Air War College, Edition 12

Lesson 1. Strategy, Doctrine and Airpower: A Conceptual Framework

Lesson Objective: Comprehend the basic concepts of strategy, doctrine and aerospace power.

Definitions:

Strategy-a concept that ties resources (time, people, equipment, etc.) to an objective through the use of a plan. Development of strategy as art vs science. (Book 1, Lesson 1, p1,2). Strategy relates ends to means; it identifies steps to achieve a specified objective…and can be viewed as a scientific enterprise. Efforts to make it so have resulted in our current laws of war. Book 1, Lesson 1, p6 (Stephen Walt). National strategy involves all the elements of national power: political, economic, psychological and military. (See page 10, Figure 1.5, National Strategy, The Horizontal Plane)

Doctrine-fundamental principles and beliefs on how to fight wars. It is the basis for organizing, training, equipping and employing forces. Book 1, Lesson 1, p1. It is what we believe about the best way to conduct military operations. Book 1, Lesson 1, p2

Aerospace power-Includes the following attributes: perspective; speed/tempo; range; the combination of mass/energy and maneuver; and versatility.

Genius in warfare-the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole. Book 1, Lesson 1, p6 (Clausewitz)

Desired Learning Outcomes:

  1. Explain why strategy formulation is difficult.
    1. Many factors must be considered amid many uncertainties (What is the object? What are the means to achieve it? Are they available? What are the costs? The benefits? What are the hazards? What are the limitations? What are the alternatives? How will the public react? Are the proposed actions morally justifiable? What are the lessons of experience? How does the present differ from the past? –Crowl’s Questions).
    2. Resources are limited, priorities must be established leaving some unacceptable situations unresolved…
    3. Many proponents are biased…concerned about their own jobs/careers/organizations and maintaining the status quo…
    4. Often "laws of war" were not scientifically tested. Confusion was common…with Mahan, Jomini, Douhet and others ignoring the evidence that did not correspond to their favorite theories (laws) of war. Book 1, Lesson 1, p7. Note that Clausewitz and Delbruck were skeptical of simplistic "scientific" formulas, ironically many of their enduring ideas were obtained utilizing the scientific method. Much of Clausewitz’s strategic thought is applicable today. Book 1, Lesson 1, p7.
    5. Barriers to improvements in strategy include: 1) secrecy—states conceal a great deal of their strategy making it difficult to assess; 2) bias and distortion common—due to the positions already taken of those politically involved in and out of the military—they don’t want to undermine their own position; 3) those most biased are often in control; 4) military community can promote self serving ideas. Ex: inter-service rivalry, opposition to innovation, hostility to critical evaluation
    6. What are the major factors that impact the development of strategy?
      1. The ends (objectives) and means (resources) and the way resources are applied define the playing field.
        1. ends are survival as a free and independent nation, a healthy and growing economy, good relations with allied and friendly nations, and a stable and secure world.
        2. means include political negotiation, military power, economic power, technological superiority, psychological influence…and how these are underwritten by the American people through congress
      2. Military doctrine—what we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs (also dependent on scientific method and frought with bias)..
      3. The scientific method (can be lacking sometimes fatally)--Effective strategic guidance requires an accurate assessment (what works best in a given situation) of how well the means applied achieved the desired ends in a given scenario. This is necessary from small-unit tactics to battlefield operations to economic sanctions to psychological warfare to international politics. Book 1, Lesson 1, p10
      4. Bias--Process often flawed to due unbiased and unscientific processes by the nations/practitioners involved—human element all too apparent. Parochial interests (by military, civilians, politicians, etc). Politics. Unfamiliarity of some civilian strategists with weapons effects, etc. Book 1, Lesson 1, p10&11
    7. How have these factors influenced the development of US national strategy?
      1. The National Security Act of 1947 required the President to submit an annual national strategy to Congress, which has contributed to an evolving strategic thought process that specifically addresses ends, ways and means, and attempts to be consistent with military doctrine (which is becoming more and more reliable as the scientific method is applied)—Nevertheless, there is still political and other bias in the system.
      2. The US has learned since 1945 that it is extremely difficult at the national strategic level to establish clear cause and effect ties between means application and ends advancement, especially when national strategic ends are not agreed upon. During the Cold War there was general national consensus concerning the objectives of containing the Soviet Union. There was also increased awareness that "the external environment under containment was intended to enhance the state’s security and thereby, the national quality of life, whether political, economic, or psychological." However, this changed during and after Vietnam. A public skepticism concerning what constituted vital interests led to a deeper involvement by Congress in micromanaging (especially the defense budget) and was fueled by the anti-defense mood of the country.
    8. How have changes in the world order since 1991 affected the evolution of US national military strategy? Short answer: In spite of the changes, American strategy remains very much the same as it was, relying on power projection, decisive force, overseas presence, and strategic agility. The US strategy during the cold war, before 1991 and since are outlined below (Book 1, Lesson 1, p 18-31):
      1. Before 1991, containment was the bedrock strategic concept (during cold war). It was defensive in nature. It led to web alliances, forward deployment of forces; long distance reinforcement capability; air and naval superiority; interoperability with allied forces; extended nuclear deterrence; qualitative superiority; security assistance; counterinsurgency support to friendly regimes; limited use of active components of military forces in non-warfighting missions. Book 1, Lesson 1, p18
      2. After demise of soviet union, change in our strategy was slow, but went from a response to a direct threat (fear of outright conquest of ourselves or allies) to indirect threats ("violence, particularly intra-state conflict, could lead to collapse of friends and thwart efforts at reform" Book 1, Lesson 1, p19). General Powell developed a "base force" concept—to deter aggression, provide overseas presence, respond to regional crises, and be ready to build a global warfighting capability if necessary. It included the nuclear triad, 18 Army divisions, 12 carrier battle groups, 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces, and 26 Air Force fighter wing equivalents.
      3. During the Bush administration the US acted in partnership with the UN: 1) in conventional warfare (Iraq)—successfully; 2) to support failed states in humanitarian efforts (Somalia)—unsuccessfully. The US military determined to avoid involvement in the latter.
      4. Bottom up review (BUR) of military was initiated at beginning of Clinton administration and led to the 1994 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 which outlined his new policy of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The BUR also led to the independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) released in 1995 which suggested the need for a major quadrennial status review, and that the chairman of the joint chiefs develop a vision for future joint operations.
      5. In 1995 Clinton distinguished between vital (those for which the US would be willing to use force unilaterally), important (those for which the US would use force in conjunction with partners), and humanitarian interests (those for which the large scale use of force was not appropriate).
      6. In 1996, SoD Perry began to describe US military strategy as "prevent, deter, defeat." Prevention to include: 1)working with successor states to the Soviet Union to reduce the nuclear threat, 2) limiting proliferation of WMD, 3) encouraging newly independent states to restructure their defenses, 4) establishing military-to-military ties with non-traditional American allies
      7. In early to mid-1990s several services developed future visions of possible conflict and their roles. Environment ripe for joint vision.
      8. In 1996 time frame, Joint Vision 2010 by Gen John Shalikashvili provided the joint concept of "full spectrum dominance" to include Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics.
      9. 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (1st one directed by CORM, QDR done once every 4 years) became a budget driven process that simply codified the existing strategy…It maintained that the US should be able to fight two major (nearly) simultaneous regional conflicts. However, it did define the concept of asymmetric attacks and responses. Speed of military action became more and more a factor in post cold war strategy.
      10. 1997 National Military Strategy published by Gen Shalikashvili reflected the times and was based on concepts of strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection, decisive force.
      11. In 1997 congress also commissioned an independent national defense panel (NDP) to provide another perspective to the QDR. The NDP said that supporting two major conflicts should be rethought. It emphasized that the military needed to work more on jointness, and modernize…The NDP was much more forward leaning that the QDR.
      12. Late 1990s, the NSS integrated the "shape, respond, prepare now" and other strategic thinking that included consequence management due to a terrorist attack; critical infrastructure protection; counter-narco-trafficking; military-to-military engagement; information warfare; environmental security; concept of asymmetry emphasized—terrorism, wmd, information warfare, sabotage, C4I disruption, deter allies, deter American resolve by inflicting casualties; enemies using precision weapons with WMD; political asymmetry; etc…leading to effects based warfare.
    9. How well does "Crowl’s Questions" perform as a framework for analyzing why decision makers select a particular strategy form various options?
      1. Crowl’s questions are a good analytical tool because they address the most fundamental ideas that should be well understood before one makes strategic plans to obtain objectives. They don’t provide a simple formula, or simple answers...They are open ended allowing great flexibility in response. They don’t rely on any particular historical scenario. Possible drawback: Individuals from different perspectives may answer the same question differently. So, discussions would be needed between these individuals to decide on the best answers. The questions help shape strategy by allowing the right questions to be asked. As he states the "scientific laws of war cannot be precisely deduced from history for the obvious reason that history never exactly repeats itself." He feels that the strategic problem is essentially an intellectual problem. The questions help to define the problem which will help to shape or select the strategy.
      2. Crowl’s Questions in a nut shell: What is the object? What are the means to achieve it? Are they available? What are the costs? The benefits? What are the hazards? What are the limitations? What are the alternatives? How will the public react? Are the proposed actions morally justifiable? What are the lessons of experience? How does the present differ from the past? Book 1, Lesson 1, p 35-41
  2. Explain the role of doctrine in military strategy.
    1. What is doctrine? How is doctrine "tiered"? (Drew and Don Snow)
      1. Military doctrine is what we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs. What we believe about the best way to do things.
      2. Three types of doctrine: fundamental, environmental and organizational.

      Fundamental: forms the foundation of all other types of doctrine. Broad in scope, abstract concepts, seldom changes, relatively insensitive to political philosophy or technological change. Defines the nature of war, the purpose of military forces, the relationship of military force to other instruments of power.

      Environmental: a compilation of beliefs about the employment of military forces within a particular operating medium. Narrower in scope, deals with exercise of military power in a particular medium. Influenced by geography and technology.

      Organizational: basic beliefs about the operation of a particular military organization or group of closely linked military organizations. Roles and missions of an organization, current objectives, force employment principles as affected by current political realities and cultural values. Very narrow in scope, the use of a particular force in a particular environment at a particular time.

      (Book 1, Lesson 1, p 43-45)

    2. What are some applications of doctrine using Drew and Snow’s definitions?
      1. Fundamental—i.e. 1) Application of military force to obtain political objectives 2) Clearly defining an objective before executing military operations (using any Basic Principles of War (Objective, Maneuver, Surprise, …)--doctrinal beliefs that have become axiomatic providing general guidance for all military operations. 3) Effective strategic bombing doctrine of WWII was ineffective in Vietnam…
      2. Environmental—i.e. Using ground Army forces to occupy/control a landlocked enemy territory and people (as opposed to using the Navy or Air Force).
      3. Organizational—Application assumes character of standard operating procedures and operating instructions (Book 1, Lesson 1, p 45).
    3. How are strategy and doctrine related?
      1. Doctrine provides the fundamental knowledge and principles upon which strategy is based. (Book 1, Lesson 1, p 45-46)
      2. The lessons learned from the application of the strategy are used to update the relevant doctrine.
  3. Summarize the advantages of the use of aerospace power in today’s world.
    1. What is aerospace power? Aerospace power refers to controlling the third dimension (the space and atmosphere above the surface of the earth). It includes information dominance, global mobility and engagement, rapid combat support, aerospace superiority, precise application of force.
    2. What characteristics make aerospace power unique? The characteristics are:

      3. Perspective: the vantage of the third dimension. The view which leads to global awareness, global presence, global reach and global power.

      Speed/Tempo: the speed with which airpower may be brought to bear, acting or reacting quickly, responsiveness. Tempo is the ability to modulate the speed of activity in and coming from the third dimension that is essential to strategic effect.

      Range: Global reach, distance. Getting precisely there, in time.

      The combination of mass (energy) and maneuver: Mass forces at a decisive point, concentration of forces. Maneuverability is the ability to change axis/avenue of attack. They may be employed simultaneously.

      Versatility: being able to perform a variety of tasks, being capable of many uses. Multi-task, multi-functional. Capable of performing a strategic as well as tactical mission. Book 1, Lesson 1, p 54-57

    3. What is the utility of aerospace power to the United States as a means of implementing national strategy? "Utilizing these attributes (perspective, speed, range, etc) effectively allows the USAF to achieve air superiority, space superiority, precision employment, global mobility, and information dominance." This power helps the US to obtain its strategic objectives of survival as a free and independent nation, a healthy and growing economy, good relations with allied and friendly nations, and a stable and secure world—even if other means ( to include political negotiation, economic power, technological superiority, psychological influence) are insufficient by themselves to obtain our national objectives.
    4. What are some concerns when doctrine equals strategic use of aerospace power? This would make our strategic response one dimensional…This is akin to using a hammer to solve every problem or a putting iron to play 18 holes of golf. For instance, controlling people on the land is usually best done using an Army. Imagine trying to control the behavior of civilians/military in a jungle or mountainous environment from above the tree or mountain tops. Depending on the desired outcome, this could be a very ineffective and destructive application of power. Such a course would lead to defeat and compromise of our strategic objectives.
    5. How can aerospace power be decisive in the types of wars and military conflicts that characterize today’s world? It should be used judiciously. Many problems can most easily be solved using political, economic, technological, or psychological instruments of power. Other challenges can be most easily put to rest using the military tools available in the Army, Navy or Marines. Let those instruments handle such situations. However, if a military solution is required that does not lend itself to efficient resolution by other instruments (cost benefit analysis) and especially if the situation demands perspective, speed, great range, mass, and versatility the Air Force should be used—in concert with the other instruments of national power. (Book 1, Lesson 1, p 64)