Airpower exploits the third dimension (that is, the vertical direction of the sky) in a way that avoids entanglement with ground forces and the terrain itself. It offers unparalleled speed and freedom of action (flexibility).

The offensive is the stronger form of combat in air war (this is a truly radical concept when compared to theories based on ground combat). Effective defense against the airplane is virtually impossible. In a related sense, the concept of exploiting the initiative is central in air warfare. In other words, a good offense is the best (only) defense.

• The inability of an enemy to determine the time and place of an attack gives a great advantage to the offense
• Defense requires a large force in order to provide local protection over a wide area (presumably the area to be defended
• Offense requires a force large enough to deliver the weapons and overwhelm local defense, but comparatively smaller than the defending force—speed and freedom to maneuver in the air gives the offense the advantage to mass forces at the point of attack
• Aircraft tasked for defense would be better applied to offense
• All aircraft available should be committed to the offense; an air reserve is merely a subtraction of potential combat power. Superior speed and range allow aircraft to act as their own reserve compared to ground forces
• Readiness is Key. The fight for command of the air suggests a well-prepared force poised to deliver a knockout blow before it receives one. The argument for a first-strike (preventative war) is a natural.

Because no effective defense exists (air-to-air or surface-to-air) against an air offensive, the only way to protect one’s homeland (and one’s own air force) it is to attack the ground based portion of an enemy air force. Destroying the enemy air force on the ground leaves the skies uncontested and gains command of the air. It is the great enabler. Command of the air has three related elements

• The homeland and armed forces are relieved of enemy air-to-ground attack
• The air force is freed from interference from enemy air defense and air attack
• The air forces can concentrate on attacking key targets aimed at winning the war

Airpower can attack directly "vital centers" of the state as can cause an internal breakdown of key elements of society, government, military, and industrial structure. Sufficient damage to (destruction of) a nation’s vital centers would result in a loss popular support to continue the war.

• There are five basic "vital centers" of a modern country: industry, transportation, communications, government, and the will of the people. Airpower can affect each vital directly and, with proper targeting, decisively
• The will of people is most important and is ultimately the deciding factor—a war isn’t lost until the people accept the verdict. High tempo, relentless attacks tend to produce the right overall effect. Terror bombing is the natural progression of the argument
• The notion of "combatant" requires redefinition in total war
• There is a good chance that a nation may surrender rather than subject itself to an air offensive exploiting command of the air (war might become so inhumane, it becomes more civilized). If not, air attacks on the ground forces may be required to open the enemy homeland up to occupation

Airpower should conduct intensive offensive counterair operations to gain command of the air, then intensive strategic attacks on to attack enemy vital centers to decide the war. Because airpower can be decisive in strategic attack, support of other services detracts from the nation’s main effort. Aviation resources put to other uses (such as air superiority and CAS) were "useless, superfluous, and harmful.

The independent, strategic nature of airpower suggests it be organized and funded separately from army and navy services. Ground and sea commanders are not trained to employ aircraft effectively, their perspective tends to put aircraft in support of land/sea forces, and funding for air forces should be considered separately from army and navy force structures. An Independent Air Force (IAF) is the best arrangement for nation’s armed forces.

Bombers Rule! Though initially Douhet acknowledges the role of attack and auxiliary aircraft, he arrives at the conclusion that three (eventually two) types of aircraft are required:

• The mainstay of the air force should be formations of bombers with long range, heavy bomb loads, and moderate speed
• To help protect the bombers from enemy interceptors, escorts with similar performance characteristics but carrying more robust defensive armament (machine guns) fly with the bomber formation
• The functionality of the bomber and escort aircraft can be combined into one design (the battle plane). The chances of significant air battles are small, so the defensive component of the bomber/escort package is far second to the offensive elements
• Long range, high-speed reconnaissance aircraft round out the force structure

"Vital centers" and terror bombing suggest urban area targets.

• Pinpoint accuracy is not required—effective dispersion is more relevant for desired Pk
• Mass effects are best, several targets attacked simultaneously develop complementary effects and foster the desired paralysis, panic, and loss of will of the population
• A mix of ordnance produces synergistic effects: the "Douhetian" triple-spank
• High explosive bombs to produce rubble
• Incendiary bombs to ignite combustible elements of undamaged buildings and rubble
• Chem/Bio bombs to prevent damage control

The government should subsidize and nurture civil aviation as a means of enhancing military aviation.

• Shared infrastructure—airports, NAVAIDS, weather, etc.
• Shared design/performance improvements
• Distributed expense between government and industry—jump-start innovation
• Shared aircraft in time of war

Mitchell’s view on airpower was similar to Douhet’s in key ways

• Airpower had the unique potential to conduct strategic attack to attack an enemy’s "vital centers" (he used the same term as Douhet) to paralyze the population and government and degrade a nation’s war making potential. It was unconstrained by a stalemate on the ground
• Gain air superiority should be the first task accomplished, as an enabler to air to ground operations
• He emphasized strategic attack as the focus for operations. His viewpoint shifted from support of a balanced airforce (one with a force structure to conduct strategic attack as well as defensive counterair and of support ground and sea forces) to one weighted toward strategic attack
• The unique nature of airpower demanded an independent air force lead by airman. An independent air force was the best and cheapest way to provide national defense
• Their perception of the proper force structure composition of pursuit, attack, auxiliary, and bombardment evolved toward emphasis on bombers
• Douhet initially acknowledged the requirement for attack/auxiliary aviation and the need for pursuit aircraft to escort bombers. He later took a more radical position that bomber aircraft capable of self defense should form the overwhelming proportion of air force’s force structure
• Mitchell initially proposed an balanced force (60% pursuit, 20% attack, and 20% bomber) but grew to believe that the proper force structure should be built around a strong bomber force
• It was not possible to defend effectively against an determined bomber attack
• Appreciation of aviation is important to cultivate in public mind
• Tight relationship between government and civil aviation is essential

• Mitchell was conflicted regarding operations aimed at breaking the enemy’s will to fight
• He advocated direct attacks on population centers using fire bombing and poison gas to cause panic and evacuations from urban areas (not unlike Douhet, but . . .)
• He wavered over the ethical implications of the above operations and suggested warnings posted before attacks and attacks be designed to sever workers from factories rather than attacking civilians directly
• He believed enemy airpower could be drawn into air combat through attack on its vital centers and defeated in air combat-- a valid way of gaining command of the air apart from Douhet’s emphasis on OCA
• Pursuit aircraft must escort bombers to protect them from enemy fighters

• Over estimated the psychological effects of terror bombing—underestimated the resilience of nations at war
• Did not account for the influence of totalitarian regimes: Germany and Japan
• The Brits held up OK—not mentioned in the readings
• Over estimated the physical effects of bombing
• Optimistic and simplistic mathematical model of bombing/destructive potential
• Little attention to challenges in weapons delivery and crew training
• Little development of associated target sets
• Discounted the DCA fight required to gain air superiority, near exclusive discussion on OCA
• Didn’t foresee the technological improvements to fighters
• Didn’t foresee the potential effectiveness of AAA (or missiles)
• Battle of Britain proved the weaker air force does not have to prosecute an ever more violent OCA fight. Defense against an air offensive is possible (one data point for this)
• Douhet envisioned airpower as able to force the enemy to submit (annihilation) rather than wear down them a long, drawn out conflict (exhaustion). So far, major air wars have produced the latter
• Focused attention of total war—little application to limited conflicts
• What about nuclear war? Discounted in the readings as irrelevant
• Estimated that the quick decision (knock out blow) would render land army action irrelevant—the war would over before decision would reached on the ground
• Underestimated the effect of attrition on sustained operations; he saw a quick decision and didn’t see the effect of high casualties as problematic
• 1%/day 100: 99, 98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 91, 90 Note: these figures are not in the readings
• 5%/day 100: 95, 90, 86, 81, 77, 74, 70, 66, 63, 60
• 10%/day 100: 90, 81, 72, 66, 60, 53, 47, 43, 38, 35
• 20%/day 100: 80, 64, 51, 40, 32, 26, 20, 16, 13, 10
• WWII as a test—where he missed
• Land war didn’t stagnate
• Prolonged air battle to gain air supremacy
• Civilian morale held despite bombing
• No chemical warfare/bombing
• Tactical and auxiliary air proved valuable
• Some argue that Douhet’s theory wasn’y fully tested—too great a weight was given to the ground fight

• Support for expanding the role of dirigibles was optimistic and proved misplaced
• Vacillated on support for aircraft carriers and ultimately was proved wrong
• Foresaw the nature of carrier based naval combat in WWII—but. . .
• Reconsidered his position and opposed carrier-based aviation because he thought carriers were not able to be defended
• Made the same mistakes as Douhet regarding the effect of bombing on civilian populations
• Did not develop concepts in strategic bombing beyond assertions
• Broad interpretation based very little empirical data

• Maj.Gen Frank M. Andrews
• Proposed that could best defend its frontiers by attacking the enemy "as far from our shores as we can reach him."
• Established the context for the strategic bombers in a defensive role—fitting contemporary US strategic thought. Provided a rationale for developing strategic bombing doctrine and force structure
• Capt Chennault
• Champion for fighter development and efficacy of air defense. Key innovator in interceptor tactics
• Identified the need for a solid C2 network as a part of an effective air defense network laid the groundwork for pursuit combat tactics during the early 1930s
• Argued the role and relevancy of the fighter vs the strategic bomber perspective at the Tactical School
• Maj Gen Ira Eaker
• Applied observations made from RAF early war experience
• Argued fighters could reduce bomber effectiveness
• Favored a modified area-bombing theory rather than strict precision bombing
• Promoted a compromise between RAF and AAC bombing tatcics
• Maj Gen Haywood S Hansell,Jr.
• Participated was closely associated with the theoretical development of the evolving doctrine of bombardment calling for precision attacks upon vital and venerable points in the enemy's national structure
• Alexander de Seversky
• Major voice in advocating strategic bombing theory
• Criticized the quality and performance of initial AAC aircraft as deficient to the task at hand.
• -LtCol Carl Spaatz
• Advocated the role of attack aviation. Regarded attack aviation as more useful than heavy bombardment for close support of an infantry breakthrough or in opposition to a strong enemy ground assault.
• John Slessor (RAF)
• Reinforced Tactical School conclusion regarding the primacy of strategic bombing. He believed an independent air force should be composed as a an offensive striking force directed against the enemy national structure or armed forces according to circumstances
• Identified the importance of target development and sustained bombing
• Lt Col Donald Wilson
• Promoted the role of pursuit aviation as a bomber interceptor (defensive role). Estimated that harassment was a more practical goal than preventing attacks unless a large fighter force structure was available
• Advocated the utility of escort fighters to protect bombers when required require enemy bombers to carry heavy armament in place of a maximum bomb load, to fly in defensive formation and to suffer loss of bombing accuracy
• Maj.Gen Oscar Westover
• Applied bomber capabilities to defending US interests overseas. He made the case that the Army required bombers "ensure the Army's responsibility in defending the United States" and which would permit the reinforcement of Hawaii, Panama and Alaska

• Development of strategic bombing doctrine at ACTS
• The contemporary concept of total war
• Neutralization of an enemy’s economic/industrial means of waging war is key
• Breaking popular support for war is viable—generally regarded as a potential side-effect of attacks on economic targets
• Airpower (strategic bombing) can be decisive in achieving the above through:
• Precision attacks on industrial/infrastructure targets (highly developed target sets)
• Precision attacks requires daylight/good weather conditions (optical aiming)
• High altitude for range and protection (interceptors/AAA)
• Unescorted bombers are survivable (detection, speed, defensive firepower)
• Escort aircraft would enhance mission effectiveness, but are too hard to design/develop and not absolutely necessary
• Land and sea forces of the enemy are only indirectly relevant to a strategic bombing campaign
• Enemy air forces may have to be defeated as an intermediate goal
• Strategic bombing suggested an independent air force
• Bombers are the main arm of aviation; pursuit is secondary (for local defense and short range escort); attack is a poor third
• Implications on technology development
• Bomber development (range, speed, payload) received top priority. US had the best bombers throughout the war
• Extra firepower had to added early in the war, due to reliance on speed and altitude
• Super-bomber development proceeded at the expense of other aviation programs
• Fighter development lagged behind bombers
• Advice of fighter tactical expertise was not leveraged (two-seat killer favored over more maneuverable/faster single seat models
• Reinforced the concept of "bomber invincibility" (bombers outperformed fighters at altitude until the mid 30s
• US fighters were initially outclassed by everyone. Wartime innovation turned the corner
• No long range escort ready for initial US deep bombing raids, though the drop tank solution was achievable much earlier
• Attack aviation was neglected

• Reconnaissance and observation (including artillery spotting) were primary uses
• Pursuit aviation evolved as a primary use
• Deny enemy recce/observation
• Air control
• Bombing and evolved last and were secondary uses

• Initial data points for development of airpower theory
• Aircraft performance
• Popular reaction to bombing
• Organization (independent vs integrated)

1. How did Douhet and Mitchell envision airplanes could be used in warfare?

• Gain air superiority to protect homeland through destruction of enemy air forces on the ground
• Strategic attack vs enemy vital centers
• Independent air force lead by airman
• Their perception of the proper use of pursuit, attack, auxiliary, and bombardment evolved toward emphasis on bombers
• Douhet initially acknowledged the requirement for attack/auxiliary aviation and the need for pursuit aircraft to escort bombers. He later took a more radical position that bomber aircraft capable of self defense should form the overwhelming proportion of air force’s force structure
• Mitchell initially proposed an balanced uses of pursuit, attack, and bomber aviation but grew to believe that the best use of airpower was strategic bombing

1. How did BG Billy Mitchell influence the development of US airpower doctrine?

• Demonstrated effectiveness of well planned integration of air support to ground operations in WWI
• Advocated strategic bombing as the best defense for US—strong public voice for organizational and force structure change
• Demonstrated effectiveness of airpower vs naval capital ships
• Argued (agitated) for independent air force run by airmen—fought navy control of land based air assets
• Passed his vision to the next generation of airpower advocates
• Public voice for "airmindedness" and close relationship between civil and military aviation

• See DLO 2 above

1. How did the airmen at ATCS contribute to the development of US airpower in the inter-war years?

• Argued the direction the Air Corps should take regarding doctrine
• Strategic bombing—it was a laboratory the applied methodology (science) to the problem of "operationalizing" strategic bombing theory. It drove the discussion that saw strategic bombing become the centerpiece of US airpower—unescorted daylight precision strategic bombing
• Pursuit aviation—argued for the role of fighters for defense (Chenault’s network) and for bomber escort. Provided a counter-argument to the "bomber invincibility" perspective of the strategic bombardment advocates
• Shaped the direction of AAC technology investment
• Bombers thrived
• Pursuit and attack aviation lagged and only through wartime innovation caught up (no long range escort)

1. In what ways did the air doctrine of the Air Corps in 1941 differ from the views of Mitchel and Douhet?

• Air Corps doctrine favored precision bombing as more efficient and more humane
• No fire bombing
• No Chemical bombing
• Breaking the will of the enemy population was a side-effect of attacks on industrial targets
• Greater role for pursuit aviation
• Local defense to harass enemy bomber attacks
• Short range escort
• Acknowledged requirement for close support of ground forces
• Land based countersea role

1. What were differing doctrinal views between ground and air officers in the Army in the thirties and how did FM 1-5 address those issues in 1940?

• ATCS argued for primacy of strategic bombing—a different scenario than the conventional approach to war
• Ground officers emphasized recce, attack, and pursuit (for local defense); many considered (and still do) that strategic bombing wouldn’t work
• FM 1-5 was a compromise
• Took a moderate course regarding airpower employment
• Defensive orientation vs radical offensive action
• Small direct reference to strategic bombing as envisaged by ACTS
• Oriented toward operations against enemy armed forces (in order): air, ground, sea, joint forces, and material
• Organization: did not emphasize centralized command of air force units. A central GHQ would act as repository for airpower and parse it out to supported ground units as required. Air units attached to ground units responded to local calls for support—North Africa here we come!

• Revolutionary turn in warfighting—no repeat of WWI
• Intellectual justification for an independent air force

1. How did strategic bombing doctrine, developed at the ACTS, affect aircraft requirements in the late 1930’s?

• Bomber development was made top priority in an time of scarce resources
• Range, speed, and payload were emphasized
• Firepower/defensive provisions were not a priority because detection and interception were not considered practical
• Long range escort aircraft were assumed beyond the technology of the time and not emphasized
• Pursuit aircraft were designed for local defense and short range escort

1. How did the growing devotion to strategic bombardment doctrine by many USAAC leaders of the late 1930’s affect the development of others areas of airpower doctrine?

• Bomber development was made top priority in an time of scarce resources. Doctrinal emphasis on strategic bombardment was required to justify emphasis on 4-engine bombers and subsequent super-bombers
• Fighter development lagged behind bombers
• Lower doctrinal emphasis meant lower investment in technology
• Lagging performance in fighters provided evidence in favor of "bomber invincibility"