-rebellion must change the costs and amounts of the inputs that the insurgents system gets, must attack the process by which these inputs are converted and must undertake the business of hardening the insurgency’s targets so that they can withstand more of the insurgent activities
Cost-benefit approach is coercion

6. What is the role of political and social reform in counterinsurgency?

- Political reform

Insurgency threatened governments ought to attack two basic political problems behind insurgency: bad administration and under administration
They should become what all modern governments ought to be anyway: law-abiding; administratively strong; and responsive
Gives population what they need/want such as security (safety), food, fair government
Opposite of "collapsed states" scenario

- Social reform

Govts ought to provide benefits only promised by insurgents
If govt is viewed as distant and disinterested, aid will persuade the masses to abandon the insurgents and rally to the govt and economic development ought to eliminate the threat
Government understands needs of people and identifies with them
Population sees government as their rightful leader

Unlike French in Algeria

- Both have dual function

-- Economic appeal of resources, security

-- Emotional appeal of ideological compatibility

7. What were the flaws of French counterinsurgency doctrine and practice?

- Failed to develop correct doctrine because they confused methods of insurgency with

causes

- Had image of themselves as a "great nation" therefore, they knew best for Algeria

-- Deluded themselves that their ethnocentric view were shared by Algeria

- Believed communist meddling was source of insurgency when it was really rising

nationalism

-- "Expressions of popular discontent must be ignored; they are evidence not of the

people’s true interests, but rather of communist ventriloquy."

- Saw Algerians as childlike and backward

-- Rebel leaders were just troublemakers

-- Desire for independence showed "lack of political maturity" (!)

- Doctrine was "destroy and construct"

-- Destroy the insurgent organization(s)

-- "Construct peace" by protection and assistance of all kinds to the population

-- Also intense propaganda effort to neutralize that of insurgents

- Destroy did not work since they couldn’t tell insurgents from innocent populace

-- Used interrogation, relocation to ferret out insurgents

-- Believed populace would accept as or necessary evil; they didn’t

- Construct was based on psychwar or psychological impregnation, simply a reverse

propaganda campaign

-- The information was so alien to Algerians that it had no effect on them

-- References to Christendom, (Algerians are largely Muslin) and an epic battle between

East and West, and France’s role in international leadership

-- All made an impression on French not on Algerians

- de Gaulle offered independence in 1959

8. Why did the US Army ignore potential counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam?

- President Kennedy began development of Special Forces (Shy and Collier)

-- Initially weak organization made worse by rapid expansion

-- US Army "establishment" mistrusted this group trained for irregular operation

-- Last straw came when Special Forces started to work with CIA

-- Distrust manifested by arrest of Special Forces commander in Vietnam

- American technicians and advisors assumed that politics was someone else’s problem

-- Ignored an important part of counterinsurgency which is counter – propaganda

- US counterinsurgency was "intellectually shallow;" devoid of "mysticism" and

"pragmatism"

American strategy at the time was focused on Nuclear War and the perceived threat of Communism

DLO III. Summarize the reasons for US failure in Vietnam.

9. What principles of war, if any, did the United States violate in Vietnam?

- Mass – undoubtedly on the side of the US, but led us to believe that "applied firepower,

even in lesser doses, could substitute for strategy"

- Objective – Tilford describes US objectives as tenuous, ill – defined and limited goals"

- Every military operation should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective; entered war to prevent spread of communism

- Economy of force – probably violated in light of "Mass" above

- Maneuver – US was so convinced that mass was everything that we probably were not

concerned with the "flexible application of combat power"

- Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power; includes flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. Use of conventional forces against guerrillas difficult, lack flexibility and mobility

- Surprise – strike the enemy at a time or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared

10. Why was North Vietnam a poor candidate for a strategic bombardment campaign?

- North Vietnam was immune to coercion with air power (Pape)

-- Not destructive enough to affect civilian morale or hamper military strategy

-- Guerrilla campaign not vulnerable to massive air attack

- North’s interest in South based on "powerful motive of national cohesion"

-- Lenient start to Rolling Thunder (Schnelling strategy) did not create sufficient

risk/fear to affect North’s thinking (bombing to display the threat)

- Industrial base was tiny, too few targets of too little significance

-- Minimal risk to civilian economy or population (avoided)

- "Genteel" Douhet plan in second phase

-- Higher current costs rather than threat of future destruction

-- Not impressive to North already losing huge numbers of personnel, between 600,000

and 950,000 from 1965-74 (170)

-- Lost production backfilled by Communist allies

- Exploit military vulnerabilities – advocated by JCS chairman General Earle G. Wheeler

-- Block transport of men and equipment into the South

- Logistics support for guerrilla operations flowed from forward bases to insurgent rear areas and were generally very small

-- Not possible to reduce flow of materiel below that actually required by guerrilla

forces in field

- Statistics proved a poor substitute for strategy, and perceived successes fostered by the numbers game succeeded in providing only the illusion of victory

11. How might the Air Force have better prepared itself for its entry into the Vietnam War?

- Air Force leaders used strategic bombing doctrine as a means to promote a separate AF

-- Neglected Close Air Support, squabbled with Army

-- Believed that pre-industrial North Vietnam could be defeated in the same way as

Germany and Japan

- Fascination with technology kept AF looking for "silver bullet" at expense of

development of doctrine and strategy suitable for revolutionary/guerrilla war

-- Focused on "numbers game" counting deaths and targets destroyed; providing an

illusion of winning

-- Compare to low logistic needs of North Vietnam’s army and willingness to sacrifice

lives

- SecDef Louis Johnson, 1949, required screening of all info from Pentagon for "policy

and propriety"

-- Led to cessation of original thinking on doctrine and strategy

-- General LeMay in 1961 told Congress that 1935 doctrine was still appropriate

-- Caused USAF to retain WW II strategic bombing thinking, "not outfought---out

thought"

- AF Generals did not integrate social, cultural and political considerations with military

aspects of war

12. Is air power an effective tool of political coercion in a limited war?

- Not every adversary is susceptible to coercion

-- Willingness to pay high cost in lives

- Coercion based on military vulnerability will not work if enemy strategy cannot be

affected by air attack

-- Amount of supplies required by guerrilla vs. amount we could interdict

-- Dispersion of forces, storage sites

-- Dense jungle obscured logistic lines which were only trails anyway

- Assessing enemy vulnerability to choose an effective coercion strategy is difficult

-- Must understand morale and commitment of enemy

-- Is enemy strategy vulnerable to attack?

--- Logistic flows and requirements

- What is the relationship between military action and enemy goals?

-- Attacked morale/will of people

-- Extreme will and dedication to unification made this area invulnerable

-- Attacked industrial base which was barely needed for war effort

-- Minimal supply requirement and material support from others

- Aim of air campaign was to force Hanoi (North Vietnam) to stop supporting insurgency

in South and enter serious negotiation

-- Critical "leverage" comes from exploiting vulnerabilities in opponents military

strategy

- Guerrilla campaign during Johnson administration was immune to air attack

-- Rolling Thunder had no effect, i.e. no significant concessions from North

- Pape concludes, "American leaders failed to realize that no coercive air power strategy

could have succeeded during 1965-1968."

In final analysis, the war was not America’s to win or lose, it was South Vietnam’s war