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Lesson 4 - World War II: Strategy and Airpower
AWC, Class 059-A, MacDill Seminar
LTC Nerina Stepanovsky
28 Aug 01
Lesson Objective: To analyze Axis and Allied national and military strategies and the role of airpower in the major theaters.
Desired Learning Outcomes:
Questions for Study and Discussion:
For DLO 1:
AWPD-1 (Air War Plans Division-Plan 1), named "Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Force", was completed on August 12, 1941. This was the first major strategic air war plan by the newly formed Army Air Forces staff, and was completed in only 9 days. It served as a blueprint for the air war that would follow (pp.272). It was offensive in nature, much to the pleasure of Asst. Sec. John J. McCloy, who remarked that ground and air plans were being stifled by the out-of-date conception of hemispheric defense. Additionally, McCloy also believed both ground and air forces had made a major error in trying to press for an early seizure of African air bases (pp.273). It is important to note that this was not a war plan, but rather, it was an effort to provide the Office of Production Management with a good feel for what America’s wartime military requirements might be, along with the Joint Board estimate (pp. 274).
The Army Air Forces War Plans Division was headed up by LTC Harold George. The only other officers assigned to the AWPD at the time were LTCs Orvil Anderson and Kenneth Walker and MAJ Haywood Hansell. However, George added additional officers temporarily, with most of the members having been faculty members at the Air Corps Tactical School. Although only tasked with estimating the maximum number of air squadrons that may ultimately be required to garrison a great number of geographical sites and to hold as "reserves of opportunity", George and his group prepared a comprehensive air plan to defeat the Axis. They believed it improbable that a land invasion could be mounted against Germany for at least 3 years, and that if the air offensive was successful, a land offensive might not even be necessary. They also believed that heavy bombers could make deep penetrations of German defenses in daylight hours. However, the development of a large, heavily-armed escort fighter would also be necessary. Hemispheric defense would be maintained by the simultaneous dispersal of other AAF units to Alaska, Hawaii, Iceland, and South America. To maintain a strategic defense in Asia, the planners visualized a buildup of bomber forces in the Philippines and shuttling B-29 and B-32 aircraft from Alaska and the Philippines to a refueling and staging area in Siberia (pp.272). Ground operations would not be mounted until strategic air campaigns had already attained air superiority; in appropriate situations, available combat aviation would support theater operations of ground armies. Regarding pursuit aircraft, the planners believed that their function was defensive-the protection of bases and vital areas-and that air superiority would be won by the bombers (The planners also believed that an ideal force from the standpoint of economy would consist entirely of B-29s (pp 273).
The planners primarily used offensive operations to build AWPD-1, with the exception as noted above in using pursuit aircraft in the defensive mode. They proposed 3 lines of action:
The planners did not favor attacks against cities unless the enemy people were known to be low in morale either because of sustained effort and deprivation or because of a recognition that their armed forces could not win a favorable decision (pp.272). Some of the shortcomings of AWPD-1 included the timeline needed to manufacture all the needed airframes, and being unable to dissuade the Joint Board from believing that "only land armies can flatly win wars". Although the AWPD was correct in assuming how the Germans would react, they were not able to correctly predict the Japanese will, leading to the bombing of Pearl Harbor (pp. 274).
For DLO 2:
The Grand Alliance, composed of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, was forged in war and for the purpose of war…it was a marriage of expediency. The UK preferred the "indirect approach", to make use of its resources and its navy, and to shore up continental allies against any major power threatening the balance of Europe. Dependent upon the sea lanes for its existence, Great Britain was not self-sufficient. Even though it had a highly-industrialized economy, it was still dependent on its neighbors, especially the US, to assist in its wartime re-supply effort. Great Britain was also still reeling from the huge manpower losses from WWI. It was depending on the occupied countries to uprise and revolt, and long-term, to return to the status quo ante bellum in the balance of power (pp.276-77).
The United States viewed war as an aberration, or a disturber of normalcy. Like the UK, this would be the second major coalition war in the 20th century. However, once attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, American entry into the war was natural. Traditionally, America usually declared war first, then prepared for it. Americans were also fairly opposed to getting involved in European quarrels. The American approach was initially isolationist, holding off as long as possible and entering only when there was no other option. In fact, the country remained divided until after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. After WWI, the popular American opinion was to stay out of military alliances and not maintain armed forces capable of offensive action. This was vastly different from the British and Soviet views, probably because they had much more to lose, and the war was on their homefront. The US view of war was move in, get the job done as quickly as possible, then go back to normal life (pp. 277-78).
The Soviet Union was different in that it lacked air and naval traditions, but had a very strong land power. It also possessed a huge population with great resources, but was not very industrialized. Unlike the UK and US, they preferred to fight only one enemy at a time. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the strong historical Soviet desire to strengthen its position in eastern Europe resurfaced. They remained highly suspicious of capitalist encirclement, and were very distrustful of its allies. As a result, they were only peripherally involved in strategic planning with the other 2 allies until the international conferences at Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. The Soviets consistently pushed for a second front, in the West. Every time the Brits and Americans postponed this suggestion, the distrust increased.
In the end, I believe the Soviets were the most successful in achieving their goals, as they were able to infiltrate into Eastern Europe, enlarging their empire. Look how long the Communist regime controlled Poland, Czekoslovakia, etc. This was not achieved without a price, however, as the Soviets still blame the other allies for their heavy casualties. Great Britain was not as successful, because the balance of power did not go back to the way it was before the war. However, they did win in the Europe-first strategic scenario (Torch versus Bolero, pp. 281), to the dismay of the Soviets. The US, I believe, also came out of the war fairly well, as they were shown to have matured their coalition strategies and their military diplomacy, and were able to plan and execute a war fairly successfully on two fronts, though not simultaneously. Interestingly, the US and England were the two tightest allies initially, but towards the end, the US and the Soviet Union were more successful in their partnership. In the middle, GB and the Soviet Union were more closely knit as the US was not yet that greatly involved in the war, until after the Pearl Harbor attack (pp. 278).
The Allied strategy changed as the War progressed. For Great Britain, still reeling from huge losses of their soldiers during WWI, caution was key. They used the "indirect approach"- making use it its economic resources and its navy, and shoring up Continental allies against any major power threatening Europe (pp. 276). The Americans did not want to get involved in the war until absolutely necessary. Once they became involved, they were involved in more large-scale operations. The Soviets were concerned about the spread of capitalism, and wanted to strengthen its hold on Eastern Europe, but were at constant odds with the other two allies. They best example of conflicting strategies was the debate of Operations Bolero vs. Torch, Bolero being devised by the Americans, and Torch devised by the British. The Americans were so upset when it was evident that Torch was going forward that they considered going all-out in the Pacific. This is probably the main instigator of worsening relations between the US and Great Britain, as well as putting a strain on the relationship with the Soviets. They were not involved in the planning of either operation, nor had their expectation of a second front been fulfilled (pp. 282).
Probably the biggest problem, again, arose with adoption of Operation Torch over Bolero. As the American production of airframes and other production increased in 1943, they felt more confident in their ability to shape the coalition. The war in the Pacific, in which the British were not very interested in, gave the Americans the opportunity to leverage some of their views, as well as giving the Soviets their wish for a second front. Teheran was the decisive conference for European strategy. It was there that Stalin came out in favor with the Americans to adopt Operation Overlord as the major campaign for 1944, in contrast to the British desire to further advance into Italy and the Balkans (pp.283). 1941-42 represented the formative era, which was also a period of defensive strategy for the Allies, as well as a strategy of scarcity for the Western partners. Their two approaches to war had conflicted, and British opportunism or peripheral strategy won the first round. 1943 started the second stage of strategy, in which the means were more plentiful and the offensive phase of coalition warfare was seen (pp. 281). The third and final phase of war strategy was during the last 9 months of the European conflict, which was the period of pursuit of victory and the unfolding of the strategy in practice, meaning the problems of winning the war came up against the problems of winning the peace. From 1944-45, Marshall wanted to wind up the war in Europe and get on with the war in Japan (pp.285).
For DLO 3:
Initially, strategic air power didn’t do a lot more than anger Hitler, leading to more retaliation against the British through bombing of English cities. British bombing was very inaccurate (pp. 314). However, during the second phase of strategy, as the Americans had more airframes to include bombers and fighter escorts, and some new technology allowing them to confuse German radar, the bombings were much more effective against the Germans. Bombers alone could not win the war, as was demonstrated by the huge losses of the bombers initially. The use of longer-range fighter escorts definitely improved the success of the bombers’ mission (pp. 327). The Germans used fighters much more for ground support during the initial conflict, but as the war progressed and the losses mounted, more emphasis was placed on the use of bombers. Fighters would not have been as effective overall as the bombers, especially against Japan. Interviews with civilians from both German and Japanese civilians indicated that bombing was very demoralizing and did directly result in loss of productivity (pp. 321, 328-330).
Initially, the bombing by the recommended by the AWPD-1 constituted more of a target list- the first line was disruption of Germany’s electrical power and transportation systems, destruction of petroleum resources, and undermining their morale by air attack against civilian concentrations. The second line of air action required neutralization of German air forces by attacks against their bases, aircraft factories, and aluminum and magnesium factories. The third line of action included attacks on submarine bases, surface sea-craft, and invasion ports (pp. 272). However, once moved to Japan, the bombing was actually part of the strategy to end the war.
The European survey stated that strategic bombing had a debilitating affect on Germany’s morale and its will to resist, but not enough to force capitulation upon its totalitarian regime (pp. 340). The Pacific version also argued that bombing greatly affected morale, but they also believed that the Japanese would have continued fighting and working to support the war effort had the Emperor so desired.
The Pacific Survey’s reports contain even more diversity and disparity than the European reports. The chairman’s Summary Report (Pacific War), acknowledged that the war against Japan’s shipping was important in destroying the economy, but the decisive factor in persuading Japanese leaders to surrender was the conventional strategic bombing of the home islands. In the Transportation Division’s report, attacks on Japan’s merchant shipping, conducted predominantly by subs and carrier-based aircraft were cited as the critical factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy. This was in contrast with the Chairman’s Summary Report, again listing conventional air power as the decisive force (pp. 337).
Perhaps the most controversial conclusion was "Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the was, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated…The survey’s implicit argument is that in the final stages of the war conventional (non-atomic) strategic air power was the decisive factor that forced Japan to surrender ‘unconditionally’". However, the narrative itself suggests that the atom bomb and Soviet war declaration might have been more critical in forcing Japan to surrender.
Pp. 344 – "Thought the central arguments may well continue, it is clear that the US Strategic Bombing Survey should not be represented as an unimpeachable authority, as has frequently been done, but as a collection of interpretations, subject to close reading…The challenge to scholars is to use them critically, not slavishly, in their attempts to better understand a crucial period of the past."